Vulnerabilities

In Splunk On-Call (VictorOps) app versions below 1.0.43 on Splunkbase, a user who does not hold the "admin" or "power" Splunk roles could read a partially masked Application Programming Interface (API) key from the App Key Value Store (KV Store). The exposure is possible because the Splunk On-Call (VictorOps) app does not fully mask the API key before storing it in a KV Store collection that the user can read. For more information see About the app key value store (https://help.splunk.com/en/data-management/splunk-enterprise-admin-manual/9.2/administer-the-app-key-value-store/about-the-app-key-value-store) in the Splunk documentation.

In Splunk MCP Server app versions below 1.2.1, a user who holds the "admin" Splunk role could execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. The vulnerability is possible because of missing input validation in the app's credential management component, which deserializes stored data without checking whether the content is of the expected type.

In Splunk Connect for Kafka versions below 2.2.7, an unauthenticated user who can reach the Kafka Connect Representational State Transfer (REST) API could configure a non-secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Event Collector endpoint in Splunk Enterprise that causes the connector to send authentication credentials to an attacker-controlled server, allowing for exposure of credentials that compromise all relevant data sent through the connector and limited alteration of event delivery. The vulnerability is possible because HTTP Event Collector endpoint validation does not require secure transport by default. For more information see Install Splunk Connect for Kafka (https://help.splunk.com/en/data-management/integrate-data-with-add-ons/splunk-connect-for-kafka/2.2/install/install-splunk-connect-for-kafka), Data ingestion parameters for Splunk Connect for Kafka (https://help.splunk.com/en/data-management/integrate-data-with-add-ons/splunk-connect-for-kafka/2.2/overview/data-ingestion-parameters-for-splunk-connect-for-kafka), and Set up and use HTTP Event Collector with configuration files (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/get-data-in/get-started-with-getting-data-in/9.4/get-data-with-http-event-collector/set-up-and-use-http-event-collector-with-configuration-files) in the Splunk documentation.

In Splunk AI Toolkit versions below 6.0.0, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role could execute arbitrary code on the Splunk server by loading a model file containing crafted sparse matrix data. The deserialization of untrusted data is possible because a model codec in Splunk AI Toolkit deserializes sparse matrix data without guarding against embedded pickle content. For more information see Troubleshoot the Splunk Machine Learning Toolkit (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-cloud-platform/apply-machine-learning/machine-learning-toolkit-user-guide/5.5.0/troubleshooting-mltk/troubleshoot-the-splunk-machine-learning-toolkit) in the Splunk documentation.

In Splunk Enterprise Security versions below 8.6.1, a user who holds a Splunk Enterprise Security role that contains the mc_investigation_read capability could inject Search Processing Language (SPL) through Analyst Queue search filters, allowing for access to all relevant data and system integrity available to the scheduled searches that run for that user. The vulnerability is possible because the Analyst Queue search filter handling does not validate filter field names before the fields are included in SPL searches. For more information see Users and roles for Splunk Enterprise Security (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/install/8.4/installation/users-and-roles-for-splunk-enterprise-security), Manage analyst workflows using the analyst queue in Splunk Enterprise Security (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/administer/8.4/mission-control/manage-analyst-workflows-using-the-analyst-queue-in-splunk-enterprise-security), and Overview of Mission Control in Splunk Enterprise Security (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/user-guide/8.5/mission-control/overview-of-mission-control-in-splunk-enterprise-security) in the Splunk documentation.

In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.6.0, an unauthenticated user could spoof the source IP address in a crafted request to an Automation Broker notification endpoint and execute arbitrary code on the Splunk SOAR host. The vulnerability is possible because the Splunk SOAR Automation Broker trusts a client-supplied source IP address header as proof that the request originates from the local system. Successful exploitation can expose all relevant data, affect system integrity, and disrupt service availability. For more information see About Splunk SOAR Automation Broker (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/splunk-automation-broker/about-splunk-soar-automation-broker/about-splunk-soar-automation-broker) in the Splunk documentation.

In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.2, 10.2.6, 10.0.9, and 9.4.14, a user that holds a role with the schedule_search capability could configure Portable Document Format (PDF) attachments in the email alert action workflow. When the email alert action runs, it could execute arbitrary Search Processing Language (SPL) commands with system-level privileges, expose all relevant data, and affect system integrity and availability on the search head. The vulnerability is possible because the search scheduler passes a system-level authentication context rather than the action owner context to the email alert action when it renders PDF attachments. For more information see alert_actions.conf (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/admin-manual/10.4/configuration-file-reference/10.4.0-configuration-file-reference/alert_actions.conf) in the Splunk documentation.