CVE-2026-71198

OpenStack Glance before 32.0.1 does not validate destination hosts when an image location is added, allowing server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) by an authenticated user. Unlike the web-download import path, the location API — both the new POST /v2/images/{id}/locations endpoint and the old PATCH API when show_multiple_locations is enabled — only checks the URL scheme and ignores the import_filtering_opts host restrictions. An attacker can register a location pointing at internal-only endpoints such as the cloud metadata service at 169.254.169.254, then exfiltrate the response (e.g., cloud instance credentials) by downloading the image data. Deployments with the HTTP store backend enabled are affected. The flaw is rated high severity (CVSS 4.0 score 7.0); it is not in CISA's KEV and no public PoC or known exploitation exists as of this writing.

What to do: Upgrade Glance to 32.0.1 or later, or apply your distribution's backported security fix. If the HTTP store backend is not required, disable it, and keep show_multiple_locations off (the default) to close the legacy PATCH path; also restrict the location API via policy so only trusted administrators can add image locations. Audit existing images for HTTP locations resolving to internal or link-local addresses (e.g., 169.254.169.254) and rotate any cloud or infrastructure credentials that could have been exposed through metadata-service responses.