Vulnerabilities

GitPython before 3.1.60 fails to properly validate the location of the git directory, which lets an attacker impersonate it using tracked files such as gitdir, commondir, and HEAD. An attacker who can get a victim to clone or open a crafted repository can plant a malicious pre-commit hook in the tracked hooks directory. When the victim's code then calls index.commit() on that repository, the hook executes, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the process running GitPython. Anyone running affected versions in workflows that process untrusted or attacker-influenced repositories — such as CI/CD pipelines, automation, and developer tooling — is affected, while purely local, fully trusted repository use is largely out of scope. No public proof-of-concept is known, the issue is not in CISA KEV, and no in-the-wild exploitation has been reported.

Do: Upgrade GitPython to 3.1.60 or later. As interim mitigation, avoid calling index.commit() or other hook-triggering operations on repositories cloned from untrusted sources, and audit dependency trees and CI images for GitPython versions below 3.1.60. When reviewing untrusted repositories, look for tracked files named gitdir, commondir, or HEAD and unexpected files in a tracked hooks directory.

GitPython's GitConfigParser contains a configuration-injection flaw (CWE-88/CWE-94) in its read-then-write round trip: multi-line values parsed from an on-disk config file using git's standard backslash-continuation syntax are decoded into Python strings with embedded newlines, and when the parser later rewrites the file, write_section() serializes them as a bare, unquoted newline-plus-tab continuation that real git parses as separate top-level config lines. The recently added UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE safety guard only applies to values passed directly to set()/set_value()/add_value()/add_section(), never to values loaded from disk via _read(), so any unrelated write can turn a dormant value into a live directive such as core.hooksPath = <attacker-controlled path>. An attacker who can plant such a value in a config file that a GitPython-based application later rewrites gains arbitrary code execution, because git will execute the attacker's hook programs with the privileges of the user running GitPython. Developers, CI/CD systems, and pip-packaged tools that embed GitPython and rewrite git config files are affected, with GitPython 3.1.58 at HEAD confirmed vulnerable. No public PoC exists, it is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS assigns only a 0.4% probability of exploitation within 30 days, so no exploitation is currently known.

Do: Monitor GitPython for a patched release beyond 3.1.58/commit 9729ed3b (no fixed version is identified in the available data) and upgrade as soon as one is published. In the interim, avoid letting GitConfigParser rewrite config files that may contain multi-line (backslash-continuation) values, audit managed .git/config and related files for values with embedded newlines or unexpected trailing fragments like hooksPath, and restrict write access to those files to trusted principals.

GitPython before 3.1.58 contains a flaw (CWE-88) in its check_unsafe_options guard, which is meant to block unsafe git options while allow_unsafe_options is set to its default value of False. The guard can be bypassed by combining a single-character keyword argument with split_single_char_options=False, causing GitPython to emit a joined token that git itself parses as an --upload-pack option. An attacker who can influence the kwargs passed to guarded methods such as clone_from can therefore inject --upload-pack and achieve arbitrary OS command execution, despite the library's default safe configuration. Any Python application, service, or pipeline built on the pip-installed GitPython library that passes attacker-controlled or remotely influenced arguments into its git wrapper methods is affected. A public proof-of-concept reference exists via the project's GitHub security advisory (GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j); there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation yet, and EPSS puts 30-day exploitation probability at roughly 0.6%.

Do: Upgrade to GitPython 3.1.58 or later via pip as soon as possible. Audit application code paths where user or remote input flows into kwargs of guarded GitPython methods (e.g., clone_from), and avoid combining split_single_char_options=False with single-character keyword arguments until patched. No in-the-wild exploitation is confirmed, but given the public advisory, prioritize updates for internet-facing services that wrap git operations.