Sociotechnical Aspects of Tor Relay Rejection
User study and simulations of Tor's relay end-of-life rejection policy find operators favor it; network churn affects anonymity more than EoL exclusions.
The study examines the Tor Project's 2019 end-of-life policy that rejects outdated relays, which constitute a notable fraction of consensus weight. A user study of 26 relay operators found they generally view the policy favorably despite limited awareness, though operational practices occasionally exclude newly installed relays. Historical-data-driven simulations show the policy gives adversaries only marginal advantage, with network churn exerting a more pronounced effect on user anonymity. Analysis of four exclusion rounds shows a minority of rejected relays typically account for over 50% of the security provided by all excluded relays, informing EoL policy recommendations.
- Tor's 2019 EoL policy rejects outdated relay versions from consensus
- 26-operator study shows generally favorable but unevenly known policy
- Simulations show marginal adversarial advantage; churn matters more
- Minority of rejected relays provides over 50% of excluded-relay security
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgIn 2019, the Tor Project enforced an end-of-life (EoL) policy for Tor versions, leading to the rejection of outdated relays, amounting to a notable fraction of consensus weight. While this policy aids network maintenance, reduces backporting efforts, and shortens vulnerability exposure, its sociotechnical implications remain unstudied.
By Jules Dejaeghere · arxiv.org
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