ZeroHour

CVE-2026-10848

PoC niche

Out-of-bounds read/write in Zephyr RTOS experimental OCPP 1.6 client enables remote DoS

CVSS 3.1
8.6 high
EPSS
<1%p17
Published
()
Modified
AI analysis

Zephyr RTOS's experimental OCPP 1.6 client contains an out-of-bounds read and a potential one-byte out-of-bounds write in its inbound RPC message parser, caused by a hand-rolled strncpy-based extractor that can leave the 128-byte stack buffer unterminated so a subsequent strchr scans past it. A malicious or compromised OCPP central-system server, or any on-path attacker when OCPP is deployed over unencrypted ws://, can trigger the flaw by sending an RPC frame whose uid or action field is 127+ bytes with no closing quote, or by filling the receive buffer with a maximal-length frame. The primary impact is a remotely triggerable denial of service, since the unbounded scan can fault on an unmapped page and the stray NUL write can corrupt adjacent stack state; confidentiality impact is limited because the over-read bytes are not reflected to the peer. Only Zephyr builds that explicitly enable the experimental OCPP subsystem (CONFIG_OCPP), typically OCPP 1.6 charge-point or charging-infrastructure prototypes, are affected. No exploitation has been reported in the wild: the EPSS probability is low (0.3%), the flaw is not in CISA KEV, and a public reference exists in the Zephyr security advisory GHSA-jgqq-7mjj-w642.

What to do: Check Zephyr security advisory GHSA-jgqq-7mjj-w642 for the affected and fixed version ranges and upgrade to a Zephyr release containing the rewritten parser, which uses bounds-respecting json_mixed_arr_parse() and an explicitly NUL-terminated uid copy. If OCPP is not required, disable CONFIG_OCPP; if it is, use wss:// (TLS) with trusted central systems to remove the on-path attack vector. Audit whether any deployed charge-point or charging-infrastructure builds enable the experimental OCPP client and are reachable from untrusted networks.

Affected
Zephyr Project Zephyr RTOSBuilds with the experimental OCPP 1.6 client enabled (CONFIG_OCPP); exact affected and fixed version ranges are not stated in the provided data and should be co
Estimated exposure
nichelikely well under 10,000 devices, plausibly in the hundreds (opt-in experimental subsystem) — Zephyr ships in a large embedded installed base, but the OCPP 1.6 client is experimental, must be explicitly enabled via CONFIG_OCPP, and OCPP 1.6 charge-point deployments on Zephyr are uncommon, so only a small fraction of devices…

Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.

Description

The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp parsed inbound WAMP RPC frames in parse_rpc_msg() (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c) using a hand-rolled helper, extract_string_field(), that copied the message's uid and action fields with strncpy(out_buf, token + 1, outlen - 1) and then scanned the result with strchr(out_buf, '"'). Because strncpy does not NUL-terminate the destination when the source is at least outlen - 1 (127) bytes long, the subsequent strchr reads past the 128-byte destination buffer into adjacent stack memory; if a " byte is found beyond the buffer, a one-byte out-of-bounds NUL write also occurs. A related defect in extract_payload() runs strchr/strrchr over the receive buffer, which may not be NUL-terminated when a maximal-length frame fills it. The parsed bytes come directly from the OCPP central-system server over a websocket: the reader thread fills recv_buf via websocket_recv_msg() and calls parse_rpc_msg() on each inbound DATA frame (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c). A malicious or compromised central server, or an on-path attacker (OCPP is commonly deployed over plain ws://), can send an RPC frame whose uid or action field is 127+ bytes with no closing quote, triggering the out-of-bounds access. The primary impact is a remotely triggerable denial of service: the unbounded scan can fault on an unmapped page, and the stray NUL write can corrupt adjacent stack state. The over-read data is not reflected to the peer, so disclosure is limited. The feature is EXPERIMENTAL and must be explicitly enabled (CONFIG_OCPP). The fix replaces the manual parser with the bounds-respecting json_mixed_arr_parse() and copies the extracted uid with an explicitly NUL-terminated buffer, eliminating both over-reads.

Vendors
zephyrproject
Products
zephyr
Weakness
CWE-125, CWE-787
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H

In the news

No ingested article mentions this CVE yet.