Vulnerabilities

GitPython's GitConfigParser contains a configuration-injection flaw (CWE-88/CWE-94) in its read-then-write round trip: multi-line values parsed from an on-disk config file using git's standard backslash-continuation syntax are decoded into Python strings with embedded newlines, and when the parser later rewrites the file, write_section() serializes them as a bare, unquoted newline-plus-tab continuation that real git parses as separate top-level config lines. The recently added UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE safety guard only applies to values passed directly to set()/set_value()/add_value()/add_section(), never to values loaded from disk via _read(), so any unrelated write can turn a dormant value into a live directive such as core.hooksPath = <attacker-controlled path>. An attacker who can plant such a value in a config file that a GitPython-based application later rewrites gains arbitrary code execution, because git will execute the attacker's hook programs with the privileges of the user running GitPython. Developers, CI/CD systems, and pip-packaged tools that embed GitPython and rewrite git config files are affected, with GitPython 3.1.58 at HEAD confirmed vulnerable. No public PoC exists, it is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS assigns only a 0.4% probability of exploitation within 30 days, so no exploitation is currently known.

Do: Monitor GitPython for a patched release beyond 3.1.58/commit 9729ed3b (no fixed version is identified in the available data) and upgrade as soon as one is published. In the interim, avoid letting GitConfigParser rewrite config files that may contain multi-line (backslash-continuation) values, audit managed .git/config and related files for values with embedded newlines or unexpected trailing fragments like hooksPath, and restrict write access to those files to trusted principals.

GitPython 3.1.50 contains a command-injection flaw (CWE-78) in which the library's default unsafe-option gate fails to recognize joined short-option forms such as -u, the short form of --upload-pack=. The flaw is triggered when an application passes attacker-influenced options into Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=..., allow_unsafe_options=False): the attacker supplies -u with a value of their choosing, bypassing the gate that is supposed to block --upload-pack/-u. During the clone, Git then executes the helper command named by the -u option, giving the attacker arbitrary command execution on the host running GitPython, in the context of the cloning process. Any application built on GitPython 3.1.50 that forwards untrusted, user-controlled clone options is affected; deployments that do not pass attacker-influenced options are not exposed. There is one public proof-of-concept reference (the project's GitHub security advisory GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj); the flaw is not in CISA KEV, EPSS is 0.4%, and no in-the-wild exploitation is currently reported.

Do: Upgrade to GitPython 3.1.51 or later, which recognizes joined short-option forms in the unsafe-option gate. Until patched, do not pass attacker-controlled arguments to Repo.clone_from via multi_options, and audit applications that let users supply clone options (including short options like -u) for this pattern.