CVE-2026-72789

SiYuan's publish-access gate uses an opt-out model: any notebook not explicitly listed in publishAccess.json is treated as publicly accessible, and encrypted notebooks are never written to that file because only the admin-gated setPublishAccess ever writes it. While an encrypted notebook is unlocked, an anonymous reader in publish mode can list the notebook, enumerate its documents, and retrieve their fully decrypted content over the network, with no password, key material, or cracking involved. An attacker gains read access to the plaintext of all documents in any unlocked encrypted notebook on a publish-mode instance; the impact is confidentiality only. Users of SiYuan's optional publish mode are affected; the flaw was verified on v3.7.4-alpha.1 and the development branch (commit eef105683), and no fixed version is identified in the available data. There is no known public proof-of-concept, KEV listing, or in-the-wild exploitation; EPSS estimates a 0.3% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

What to do: Until a patched release is published (no fixed version identified in the available data), disable publish mode or manually add every encrypted notebook to the publish ignore list via the admin-gated setPublishAccess, and verify publishAccess.json contains the encrypted notebook IDs. Avoid keeping encrypted notebooks unlocked while publish mode is enabled, and place publish-mode endpoints behind additional authentication (e.g., reverse-proxy auth) on internet-exposed instances.