CVE-2026-61599
nicheUnauthenticated Arbitrary Module Import in djust WebSocket/SSE View Mounts
The djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted module path via Python's __import__(), and the LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES allowlist that should restrict this is fail-open by default and loosely matched, so an unauthenticated WebSocket or SSE client can make the server import and execute the top-level code of any importable Python module. Because import runs before the LiveView subclass check and before any per-view authentication, an attacker only needs to send a mount, live_redirect_mount, or url_change frame (or an SSE mount) naming an arbitrary module. The attacker gains import-time code execution — effectively RCE-by-proxy on hosts that have a side-effectful importable module — plus denial of service via import bombs and a module/class enumeration oracle through distinct error strings. Any djust deployment exposing the WebSocket/SSE live transport is affected, including default configurations with the allowlist unset. No public proof-of-concept is known, the issue is not in CISA KEV, and no in-the-wild exploitation has been reported.
What to do: Upgrade to the patched djust release that adds the fail-closed resolution gate (is_view_import_allowed), which is applied before __import__ at all three sinks. As an interim mitigation, set LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES to the narrow list of modules containing your mountable LiveView classes, noting this is mitigation only on pre-patch versions because the import still precedes the subclass check. Restrict network access to the WebSocket/SSE endpoints and review logs for mount frames referencing unexpected module paths, which would indicate enumeration or import abuse.
| djust (PyPI project) djust | — |
Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = " .AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import__` at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside `_instantiate_view`). As a workaround, set `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is `startswith`-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)
- Ecosystems
- pip
- Weakness
- CWE-470
- Vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- GHSA
- GHSA-7prp-2623-8g45 (high)
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