Vulnerabilities

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the Windows agent component of SecureConnector due to improper access controls on a named pipe. The pipe is accessible to the Everyone group and does not restrict remote connections, allowing any network-based attacker to connect without authentication. By interacting with this pipe, an attacker can redirect the agent to communicate with a rogue server that can issue commands via the SecureConnector Agent. This does not impact Linux or OSX Secure Connector.

A vulnerability in Forescout SecureConnector v11.3.07.0109 on Windows allows unauthenticated user to modify compliance scripts due to insecure temporary directory.

Denial of Service in Forescout SecureConnector 11.1.02.1019 on Windows allows Unprivileged user to corrupt the configuration file and cause Denial of Service in the application.

Insecure Permissions vulnerability in Forescout SecureConnector v.11.3.06.0063 allows a local attacker to escalate privileges via the Recheck Compliance Status component.

ForeScout NAC SecureConnector version 11.2 - CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element

ForeScout - SecureConnector Local Service DoS - A low privilaged user which doesn't have permissions to shutdown the secure connector service writes a large amount of characters in the installationPath. This will cause the buffer to overflow and override the stack cookie causing the service to crash.

An issue was discovered in Forescout CounterACT before 8.1.4. A local privilege escalation vulnerability is present in the logging function. SecureConnector runs with administrative privileges and writes logs entries to a file in %PROGRAMDATA%\ForeScout SecureConnector\ that has full permissions for the Everyone group. Using a symbolic link allows an attacker to point the log file to a privileged location such as %WINDIR%\System32. The resulting log file adopts the file permissions of the source of the symbolic link (in this case, the Everyone group). The log file in System32 can be replaced and renamed with a malicious DLL for DLL hijacking.

On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent must run under the local SYSTEM account or another administrator account in order to enable full functionality of the agent. The typical configuration is for the agent to run as a Windows service under the local SYSTEM account. The SecureConnector agent runs various plugin scripts and executables on the endpoint in order to gather and report information about the host to the CounterACT management appliance. The SecureConnector agent downloads these scripts and executables as needed from the CounterACT management appliance and runs them on the endpoint. By default, these executable files are downloaded to and run from the %TEMP% directory of the currently logged on user, despite the fact that the SecureConnector agent is running as SYSTEM. Aside from the downloaded scripts, the SecureConnector agent runs a batch file with SYSTEM privileges from the temp directory of the currently logged on user. If the naming convention of this script can be derived, which is made possible by placing it in a directory to which the user has read access, it may be possible overwrite the legitimate batch file with a malicious one before SecureConnector executes it. It is possible to change this directory by setting the the configuration property config.script_run_folder.value in the local.properties configuration file on the CounterACT management appliance, however the batch file which is run does not follow this property.