CVE-2026-69259

Flowise, an open-source drag-and-drop UI for building LLM workflows, allowed an authenticated attacker to overwrite the SQLite database path in the SQLite Record Manager node prior to version 3.1.3. The node spread a user-controlled 'additionalConfig' object after the intended database setting, so additionalConfig.database could redirect where the SQLite file is written — for example to /etc/chromium/exploit.conf. Because the official Docker image runs as root, and because the attacker controls the table name and namespace value stored in the file, they can place shell syntax in the database file that executes when Puppeteer launches Chromium, which sources /etc/chromium/*.conf at startup. This yields remote code execution with root privileges inside the container, affecting any self-hosted Flowise deployment prior to 3.1.3 where an attacker has an account (or open registration) and can use the Record Manager node. Exploitation requires authentication (PR:L per CVSS 4.0, scored 9.4 critical), and while a public advisory/PoC exists, EPSS is low (0.4%, 29th percentile) and there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation or a CISA KEV listing.

What to do: Upgrade Flowise to version 3.1.3 or later immediately. If upgrade is delayed, restrict who can authenticate (disable open registration, use SSO/reverse-proxy auth), avoid exposing Flowise directly to the internet, and re-run the container as a non-root user with a read-only or restricted filesystem to blunt the file-write path. Audit existing deployments for unexpected files such as /etc/chromium/*.conf or anomalous SQLite files outside expected data directories, and review logs for unusual Record Manager node usage.