CVE-2026-89675
largeUse-After-Free in Linux Kernel nfsd NFSv4.2 Async Copy Cancellation
The Linux kernel's NFS server (nfsd) contains multiple use-after-free flaws in the teardown paths for asynchronous NFSv4.2 server-side copies: a racing OFFLOAD_CANCEL or shutdown could double-put nfsd_file references, NULL/UAF-dereference copy->nf_dst while the copy kthread was still running, kthread_stop() a freed task_struct, or free the copy while a CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight. The bug is triggered remotely by an NFSv4.2 client that issues a COPY and then races a cancel against the copy kthread, so any attacker who can reach the server as an NFS client (no separate privileges beyond export access) can attempt it. Successful exploitation corrupts kernel memory in the nfsd context, which the assigning CNA scores as CVSS 3.1 9.8 (network, low complexity, no privileges) with high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability — realistically a server crash or potential kernel-level code execution on the NFS server. Affected systems are Linux machines running kernel nfsd with NFSv4.2 server-side copy enabled and reachable by clients. No public PoC exists, the issue is not in CISA's KEV, and no exploitation is known to date.
What to do: Patch to a kernel that includes the upstream nfsd async-copy teardown fix once your distribution backports it. Until then, firewall TCP/2049 from untrusted networks and restrict exports to trusted clients, since triggering the race requires NFS-client access to issue COPY and OFFLOAD_CANCEL. Review server logs for kernel oopses in nfsd4_do_async_copy/cleanup_async_copy paths as a possible indicator of the race being hit.
| Linux kernel (nfsd) | — |
Order-of-magnitude estimate by the model from install counts, market share and public scan data it knows; verify before quoting.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown An async copy could be freed or used after free while a teardown caller (OFFLOAD_CANCEL, nfsd4_shutdown_copy, nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb) raced the copy kthread: - find_async_copy() bumped copy->refcount but left the copy on clp->async_copies, so the reaper's cleanup_async_copy() could run release_copy_files() concurrently with a cancel/shutdown caller. Both put and NULL nf_src/nf_dst without a common lock, double-putting the nfsd_file and freeing it early. - nfsd4_do_async_copy() set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED before its final uses of the copy (nfsd_update_cmtime_attr() on copy->nf_dst, nfsd4_send_cb_offload()). nfsd4_stop_copy() treats a set STOPPED bit as "kthread done, skip kthread_stop()", so a teardown caller ran release_copy_files() -- which puts and NULLs nf_dst -- while the kthread still dereferenced it (NULL/UAF). - copy->copy_task was never pinned. The one-shot kthread self-reaps on return, so kthread_stop()'s get_task_struct() could touch a freed task_struct. - co_cb is embedded in the copy, but nfsd4_send_cb_offload() held a reference only on the client, so a concurrent teardown could free the copy while the CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight. Fix the teardown lifetime as a whole: - find_async_copy() unlinks the copy (clear cp_clp, list_del_init) under async_lock; the cancel, shutdown, and sb-cancel paths drop the list-membership reference via nfs4_put_copy() after nfsd4_stop_copy(). Drop the now-redundant list_del fixup from cleanup_async_copy(). - Because unlinking hides the copy from the reaper, its cleanup_async_copy() can no longer remove the copy's s2s_cp_stateids entry; the cancel/shutdown/sb-cancel paths now call nfs4_free_copy_state() themselves (while cp_clp is still valid) so the entry does not dangle at freed memory for the laundromat and manage_cpntf_state() to dereference. - Give the kthread its own reference, taken in nfsd4_copy() before wake_up_process() and dropped at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy(); call wake_up_process() before list_add(). - Pin the task_struct with get_task_struct() in nfsd4_copy(), released in nfs4_put_copy(), so kthread_stop() is safe whenever the kthread exits. Set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED only in nfsd4_stop_copy(), which now always kthread_stop()s before release_copy_files(); completion is still reported via NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, so nfsd4_has_active_async_copies() is unaffected. Each teardown caller removes the copy from clp->async_copies first, so kthread_stop() runs exactly once. - Take a copy reference in nfsd4_send_cb_offload(), dropped in nfsd4_cb_offload_release(). The kthread still holds its own reference there, so the refcount_inc() cannot race the final free. - Read cp_clp with smp_load_acquire() to pair with the unordered set_bit()/clear_bit() writers (Documentation/atomic_bitops.rst).
- Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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