Vulnerabilities

Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Prior to 4.13.0, coturn rejects loopback peers by default unless allow-loopback-peers is enabled, but the default loopback guard can be bypassed by using the IPv4-mapped IPv6 peer address ::ffff:127.0.0.1 in a TURN XOR-PEER-ADDRESS attribute. ioa_addr_is_loopback checks for the literal IPv6 loopback shape before IPv4-mapped IPv6 handling, so good_peer_addr does not apply the default loopback rejection and an authenticated TURN client can expose services bound only to localhost on the coturn host through TURN relay traffic. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.0.

Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Versions prior to 4.10.0 contain a stack buffer overflow in decode_oauth_token_gcm(). A uint16_t nonce_len field read from an attacker-supplied OAuth access token (0-65535) is passed directly to memcpy() as the copy length into a 256-byte stack buffer (oauth_encrypted_block.nonce[256]) without bounds checking. The overflow occurs before AES-GCM authentication is verified, the attacker does not need to know the OAuth key or produce a valid AES-GCM token. Up to 735 bytes of attacker-controlled data are written past the buffer, may corrupt adjacent stack data, including control-flow data depending on compiler, ABI, and mitigations. Requires --oauth mode (non-default). This may provide a plausible RCE primitive depending on exploit mitigations; because coturn is widely deployed for WebRTC TURN/STUN and --oauth is commonly recommended, impact can be broad. This issue has been fixed in version 4.10.0.

Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Prior to 4.10.0, the STUN/TURN attribute parsing functions in coturn perform unsafe pointer casts from uint8_t * to uint16_t * without alignment checks. When processing a crafted STUN message with odd-aligned attribute boundaries, this results in misaligned memory reads at ns_turn_msg.c. On ARM64 architectures (AArch64) with strict alignment enforcement, this causes a SIGBUS signal that immediately kills the turnserver process. An unauthenticated remote attacker can crash any ARM64 coturn deployment by sending a single crafted UDP packet. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.10.0.

Coturn is a free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Coturn is commonly configured to block loopback and internal ranges using "denied-peer-ip" and/or default loopback restrictions. CVE-2020-26262 addressed bypasses involving "0.0.0.0", "[::1]" and "[::]", but IPv4-mapped IPv6 is not covered. When sending a "CreatePermission" or "ChannelBind" request with the "XOR-PEER-ADDRESS" value of "::ffff:127.0.0.1", a successful response is received, even though "127.0.0.0/8" is blocked via "denied-peer-ip". The root cause is that, prior to the updated fix implemented in version 4.9.0, three functions in "src/client/ns_turn_ioaddr.c" do not check "IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED". "ioa_addr_is_loopback()" checks "127.x.x.x" (AF_INET) and "::1" (AF_INET6), but not "::ffff:127.0.0.1." "ioa_addr_is_zero()" checks "0.0.0.0" and "::", but not "::ffff:0.0.0.0." "addr_less_eq()" used by "ioa_addr_in_range()" for "denied-peer-ip" matching: when the range is AF_INET and the peer is AF_INET6, the comparison returns 0 without extracting the embedded IPv4. Version 4.9.0 contains an updated fix to address the bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-26262.

Coturn is free open source implementation of TURN and STUN Server. Coturn before version 4.5.2 by default does not allow peers to connect and relay packets to loopback addresses in the range of `127.x.x.x`. However, it was observed that when sending a `CONNECT` request with the `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` value of `0.0.0.0`, a successful response was received and subsequently, `CONNECTIONBIND` also received a successful response. Coturn then is able to relay packets to the loopback interface. Additionally, when coturn is listening on IPv6, which is default, the loopback interface can also be reached by making use of either `[::1]` or `[::]` as the peer address. By using the address `0.0.0.0` as the peer address, a malicious user will be able to relay packets to the loopback interface, unless `--denied-peer-ip=0.0.0.0` (or similar) has been specified. Since the default configuration implies that loopback peers are not allowed, coturn administrators may choose to not set the `denied-peer-ip` setting. The issue patched in version 4.5.2. As a workaround the addresses in the address block `0.0.0.0/8`, `[::1]` and `[::]` should be denied by default unless `--allow-loopback-peers` has been specified.

In coturn before version 4.5.1.3, there is an issue whereby STUN/TURN response buffer is not initialized properly. There is a leak of information between different client connections. One client (an attacker) could use their connection to intelligently query coturn to get interesting bytes in the padding bytes from the connection of another client. This has been fixed in 4.5.1.3.

An exploitable heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the way CoTURN 4.5.1.1 web server parses POST requests. A specially crafted HTTP POST request can lead to information leaks and other misbehavior. An attacker needs to send an HTTPS request to trigger this vulnerability.

An exploitable unsafe default configuration vulnerability exists in the TURN server function of coTURN prior to version 4.5.0.9. By default, the TURN server runs an unauthenticated telnet admin portal on the loopback interface. This can provide administrator access to the TURN server configuration, which can lead to additional attacks. An attacker who can get access to the telnet port can gain administrator access to the TURN server.

An exploitable SQL injection vulnerability exists in the administrator web portal function of coTURN prior to version 4.5.0.9. A login message with a specially crafted username can cause an SQL injection, resulting in authentication bypass, which could give access to the TURN server administrator web portal. An attacker can log in via the external interface of the TURN server to trigger this vulnerability.