ZeroHour

CVE-2026-80674

mass

Out-of-bounds read in Linux kernel NTFS driver via crafted resident attribute list

CVSS 3.1
9.8 critical
EPSS
<1%p31
Published
()
Modified
AI analysis

The legacy in-kernel NTFS driver (fs/ntfs) in the Linux kernel only sanity-checks a base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST on the non-resident path, so a resident attribute list is copied into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation at all. When the kernel parses a crafted NTFS filesystem image whose base inode carries a malformed resident attribute list, later walks of that list (ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents(), ntfs_attrlist_need()) trust the unchecked entries and can perform out-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer. An attacker who can get a system to mount or read such an image (e.g., a USB drive or attached disk image) can cause kernel out-of-bounds reads, leading to kernel crashes (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of kernel memory; the flaw is rated 9.8 critical on the supplied CVSS vector. Any Linux system using the in-kernel NTFS driver to process untrusted NTFS volumes is affected, with practical exposure limited to hosts that mount attacker-supplied NTFS filesystems. There is currently no known in-the-wild exploitation, no public proof-of-concept, and a low 0.4% EPSS probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

What to do: Apply the kernel fix once your distribution ships it (the fix adds ntfs_attr_list_is_valid() validation on the resident path and at the other attribute-list walks; no specific fixed version numbers are provided in the data). Until then, avoid mounting untrusted NTFS volumes, removable media, or disk images on vulnerable hosts, or handle NTFS with ntfs3/ntfs-3g instead of the legacy in-kernel driver. Check exposure by verifying whether the legacy NTFS driver is present and loaded (e.g., 'lsmod | grep ntfs' and checking CONFIG_NTFS_FS in the kernel config).

Affected
Linux kernel (legacy in-kernel NTFS driver, fs/ntfs)
Estimated exposure
masshundreds of millions of Linux systems plausibly carry the vulnerable driver, though practical exposure is limited to hosts that mount untrusted NTFS volumes — Estimated from Linux kernel ubiquity (billions of devices run Linux and major distribution kernel configs commonly build the legacy fs/ntfs driver as a module), tempered by the fact that the bug only triggers when a crafted NTFS filesystem…

Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator A base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list() only on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident* attribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation at all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list -- ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and ntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads attr_list_entry fixed-header fields (lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with bounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident attribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive out-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer. load_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7), ale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an "al length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the name, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference. ntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries tile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list() (replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the resident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped validation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other two attribute-list walks.

Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the news

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