CVE-2026-78422
nichePolkit authorization bypass via PID-reuse TOCTOU race in Rust zbus_polkit crate
CVE-2026-78422 is a flaw in the zbus_polkit Rust crate's Subject::new_for_owner() function, which encodes the caller-supplied UID with the wrong D-Bus type (unsigned integer instead of the signed integer required by the org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority interface), so polkit silently discards the supplied UID and instead re-derives the process owner itself by looking the PID up in /proc. That /proc lookup is inherently a time-of-check/time-of-use race, meaning the UID that applications pass in — typically taken from a trusted source such as SO_PEERCRED socket peer credentials precisely to defend against PID reuse — has no effect on the authorization decision. An unprivileged local attacker who can cause an already-authorized process to terminate and then win the race to have their own process assigned the recycled PID is treated by polkit as that authorized subject, bypassing the authorization check and performing actions they are not entitled to. Only Linux applications built with zbus_polkit versions before 5.1.0 that rely on this API for authorization decisions are affected, along with their users. No public proof-of-concept, in-the-wild exploitation, or CISA KEV listing is known, and EPSS assigns a 0.1% 30-day exploitation probability; the flaw is rated 7.3 (high) in CVSS 4.0 with high attack complexity due to the required race.
What to do: Upgrade zbus_polkit to 5.1.0 or later, which encodes the UID with the correct signed D-Bus type so polkit honors the caller-supplied identity. If you maintain a Rust application using Subject::new_for_owner(), audit whether authorization decisions depend on that call and, until patched, consider re-validating subjects after authorization or using an alternative authorization path that is not vulnerable to PID reuse. Watch for updated packages from your distribution (SUSE is the assigning CNA) and rebuild dependent applications against the fixed crate.
| zbus project (Rust D-Bus ecosystem; advisory assigned by SUSE) zbus_polkit crate (Subject::new_for_owner) | all versions before 5.1.0 |
Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.
Subject::new_for_owner() in the zbus_polkit crate encodes the uid entry of a unix-process polkit subject as an unsigned 32-bit integer (D-Bus type u), whereas the org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1.Authority interface specifies a signed 32-bit integer (D-Bus type i). Because of this type mismatch, polkit silently discards the caller-supplied UID and instead determines the subject's owner itself by looking up the PID in /proc, a lookup that is inherently subject to a time-of-check/time-of-use race. Consequently, an application that passes a UID obtained from a trustworthy source — for example SO_PEERCRED Unix socket peer credentials — in order to defend against PID reuse receives no protection, and the supplied UID has no effect on the authorization decision. A local unprivileged attacker who can cause an authorized process to terminate and then win the race to have their own process assigned the same PID can be authorized under the identity of the terminated process, bypassing the polkit authorization check and performing actions the attacker is not entitled to. This issue affects zbus_polkit before 5.1.0.
- Weakness
- CWE-367, CWE-686
- Vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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