ZeroHour

CVE-2026-89573

mass

Out-of-bounds access via crafted dm-cache metadata in Linux kernel dm-array

CVSS 3.1
7.8 high
EPSS
Published
()
Modified
AI analysis

The Linux kernel's device-mapper array code (dm-array) fails to validate that a metadata block's declared value size matches the value size the caller expects: array_block_check() only checks a block header against itself, so an internally consistent but mismatched block (e.g., value_size 4 with max_entries 1018) passes validation. An attacker who can craft on-disk dm-cache metadata — for example, pointing the superblock's mappings root (8-byte entries) at a hint block (4-byte entries) — makes __load_mappings() stride 8 bytes over 4-byte entries and read offset 8160 of a 4096-byte block, an out-of-bounds access that can leak data or corrupt kernel memory and crash the machine (CVSS 3.1 base 7.8). Exploitation requires local access with privileges sufficient to write crafted metadata to the dm-cache metadata device; the flaw fires only on maliciously crafted metadata, never on legitimately written arrays. In principle, any Linux system running a kernel prior to the fix that activates device-mapper cache volumes (e.g., lvmcache) is affected. No public proof of concept exists and the issue is not listed in CISA's KEV catalog.

What to do: Apply your distribution's kernel updates as soon as they backport the upstream fix (which rejects blocks whose value_size disagrees with the caller in get_ablock() and __shadow_ablock()) and reload/reboot affected dm-cache mappings. Restrict write access to LVM/dm-cache metadata devices, and never activate dm-cache or thin-provisioned volumes sourced from untrusted media such as imported VM disks, forensic images, or removable storage. Treat kernel crashes or splats during dm-cache metadata loading as a possible tampering indicator.

Affected
Linux kernel (dm-array / device-mapper cache metadata handling)All kernel versions prior to the fixing commit; the advisory does not specify exact version ranges, so consult your distribution's kernel advisories for patched
Estimated exposure
massEffectively the entire Linux install base (hundreds of millions to billions of devices) runs the vulnerable kernel code, but the realistically exposed subset —… — Linux dominates servers, Android, and embedded deployments and the dm-array code has shipped in mainline kernels for many years, so the pre-fix install base is essentially the whole Linux fleet, gated in practice by the need for local…

Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm array: reject an array block whose value size is not the caller's array_block_check() can only compare the header against itself, so a block with value_size 4 and max_entries 1018 is internally consistent and passes. dm-cache keeps two arrays -- mappings at 8 bytes and hints at 4 -- and the roots for both live in the superblock. Point the mappings root at a hint block and __load_mappings() walks it through an info whose value size is 8, so element_at() strides 8 bytes over 4-byte entries and reaches offset 8160 of a 4096-byte block. get_ablock() and __shadow_ablock() are the two places that hold the block and the caller at once. Reject there when the two value sizes disagree. Arrays only ever read their own blocks, so this fires on crafted metadata only.

Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the news

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