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Ars Technica · Securitypublished ()ingested

Ongoing campaign compromises senior execs’ Azure accounts, locks them using MFA

mediumThreat actorimportance 45

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
domainacedatacenter.com.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure acedatacenter[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure Sok
domainairtel.com.]net Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure airtel[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure mtn
domainalexhost.comtoday Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure alexhost[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure mol
domainlobnya.comhacel[.]ru Domain Domain used for targeted phishing threats lobnya[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure mak
domainmakeapp.today.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure makeapp[.]today Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure ale
domainmol.ru.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure mol[.]ru Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure sma
domainmtnonline.com.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure mtnonline[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure ace
domainsachacel.ruer Agent involved in attack’s access and post-access phases sachacel[.]ru Domain Domain used for targeted phishing threats lobnya[.
domainsmartape.net[.]ru Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure smartape[.]net Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure air
Full article570 words · extracted from arstechnica.com · click to collapse

Examples of obfuscation mailbox rules created by attackers following successful account takeover.

Credit: Proofpoint

Examples of obfuscation mailbox rules created by attackers following successful account takeover. Credit: Proofpoint

The compromises are coming from several proxies that act as intermediaries between the attackers’ originating infrastructure and the accounts being targeted. The proxies help the attackers align the geographical location assigned to the connecting IP address with the region of the target. This helps to bypass various geofencing policies that restrict the number and location of IP addresses that can access the targeted system. The proxy services often change mid-campaign, a strategy that makes it harder for those defending against the attacks to block the IPs where the malicious activities originate.

Other techniques designed to obfuscate the attackers’ operational infrastructure include data hosting services and compromised domains.

“Beyond the use of proxy services, we have seen attackers utilize certain local fixed-line ISPs, potentially exposing their geographical locations,” Monday’s post stated. “Notable among these non-proxy sources are the Russia-based ‘Selena Telecom LLC’, and Nigerian providers ‘Airtel Networks Limited’ and ‘MTN Nigeria Communication Limited.’ While Proofpoint has not currently attributed this campaign to any known threat actor, there is a possibility that Russian and Nigerian attackers may be involved, drawing parallels to previous cloud attacks.”

How to check if you’re a target

There are several telltale signs of targeting. The most helpful one is a specific user agent used during the access phase of the attack: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

Attackers predominantly utilize this user-agent to access the ‘OfficeHome’ sign-in application along with unauthorized access to additional native Microsoft365 apps, such as:

  • Office365 Shell WCSS-Client (indicative of browser access to Office365 applications)
  • Office 365 Exchange Online (indicative of post-compromise mailbox abuse, data exfiltration, and email threats proliferation)
  • My Signins (used by attackers for MFA manipulation)
  • My Apps
  • My Profile

Proofpoint included the following Indicators of compromise:

Indicator  Type  Description 
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 User Agent User Agent involved in attack’s access phase
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 User Agent User Agent involved in attack’s access and post-access phases
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 User Agent User Agent involved in attack’s access and post-access phases
sachacel[.]ru Domain Domain used for targeted phishing threats
lobnya[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
makeapp[.]today Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
alexhost[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
mol[.]ru Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
smartape[.]net Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
airtel[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
mtnonline[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
acedatacenter[.]com Domain Source domain used as malicious infrastructure
Sokolov Dmitry Nikolaevich ISP Source ISP used as malicious infrastructure
Dom Tehniki Ltd ISP Source ISP used as malicious infrastructure
Selena Telecom LLC ISP Source ISP used as malicious infrastructure

As the campaign is ongoing, Proofpoint may update the indicators as more become available. The company advised companies to pay close attention to the user agent and source domains of incoming connections to employee accounts. Other helpful defenses are employing security defenses that look for signs of both initial account compromise and post-compromise activities, identifying initial vectors of compromise such as phishing, malware, or impersonation, and putting in place auto-remediation policies to drive out attackers quickly in the event they get in.

Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/02/ongoing-campaign-compromises-senior-execs-azure-accounts-locks-them-using-mfa/