Vulnerabilities

Roo Code's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution Roo Code (specifically$(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(malicious_command)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Prior to version 3.26.7, Due to an error in validation it was possible for Roo to automatically execute commands that did not match the allow list prefixes. This issue has been patched in version 3.26.7.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Versions 3.25.23 and below contain a default list of allowed commands that do not need manual approval if auto-approve is enabled, and npm install is included in that list. Because npm install executes lifecycle scripts, if a repository’s package.json file contains a malicious postinstall script, it would be executed automatically without user approval. This means that enabling auto-approved commands and opening a malicious repo could result in arbitrary code execution. This is fixed in version 3.26.0.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions 3.26.6 and below, a Github workflow used unsanitized pull request metadata in a privileged context, allowing an attacker to craft malicious input and achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Actions runner. The workflow runs with broad permissions and access to repository secrets. It is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the runner, push or modify code in the repository, access secrets, and create malicious releases or packages, resulting in a complete compromise of the repository and its associated services. This is fixed in version 3.26.7.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions 3.23.18 and below, RooCode does not validate line breaks (\n) in its command input, allowing potential bypass of the allow-list mechanism. The project appears to lack parsing or validation logic to prevent multi-line command injection. When commands are evaluated for execution, only the first line or token may be considered, enabling attackers to smuggle additional commands in subsequent lines. This is fixed in version 3.23.19.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. Prior to 3.22.6, if the victim had "Write" auto-approved, an attacker with the ability to submit prompts to the agent could write to VS Code settings files and trigger code execution. There were multiple ways to achieve that. One example is with the php.validate.executablePath setting which lets you set the path for the php executable for syntax validation. The attacker could have written the path to an arbitrary command there and then created a php file to trigger it. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.22.6.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. The project-specific MCP configuration for the Roo Code agent is stored in the `.roo/mcp.json` file within the VS Code workspace. Because the MCP configuration format allows for execution of arbitrary commands, prior to version 3.20.3, it would have been possible for an attacker with access to craft a prompt to ask the agent to write a malicious command to the MCP configuration file. If the user had opted-in to auto-approving file writes within the project, this would have led to arbitrary command execution. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent (for instance through a prompt injection attack), for the user to have MCP enabled (on by default), and for the user to have enabled auto-approved file writes (off by default). Version 3.20.3 fixes the issue by adding an additional layer of opt-in configuration for auto-approving writing to Roo's configuration files, including all files within the `.roo/` folder.