ZeroHour

clop

ransomware group · aka Clop, Cl0p, TA505, FIN11 (related tracking, Mandiant), Lace Tempest (Microsoft) · Russia (widely assessed as Russian-speaking; exact attribution unknown) · active since 2019 (Clop ransomware); precursor TA505/FIN11 activity tracked since 2016

Victims · 7d
0▼2
Victims · 30d
2active targets
Victims · 90d
90
All-time (tracked)
2.3Ksince 2021-09-09
Last post
09-10 01:43UTC
Estimated earnings
public reporting
Profile · glm-5.3-flash · updated

Clop (Cl0p) is a Russian-speaking data-extortion group long associated with the TA505 and FIN11 actor designations, known for high-volume extortion built on data theft rather than file encryption. The group is best known for mass exploitation of managed file transfer products: Accellion FTA (2020-21), SolarWinds Serv-U (2021), Fortra GoAnywhere (2023), Progress MOVEit (2023), Cleo (2024), and Oracle E-Business Suite (2025), affecting thousands of organizations. Its playbook combines SQL injection and webshell exploitation for initial access, large-scale exfiltration, leak-site listings, and mass email extortion campaigns aimed at victims' customers and partners. Public impact tallies (Emsisoft, 2023) counted 2,700+ organizations affected in the MOVEit campaign, but a confirmed aggregate earnings figure has not been published. Leak-site tracking on this dashboard shows continued activity, with 2 posts in the past 7 days (HENRYPRATT.COM, HARLEY-DAVIDSON.COM) as of 2026-09-10.

Tactics & tooling
  • Mass exploitation of internet-facing managed file transfer software (MOVEit, GoAnywhere, Accellion FTA, Serv-U, Cleo, Oracle EBS)
  • Exfiltration-first extortion: data theft without encryption; victims published on the Cl0p leak site
  • SQL injection and webshell deployment in file-transfer intrusions (e.g., MOVEit human2.aspx webshell)
  • Mass email extortion campaigns sent to victims' customers and partners to amplify pressure
  • Historic spearphishing with macro-enabled Office documents for initial access (TA505-era)
  • Use of rclone for bulk exfiltration reported in some file-transfer campaigns
  • Ransomware deployment (Clop) in some intrusions, though major campaigns since 2023 are largely encryption-free
  • Public deadlines on leak-site listings to pressure negotiations
Targeted sectors
Financial servicesInsuranceHealthcareGovernmentEducationEnergyManufacturingLegal
Notable public victims

Shell (Accellion FTA, 2020-21; MOVEit, 2023), Deloitte (MOVEit, 2023), Sony Interactive Entertainment (MOVEit, 2023), US Department of Energy (MOVEit, 2023), British Airways and BBC (via payroll provider Zellis, GoAnywhere campaign, 2023), Community Health Systems (GoAnywhere, 2023), New Zealand Stock Exchange (Accellion FTA, 2020), Singing River Health System (Accellion FTA, 2020-21), Harley-Davidson (listed on Cl0p leak site)

Estimated earnings

No public figure.

Leak-site victims

VictimDiscoveredDetails
COMPASSNRG.COM FILES FILES PART10 PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
WDMANOR.COM FILES PART14 - FINAL PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
COMPASSNRG.COM FILES FILES PART11 PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
GENESISNET.COM FILES PART9 - 10.0.70.121\ATS_FILESHARE\Project_Management PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
SUNSETHCS.COM FILES PART4 - EXTRACTED PST FILES PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
BPATPA.COM FILES PART3 - EXTRACTED PST FILES PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
BLUEBONNETNUTRITION.COM FILES FILES PART3 PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
BRPRINTERS.COM FILES PART2 - EXTRACTED PST FILES ( KathyEmail.pst, Outlook.pst ) PUBLISHE · Oct 5, 2021
STORAFILE.CO.UK FILES PART6 PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
EMPIRICAL-RESEARCH.COM FILES PART1 - [email protected] PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
EMPIRICAL-RESEARCH.COM FILES PART2 - [email protected] PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
BPATPA.COM FILES PART4 - BPATPA\10.0.0.17\Company Apps PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
BLUEBONNETNUTRITION.COM FILES FILES PART4 PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
STORAFILE.CO.UK FILES PART7 PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
BRPRINTERS.COM FILES PART3 - EXTRACTED PST FILES ( Archive.pst, Archive1.pst ) PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
SUNSETHCS.COM FILES *<em>PART5</em> PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
GENESISNET.COM FILES PART10 - 10.0.70.121\ATS_FILESHARE\Project_Management PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
COMPASSNRG.COM FILES FILES PART12 PUBLISHED · Oct 5, 2021
FOODLAND.COM FILES · Sep 10, 2021
MARNELLCOMPANIES.COM · Sep 10, 2021
BOMBARDIER.COM FILES PART1+2 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
TRANSPORT.NSW.GOV.AU FILES PART2 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
CGG.COM FILES PART3 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
STERIS.COM FILES PART3 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
DANAHER.COM FILES PART9 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
BOMBARDIER.COM FILES PART3 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
TRANSPORT.NSW.GOV.AU FILES PART3 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
STERIS.COM FILES PART4 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
DANAHER.COM FILES PART10 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
BOMBARDIER.COM FILES PART4 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
TRANSPORT.NSW.GOV.AU FILES PART4 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
CSAGROUP.ORG FILES PART1+2 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
TRANSPORT.NSW.GOV.AU FILES PART5 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
STERIS.COM FILES PART5 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
BOMBARDIER.COM FILES PART5 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
CSAGROUP.ORG FILES PART3 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
TRANSPORT.NSW.GOV.AU FILES PART6 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
BOMBARDIER.COM FILES PART6 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
FLAGSTAR.COM FILES PART1 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
CSAGROUP.ORG FILES PART4 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
TRANSPORT.NSW.GOV.AU FILES PART7 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
BOMBARDIER.COM FILES PART7 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
FLAGSTAR.COM FILES PART2 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
CSAGROUP.ORG FILES PART5 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
TRANSPORT.NSW.GOV.AU FILES PART8 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
BOMBARDIER.COM FILES PART8 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
FLAGSTAR.COM FILES PART3 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
CSX.COM FILES PART2 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
NOWFOODS.COM FILES PART1 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021
KINZE.COM FILES PART1 PUBLISHED · Sep 9, 2021

In the newsAll →

Victim posts come from the group's leak site via RansomLook and are claims, not confirmations. The profile is written by the model from public reporting and refreshed monthly; earnings figures cite their source and year. First tracked .