ZeroHour
The Hacker Newspublished ()ingested @TheHackersNews

Critical Flaws in Traccar GPS System Expose Users to Remote Attacks

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2024-24809
Traccar is an open source GPS tracking system.

Traccar is an open source GPS tracking system. Versions prior to 6.0 are vulnerable to path traversal and unrestricted upload of file with dangerous type. Since the system allows registration by default, attackers can acquire ordinary user permissions by registering an account and exploit this vulnerability to upload files with the prefix `device.` under any folder. Attackers can use this vulnerability for phishing, cross-site scripting attacks, and potentially execute arbitrary commands on the server. Version 6.0 contains a patch for the issue.

NVD description · AI analysis pending
8.554%
CVE-2024-2809
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Tenda AC15 15.03.05.18/15.03.20_multi.

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Tenda AC15 15.03.05.18/15.03.20_multi. Affected is the function formSetFirewallCfg of the file /goform/SetFirewallCfg. The manipulation of the argument firewallEn leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-257664. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

NVD description · AI analysis pending
9.82% PoC
  • tenda ac15 firmware
CVE-2024-31214
Traccar is an open source GPS tracking system.

Traccar is an open source GPS tracking system. Traccar versions 5.1 through 5.12 allow arbitrary files to be uploaded through the device image upload API. Attackers have full control over the file contents, full control over the directory where the file is stored, full control over the file extension, and partial control over the file name. While it's not for an attacker to overwrite an existing file, an attacker can create new files with certain names and attacker-controlled extensions anywhere on the file system. This can potentially lead to remote code execution, XSS, DOS, etc. The default install of Traccar makes this vulnerability more severe. Self-registration is enabled by default, allowing anyone to create an account to exploit this vulnerability. Traccar also runs by default with root/system privileges, allowing files to be placed anywhere on the file system. Version 6.0 contains a fix for the issue. One may also turn off self-registration by default, as that would make most vulnerabilities in the application much harder to exploit by default and reduce the severity considerably.

NVD description · AI analysis pending
9.618% PoC
  • traccar traccar
Full article458 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

Ravie LakshmananAug 26, 2024Software Security / Vulnerability

Two security vulnerabilities have been disclosed in the open-source Traccar GPS tracking system that could be potentially exploited by unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution under certain circumstances.

Both the vulnerabilities are path traversal flaws and could be weaponized if guest registration is enabled, which is the default configuration for Traccar 5, Horizon3.ai researcher Naveen Sunkavally said.

A brief description of the shortcomings is as follows -

  • CVE-2024-24809 (CVSS score: 8.5) - Path Traversal: 'dir/../../filename' and unrestricted upload of file with dangerous type
  • CVE-2024-31214 (CVSS score: 9.7) - Unrestricted file upload vulnerability in device image upload could lead to remote code execution

"The net result of CVE-2024-31214 and CVE-2024-24809 is that an attacker can place files with arbitrary content anywhere on the file system," Sunkavally said. "However an attacker only has partial control over the filename."

The issues have to do with how the program handles device image file uploads, effectively allowing an attacker to overwrite certain files on the file system and trigger code execution. This includes files matching the below naming format -

  • device.ext, where the attacker can control ext, but there MUST be an extension
  • blah", where the attacker can control blah but the filename must end with a double quote
  • blah1";blah2=blah3, where the attacker can control blah1, blah2, and blah3, but the double quote semicolon sequence and equals symbol MUST be present

In a hypothetical proof-of-concept (PoC) devised by Horizon3.ai, an adversary can exploit the path traversal in the Content-Type header to upload a crontab file and obtain a reverse shell on the attacker host.

This attack method, however, does not work on Debian/Ubuntu-based Linux systems due to file naming restrictions that bar crontab files from having periods or double quotes.

An alternative mechanism entails taking advantage of Traccar being installed as a root-level user to drop a kernel module or configuring an udev rule to run an arbitrary command every time a hardware event is raised.

On susceptible Windows instances, remote code execution could also be achieved by placing a shortcut (LNK) file named "device.lnk" in the C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp folder, which gets subsequently executed when any victim user logs into the Traccar host.

Traccar versions 5.1 to 5.12 are vulnerable to CVE-2024-31214 and CVE-2024-2809. The issues have been addressed with the release of Traccar 6 in April 2024 which turns off self-registration by default, thereby reducing the attack surface.

"If the registration setting is true, readOnly is false, and deviceReadonly is false, then an unauthenticated attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities," Sunkavally said. "These are the default settings for Traccar 5."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/critical-flaws-in-traccar-gps-system.html