Vulnerabilities

Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. Prior to 4.1.4 and 3.0.5, decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key. This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected. This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common. Panics can lead to denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.4 and 3.0.5.

In python-jose 3.3.0 (specifically jwe.decrypt), a vulnerability allows an attacker to cause a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition by crafting a malicious JSON Web Encryption (JWE) token with an exceptionally high compression ratio. When this token is processed by the server, it results in significant memory allocation and processing time during decompression.

python-jose through 3.3.0 has algorithm confusion with OpenSSH ECDSA keys and other key formats. This is similar to CVE-2022-29217.

Package jose aims to provide an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards. An attacker could send a JWE containing compressed data that used large amounts of memory and CPU when decompressed by Decrypt or DecryptMulti. Those functions now return an error if the decompressed data would exceed 250kB or 10x the compressed size (whichever is larger). This vulnerability has been patched in versions 4.0.1, 3.0.3 and 2.6.3.

jose is JavaScript module for JSON Object Signing and Encryption, providing support for JSON Web Tokens (JWT), JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Key (JWK), JSON Web Key Set (JWKS), and more. A vulnerability has been identified in the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) decryption interfaces, specifically related to the support for decompressing plaintext after its decryption. Under certain conditions it is possible to have the user's environment consume unreasonable amount of CPU time or memory during JWE Decryption operations. This issue has been patched in versions 2.0.7 and 4.15.5.

reason-jose is a JOSE implementation in ReasonML and OCaml.`Jose.Jws.validate` does not check HS256 signatures. This allows tampering of JWS header and payload data if the service does not perform additional checks. Such tampering could expose applications using reason-jose to authorization bypass. Applications relying on JWS claims assertion to enforce security boundaries may be vulnerable to privilege escalation. This issue has been patched in version 0.8.2.

The PHP JOSE Library by Gree Inc. before version 2.2.1 is vulnerable to key confusion/algorithm substitution in the JWS component resulting in bypassing the signature verification via crafted tokens.

go-jose before 1.0.4 suffers from an invalid curve attack for the ECDH-ES algorithm. When deriving a shared key using ECDH-ES for an encrypted message, go-jose neglected to check that the received public key on a message is on the same curve as the static private key of the receiver, thus making it vulnerable to an invalid curve attack.

python-jose before 1.3.2 allows attackers to have unspecified impact by leveraging failure to use a constant time comparison for HMAC keys.