Vulnerabilities

Fastify versions before 5.12.2 misinterpret the object resolved by a successful Ajv async validator as the value-result protocol used by custom validator compilers, which is an input validation flaw (CWE-20). The flaw is triggered when an authenticated request passes its route schema but contains a property named 'value' at the root of the body: Fastify then replaces the entire validated request body with that property's value before the handler executes. An authenticated low-privilege attacker can exploit this to make the handler operate on nested, effectively unvalidated data, achieving unauthorized state changes and data disclosure on routes the schema was supposed to protect. Any Fastify application running a version before 5.12.2 that uses Ajv async validation and accepts request bodies with a root-level 'value' property is affected. There is no known public proof of concept, the flaw is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS puts 30-day exploitation probability at 0.4% (32nd percentile), indicating low observed exploitation risk so far.

Do: Upgrade to fastify 5.12.2 or later. As an interim mitigation, avoid accepting request bodies with a root-level 'value' property on routes using Ajv async validation, and audit such routes for handlers that make authorization or state-change decisions based on the body's structure. Because no exploitation is observed yet, prioritize patching internet-facing Fastify APIs that accept untrusted authenticated input.

@fastify/middie, the middleware engine used to run Express-style middleware inside Fastify, decides whether to run path-scoped middleware by matching the raw request target, while Fastify's router resolves absolute-form request targets to their path before dispatching, so the two layers evaluate different strings (a CWE-436 interpretation conflict). An unauthenticated network attacker can send a request whose request line uses an absolute-form target, which then reaches the route handler while path-scoped middleware such as authentication or authorization is skipped. The attacker gains the ability to bypass path-based access controls in the affected application and reach protected endpoints without credentials. Affected users are operators of Fastify applications running @fastify/middie 9.1.0 through 9.3.3 that rely on middie path-scoped middleware for access control on reachable routes. There is no public proof of concept, the flaw is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS estimates a 0.3% 30-day exploitation probability, so no exploitation is currently known.

Do: Upgrade to @fastify/middie 9.3.4 or later. As an interim mitigation, do not rely on middie path-scoped middleware for authentication or authorization on internet-facing routes; enforce access control in Fastify's own lifecycle hooks (which see the resolved route) or normalize request targets at the proxy layer. Audit your Fastify applications for @fastify/middie in the 9.1.0-9.3.3 range and check whether any front-end proxy forwards absolute-form request targets to the application.

Versions of @fastify/http-proxy before 11.6.2 fail to validate proxied HTTP request paths for backslash-based dot-segments before forwarding them to the configured upstream. Because the plain HTTP request handler skips the destination validation that the WebSocket path performs, and the underlying reply-from library only rejects forward-slash traversal, an unauthenticated network attacker can send requests containing backslash dot-segments that escape the boundary enforced by the prefix and rewritePrefix options. This lets the attacker reach upstream paths that were intended to remain hidden behind the proxy, resulting in disclosure of internal endpoints. Any application using @fastify/http-proxy below 11.6.2 is affected. Exploitation has not been reported publicly: there is no known proof of concept, the issue is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS currently estimates only a 0.6% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

Do: Upgrade to @fastify/http-proxy 11.6.2 or later. If you cannot upgrade immediately, review your prefix/rewritePrefix configuration for upstream paths that should stay hidden, and consider rejecting incoming proxied request paths containing backslashes or dot-segments at an upstream control such as a reverse proxy or WAF. Check access logs for unusual requests with backslash sequences in the path targeting your proxy endpoints.

@fastify/busboy is a multipart form-data parser for Node.js. Its multipart part-header parser splits header lines only on the two-byte carriage-return line-feed sequence, so a lone carriage return or line feed embedded in a part header is not treated as a line break and is carried verbatim into the parsed Content-Disposition filename and field name handed to the application. An attacker who uploads a file whose filename or field name contains a bare carriage return or line feed can inject control characters into consumers that trust the parser to return clean values, enabling filesystem filename pollution, log forging, or header injection when the value is forwarded to a carriage-return-sensitive sink. All versions of @fastify/busboy up to and including 3.2.1 are affected. The issue is fixed in version 3.2.2, which rejects any header line that still contains a bare carriage return or line feed. Users should upgrade to 3.2.2, and consumers such as @fastify/multipart should bump their @fastify/busboy dependency to pull in the fix.

fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework for Node.js. Impact: the fix for CVE-2026-3635 added a guard on the forwarded-header reads used to derive the request host, protocol, hostname, ip, and ips values, checking the connecting address. That guard closes the IP, CIDR, and custom-function forms of trustProxy correctly, because those forms compile to predicates that inspect the connecting address. The hop-count form, where trustProxy is set to a number, compiles to a predicate that structurally ignores the address, so the guard is always satisfied for any hop count of one or more. Applications configured with a numeric trustProxy value, such as trustProxy set to 1 for a single reverse proxy, remain vulnerable: an attacker who can reach the Fastify origin directly, bypassing the front-facing proxy, can spoof the forwarded request fields exactly as in the unpatched version. The impact class matches the parent CVE-2026-3635, including host injection in generated URLs, HTTPS-enforcement bypass, secure-cookie and CSRF-origin bypass, and host-based routing and cache poisoning. Affected versions are fastify from 5.8.3 up to but not including 5.12.1. Patches: patched in fastify 5.12.1, where the numeric form of trustProxy is disabled at runtime and removed from the TypeScript type union. Workarounds: migrate to an IP, CIDR, or custom-function trustProxy value that validates the connecting address, and ensure the Fastify origin is only reachable through the trusted proxy chain.

@fastify/multipart is a multipart form-data parser for Fastify. In versions from 5.3.0 up to but not including 10.1.1, when the busboy fileSize limit truncates a file part, the plugin clears its internal current-file reference while the underlying stream is still open. If the client then aborts the connection before sending the terminating boundary, the abort cleanup finds no stream to destroy, so saveRequestFiles() never settles, the request handler hangs, and the temporary file already written to disk is never cleaned up. An unauthenticated client can repeat this to permanently leak temporary files and suspended handler executions, leading to disk and event-loop exhaustion. The issue is fixed in @fastify/multipart 10.1.1. Users should upgrade to 10.1.1.

@fastify/jwt is a JSON Web Token plugin for Fastify. In versions before 10.2.2, a per-request verification key passed to request.jwtVerify({ key }) is silently overridden by the plugin's globally configured secret, because the option merge applies the global key last. Applications that use different keys for different authorization domains, for example separate user and admin keys, therefore accept a token signed with the global key on a route that explicitly requires another key. This lets an ordinary authenticated user cross a key-based trust boundary without knowing either secret. The issue is fixed in @fastify/jwt 10.2.2, where an explicit per-call key takes precedence over the global secret. Users should upgrade to 10.2.2.

@fastify/oauth2 is an OAuth 2.0 plugin for Fastify. In versions from 7.2.0 up to but not including 8.3.0, the plugin validates the OAuth state, and with PKCE the code verifier, by comparing the callback query parameter against an unprefixed, predictable cookie, with no server-side binding to the browser that began the flow. Any party able to write a cookie for the application's host, such as a sibling subdomain under the same registrable domain, can plant matching state and verifier cookies and complete an attacker-owned OAuth flow inside a victim's browser, silently signing the victim in to the attacker's account (login CSRF). It does not expose the victim's own account, credentials, or tokens. The issue is fixed in @fastify/oauth2 8.3.0, which adds an opt-in hostPrefixedCookies option. Users should upgrade to 8.3.0 and enable it, or bind state to a server-side session.

@fastify/busboy is a multipart form-data parser. In versions 3.1.0 through 3.2.0, a remote unauthenticated attacker can stall the Node.js event loop by sending a multipart request whose boundary is crafted to a specific length. The vendored streaming search stores its skip table in a fixed 256 entry byte array, and a boundary of exactly 252 bytes makes the search needle 256 bytes, which truncates the default skip distance to zero and turns the search into a CPU bound loop on a small body. A single small request can keep one core busy and deny service to other requests handled by the same process. The issue is fixed in @fastify/busboy 3.2.1, which widens the skip table so the skip distance is preserved. Users should upgrade to 3.2.1.

@fastify/static before version 10.1.3 contains an incomplete fix for a previous route guard bypass. The static file handler rejected only parent directory segments, but it did not canonicalize dot segments, duplicate slashes, encoded dots, or backslashes before route matching and before delegating to the send layer. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker could request a file protected by a route based guard using a non canonical path form that misses the guarded route yet resolves back onto the protected file, disclosing its contents. Applications that protect a subtree of the static root with a route based guard are affected, while applications relying on the allowedPath option are not. This is fixed in @fastify/static 10.1.3, which canonicalizes the pathname, including rejecting backslashes, on the path used for routing and serving.

@fastify/aws-lambda version 6.4.0 decorates each Fastify request with request.awsLambda.event and request.awsLambda.context, values that applications are documented to use for authorization decisions such as reading API Gateway authorizer claims. In the default configuration, the getter that populates this decoration reads the client-controlled x-apigateway-event and x-apigateway-context HTTP headers before falling back to the trusted internal request token, and those reserved headers are not stripped from the incoming event. An unauthenticated attacker who can set a single HTTP header can therefore forge the entire Lambda proxy event, including the authorizer context, and override the genuine one. This results in a full authentication and authorization bypass and privilege escalation for any application that trusts request.awsLambda.event for identity or access control. Only version 6.4.0 is affected. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/aws-lambda 6.4.1, which resolves the decoration only through the internal per-invocation token and strips the reserved headers before the request is processed.

@fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option.

@fastify/forwarded resolves client addresses from the X-Forwarded-For header. In versions before 3.0.2, when the header contains two or more comma separated entries, the parser trims only space characters and does not strip horizontal tabs, even though RFC 7230 defines optional whitespace as both space and tab. As a result, an entry padded with a tab keeps the literal tab in the resolved address string. Applications that make exact string match security decisions on the resolved client IP, such as an allowlist, a blocklist, a per IP rate limit key, or audit log correlation, can be evaded because the tab corrupted string no longer matches the expected value. This does not cross the trust boundary, since a tab corrupted string is not a valid IP and cannot be mistaken for a trusted proxy. The issue is fixed in @fastify/forwarded 3.0.2.

@fastify/static up to and including version 10.1.0 fails to reject dot-dot path segments in request pathnames before the file-resolution stage. This is a bypass of the earlier fix for CVE-2026-6414, which only covered encoded forward slashes. Because the underlying send library normalizes dot segments before applying its own path-traversal guard, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass any route-scoped middleware and read files inside the static root that live under the guarded URL prefix. The bypass does not allow access outside the configured static root by itself, it defeats route-guard filtering only. The issue is patched in @fastify/static 10.1.1.

Impact: @fastify/http-proxy versions up to and including 11.5.0 fail to rewrite the request prefix when the prefix segment is URL-encoded. Fastify's router URL-decodes paths for route matching, but request.url retains the original encoded form, and the prefix-rewrite step uses a literal string replace against the decoded prefix. A request that encodes one or more characters of the configured prefix therefore matches the route but skips the rewrite, so the raw encoded path is forwarded to the upstream unchanged. The upstream then decodes the path and serves it, letting an attacker reach upstream paths that the proxy was configured to hide via rewritePrefix, including internal or administrative endpoints. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/http-proxy 11.6.0. Workarounds: none.

Impact: @fastify/reply-from versions from 8.3.1 up to but not including 12.6.4 build the internal URL cache key by concatenating the destination and source path without a delimiter. Different destination and source pairs can therefore produce the same key while resolving to different upstream URLs. When getUpstream selects an upstream from request data, a URL cached for one upstream can be reused for a request intended for another upstream, causing cross-upstream data access and modification. The default configuration is affected. Setting disableCache to true prevents the behavior. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/reply-from 12.6.4. Workarounds: pass disableCache: true when registering the plugin.

@fastify/middie versions 9.1.0 through 9.3.2 decode the encoded slash %2F inside path parameter values before matching middleware paths, while Fastify's underlying router preserves the encoding during route lookup. The two layers disagree on the canonical request path, so the middleware fails to match a URL that the route handler does match. When middleware is used for authentication, authorization, rate limiting, or auditing on parameterized paths, an attacker can reach the protected handler by sending a single crafted URL with an encoded slash in the parameter position. The bypass is HTTP method agnostic and requires no authentication or special preconditions. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/middie 9.3.3. Workarounds: avoid parameterized middleware paths for security decisions, or enforce authentication at the route handler or via a Fastify hook that runs after the router has resolved the request.

@fastify/express versions 4.0.6 and earlier only rewrite the plugin prefix for middleware mount paths when the path argument is a string. Non-string mount paths (arrays of paths and regular expressions) are left unprefixed inside prefixed plugin scopes, so middleware registered with those forms does not match the actual prefixed request path. Applications that use path-scoped middleware for authentication, authorization, rate limiting, or auditing on routes inside a prefixed scope can be bypassed by sending a request to the prefixed route, because Fastify still matches the route but the middleware is skipped. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/express 4.0.7. Workarounds: use string mount paths instead of arrays or regular expressions in prefixed plugins, or register one use call per path.