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Exploit / PoChighExploited in the wild

Ongoing exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD

Cisco Talos ()9 min read6 · 3 reads
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Vulnerabilities mentioned

All
CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSSignalsPublished
CVE-2026-20122
Arbitrary File Overwrite via Privileged APIs in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager
5.426%KEV
KEV
CVE-2026-20127
Authentication Bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager, Validator
10.089%KEV
KEV
CVE-2026-20133
+1 related CVE
Actively Exploited Information Disclosure in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager
7.531%KEV
KEV
CVE-2026-20182
Authentication Bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Control Components
10.092%KEV
KEV

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domain1a820b09-95ba-44eb-b350-417e8241b725-00-1lgwuuen9b77p.worf.replitCluster 8 - Download URL for the Nim-based backdoor hxxps://1a820b09-95ba-44eb-b350-417e8241b725-00-1lgwuuen9b77p[.]worf[.]replit.dev/download Cluster 8 - Attacker controlled sub-domain
domaina820b09-95ba-44eb-b350-417e8241b725-00-1lgwuuen9b77p.worf.replittacker controlled sub-domain hosting the Nim-based backdoor a820b09-95ba-44eb-b350-417e8241b725-00-1lgwuuen9b77p[.]worf[.]replit.dev Cluster 8 - Attacker IP that downloaded the Nim-bas
domainreplit.devaded and executed post-compromise from the remote location “replit[.]dev”: Figure 6. Download and startup script for the Nim-based
ipv4104.233.156.1e attributed to this cluster: 38.60.214[.]92 65.20.67[.]134 104.233.156[.]1 194.233.100[.]40 Figure 4. Godzilla webshell deployed in
ipv413.62.52.206d by the agent to communicate with the C2 hosted on “hxxp://13[.]62[.]52[.]206:5004”. This tool was downloaded and executed post-com
ipv4176.65.139.315a80 Cluster 8 - IP related to Nim-based backdoor and KScan 176[.]65[.]139[.]31 Cluster 9 - gsocket d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed84173
ipv4194.163.175.135temd-resolved” and the agent’s command and control (C2) is “194[.]163[.]175[.]135:4445”. The authors have changed the default TCP banne
ipv4194.233.100.40this cluster: 38.60.214[.]92 65.20.67[.]134 104.233.156[.]1 194.233.100[.]40 Figure 4. Godzilla webshell deployed in Cluster #4. Clust
ipv4212.83.162.37Behinder webshell under the filename “sysinit.jsp”. The IP “212.83.162[.]37” was used to carry out the exploit and interact with the
ipv423.27.143.170with the filename “CWan”. The Sliver sample’s C2 is “mtls://23.27.143[.]170:443”. Cluster 7 In this cluster of activity, since at lea
ipv438.181.52.89y out the exploit and subsequently interact with the shell: 38.181.52[.]89 89.125.244[.]33 89.125.244[.]51 Figure 1. Tas9er Godzilla
ipv438.60.214.92ikp.jsp”. The following IPs are attributed to this cluster: 38.60.214[.]92 65.20.67[.]134 104.233.156[.]1 194.233.100[.]40 Figure 4.
ipv447.104.248.798161056b7c8f70c9724d8a63abc7ff8c3843b91c30cffab0899e39b7f8 47[.]104[.]248[.]7 b0f51b098842cd630097b462aab0ec357e2c7824af37cca6d0816
ipv465.20.67.134ollowing IPs are attributed to this cluster: 38.60.214[.]92 65.20.67[.]134 104.233.156[.]1 194.233.100[.]40 Figure 4. Godzilla websh
ipv471.80.85.135AES encryption commonly observed in other variants. The IP “71.80.85[.]135” was used to carry out the exploit and interact with the
ipv479.135.105.208the compromised system while connected from the source IP “79[.]135[.]105[.]208”. This is likely a ProtonVPN node. Replit is an AI pl
ipv483.229.126.195d and deployed via a shell script from the remote location “83.229.126[.]195”. Figure 5. Download and startup script for XMRig. This I
ipv489.125.244.33it and subsequently interact with the shell: 38.181.52[.]89 89.125.244[.]33 89.125.244[.]51 Figure 1. Tas9er Godzilla shellcode deplo
ipv489.125.244.51tly interact with the shell: 38.181.52[.]89 89.125.244[.]33 89.125.244[.]51 Figure 1. Tas9er Godzilla shellcode deployed in Cluster #
md5fece5b954e69b2c6a8d0a1029631a0d7ong with a Mythic C2 server certificate with serial number: fece5b954e69b2c6a8d0a1029631a0d7 Another AdaptixC2 server on port 31337 An open SSH service
sha25602654acfb21f83485393ba8b14bd8862b919b9ec966fc6768f6aac1338a45ee8- AdaptixC2 C2 IP 194[.]163[.]175[.]135 Cluster 6 - Sliver 02654acfb21f83485393ba8b14bd8862b919b9ec966fc6768f6aac1338a45ee8 Cluster 6 - Sliver C2 over mTLS mtls[://]23.27.143[.]170:44
sha2560c87871642f84e09e8d3fb23ec36bf55601323e31151a7017a85dbec929cf15d126[.]195:8081/config[.]json Cluster 8 - Nim-based backdoor 0c87871642f84e09e8d3fb23ec36bf55601323e31151a7017a85dbec929cf15d Cluster 8 - Download URL for the Nim-based backdoor hxxps:/
sha2560ed72d52347bfe4a78afff8a6982a64050c8fc86d8957a20eeb3e0f3f5342ed0r C2 IP 23.27.143[.]170 Cluster 7 - XMRig downloader script 0ed72d52347bfe4a78afff8a6982a64050c8fc86d8957a20eeb3e0f3f5342ed0 Cluster 7 - XMRig sample 96fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb12
sha25617302d903baf182f94dc3be40ab1e0874dd0eb2ec5255bf9131fd53591efe9250ce97de3eaaffef33d90b0c337a153fc9690cc34ee207b557d868360060 17302d903baf182f94dc3be40ab1e0874dd0eb2ec5255bf9131fd53591efe925
sha25618d77c9c5bbb5b9d5bdfd366fdfcf26bad9e64c63ca865fad711bcce8e3d5a80ckdoor 13[.]62[.]52[.]206 Cluster 8 - KScan – scanning tool 18d77c9c5bbb5b9d5bdfd366fdfcf26bad9e64c63ca865fad711bcce8e3d5a80 Cluster 8 - IP related to Nim-based backdoor and KScan 176[
sha2565bc5998161056b7c8f70c9724d8a63abc7ff8c3843b91c30cffab0899e39b7f8bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa Cluster 9 - gsocket secret file 5bc5998161056b7c8f70c9724d8a63abc7ff8c3843b91c30cffab0899e39b7f8 47[.]104[.]248[.]7 b0f51b098842cd630097b462aab0ec357e2c7824
sha25672f570ce97de3eaaffef33d90b0c337a153fc9690cc34ee207b557d868360060cca6d08165265da2c2d3 Cluster 10 - Check for root escalation 72f570ce97de3eaaffef33d90b0c337a153fc9690cc34ee207b557d868360060 17302d903baf182f94dc3be40ab1e0874dd0eb2ec5255bf9131fd53591e
sha2567aa88a64a527ade7d93c20faf23b54f2ee33ad9b1246cdc2f8ded2ab639affb104976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad46 Cluster 7 - XMRig configuration 7aa88a64a527ade7d93c20faf23b54f2ee33ad9b1246cdc2f8ded2ab639affb1 Cluster 7 - XMRig remote location IP 83[.]229[.]126[.]195 C
sha25696fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad464050c8fc86d8957a20eeb3e0f3f5342ed0 Cluster 7 - XMRig sample 96fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad46 Cluster 7 - XMRig configuration 7aa88a64a527ade7d93c20faf23
sha256b0f51b098842cd630097b462aab0ec357e2c7824af37cca6d08165265da2c2d34d8a63abc7ff8c3843b91c30cffab0899e39b7f8 47[.]104[.]248[.]7 b0f51b098842cd630097b462aab0ec357e2c7824af37cca6d08165265da2c2d3 Cluster 10 - Check for root escalation 72f570ce97de3eaaffef
sha256d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfabackdoor and KScan 176[.]65[.]139[.]31 Cluster 9 - gsocket d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa Cluster 9 - gsocket secret file 5bc5998161056b7c8f70c9724d8
sha256f6f8e0d790645395188fc521039385b7c4f42fa8b426fd035f489f6cda9b5da1]134 104.233.156[.]1 194.233.100[.]40 Cluster 5 - AdaptixC2 f6f8e0d790645395188fc521039385b7c4f42fa8b426fd035f489f6cda9b5da1 Cluster 5 - AdaptixC2 C2 server 194[.]163[.]175[.]135:4445
urlhttp://13.62.52.206:500479[.]135[.]105[.]208 Cluster 8 - C2 for Nim-based backdoor hxxp://13[.]62[.]52[.]206:5004 Cluster 8 - C2 IP for Nim-based backdoor 13[.]62[.]52
urlhttp://13.62.52.206:5004”be used by the agent to communicate with the C2 hosted on “hxxp://13[.]62[.]52[.]206:5004”. This tool was downloaded and executed post-compromis
urlhttp://83.229.126.195:8081/config.json/xmrig Cluster 7 - XMRig configuration file remote location hxxp://83[.]229[.]126[.]195:8081/config[.]json Cluster 8 - Nim-based backdoor 0c87871642f84e09e8d3
urlhttp://83.229.126.195:8081/xmrigcation IP 83[.]229[.]126[.]195 Cluster 7 - XMRig remote URL hxxp://83[.]229[.]126[.]195:8081/xmrig Cluster 7 - XMRig configuration file remote location
urlhttps://1a820b09-95ba-44eb-b350-417e8241b725-00-1lgwuuen9b77p.worf.replit.dev/download29cf15d Cluster 8 - Download URL for the Nim-based backdoor hxxps://1a820b09-95ba-44eb-b350-417e8241b725-00-1lgwuuen9b77p[.]worf[.]replit.dev/download Cluster 8 - Attacker controlled sub-domain hosting the

From the original article

9 min read at blog.talosintelligence.com

Cisco Talos is tracking the active exploitation of CVE-2026-20182 , an authentication bypass vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, formerly SD-WAN vSmart, and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage. Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-20182 allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain administrative privileges on an affected system.

Cisco Talos

blog.talosintelligence.com

Read the full article at Cisco Talos

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