ZeroHour

CVE-2026-63325

niche

Prototype-pollution RCE in Redocly CLI and respect-core via crafted $faker expressions

CVSS 3.1
7.8 high
EPSS
Published
()
Modified
AI analysis

Redocly CLI and @redocly/respect-core before version 2.33.0 dynamically evaluate $faker runtime expressions embedded in Arazzo descriptions when the 'respect' command runs, and a crafted expression can traverse constructor, prototype, or __proto__ chains in the context parser (packages/respect-core/src/modules/context-parser/get-value-from-context.ts) to reach the JavaScript Function constructor. An attacker who can supply or modify an Arazzo description that a victim processes — for example a third-party workflow file pulled into a repository or pipeline — gains arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the CLI process, including the ability to run shell commands and read CI secrets. Users who only process trusted, self-authored workflows are not affected. The flaw is code injection (CWE-94, CWE-95) reached via prototype pollution; there is no known public proof-of-concept, it is not in CISA KEV, and no in-the-wild exploitation has been reported.

What to do: Upgrade @redocly/cli and @redocly/respect-core to version 2.33.0 or later (check package.json/lockfiles and CI dependency pins). Until patched, do not run 'respect' against Arazzo descriptions from untrusted sources such as external repositories, pull requests, or downloaded files. Audit CI jobs that invoke these tools for accessible secrets, and rotate any CI secrets exposed to jobs that have processed untrusted descriptions.

Affected
Redocly @redocly/cliAll versions prior to 2.33.0
Redocly @redocly/respect-coreAll versions prior to 2.33.0
Estimated exposure
nicheunknown exact count; plausibly on the order of thousands to low tens of thousands of developer workstations and CI runners running the affected packages, with… — These are npm-distributed developer CLI tools executed on workstations and in CI pipelines rather than internet-facing services, and exploitation additionally requires feeding a third-party-authored Arazzo description to the 'respect'…

Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.

Description

Redocly CLI makes OpenAPI validation, linting, and documentation workflows easier. Prior to version 2.33.0 of @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli, the respect command dynamically evaluates $faker runtime expressions in Arazzo descriptions. A crafted expression can traverse constructor, prototype, or __proto__ properties in packages/respect-core/src/modules/context-parser/get-value-from-context.ts, reach the JavaScript Function constructor, and execute arbitrary code when a user processes an untrusted description. The executed code runs with the privileges of the CLI process and can execute shell commands or read CI secrets. Users processing only trusted, self-authored workflows are not affected. This issue is fixed in @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli version 2.33.0.

Weakness
CWE-94, CWE-95
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the news

No ingested article mentions this CVE yet.