ZeroHour
Security Affairspublished ()ingested @securityaffairs

Experts detailed a previously undetected VMware ESXi backdoor

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2019-5544
Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in OpenSLP Used by VMware ESXi and Horizon DaaS

CVE-2019-5544 is a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-787, heap overwrite) in the OpenSLP service shipped with VMware ESXi and the Horizon DaaS appliances, rated Critical at CVSSv3 9.8 by VMware. The flaw is reachable through the network-facing Service Location Protocol service with no authentication, privileges, or user interaction (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), so a remote attacker can trigger the heap overwrite with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact — in practice, remote code execution on the affected host. Organizations running affected ESXi builds or Horizon DaaS appliances are directly exposed, and CPE data also ties the flaw to upstream OpenSLP and Red Hat Enterprise Linux/Fedora packages that ship it. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA KEV on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use and EPSS puts its 30-day exploitation probability at 97.3%. Related reporting describes criminals exploiting VMware ESXi flaws to encrypt VM disks and a previously undetected ESXi backdoor, and no public PoC is catalogued.

Do: Apply updates per vendor instructions — the CISA KEV required action — for ESXi, Horizon DaaS, and any affected OpenSLP packages from Red Hat/Fedora. As an interim mitigation, restrict or disable the SLP service (TCP/UDP port 427) on ESXi hosts and avoid exposing management interfaces to the internet. Given known ransomware use since the 2021-11-03 KEV listing, hunt for signs of compromise on any unpatched ESXi hosts.

9.897% KEV ransomware
  • VMware ESXi
  • VMware Horizon DaaS (appliance)
  • OpenSLP (upstream)
  • +9 more
masshundreds of thousands to millions of ESXi hosts deployed; tens of thousands internet-exposed with the SLP service (port 427) reachable
CVE-2020-3992
Use-After-Free RCE in VMware ESXi OpenSLP Service (Port 427)

CVE-2020-3992 is a use-after-free (CWE-416) in the OpenSLP service used by VMware ESXi, rated critical at CVSS 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker with access to port 427 on an ESXi host's management network can send crafted SLP traffic that triggers the memory-reuse flaw and gains remote code execution on the hypervisor. Successful exploitation grants full control of the ESXi host, and attackers have used these OpenSLP flaws in the ESXiArgs ransomware campaign to encrypt the disks of hosted virtual machines. Affected products are ESXi 7.0, 6.7 and 6.5 prior to the October 2020 patch releases (as well as the related VMware Cloud Foundation). The flaw is in CISA's KEV catalog (added 2021-11-03) with ransomware use confirmed, and EPSS assigns an 83% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile); no public PoC is listed in the source data.

Do: Apply VMware's ESXi security patches: ESXi_7.0.1-0.0.16850804 (7.0), ESXi670-202010401-SG (6.7), or ESXi650-202010401-SG (6.5), or the corresponding VMware Cloud Foundation update, per CISA's required action. As interim mitigation, restrict or disable the SLP service and firewall port 427 so ESXi management interfaces are not reachable from the internet. Because ransomware use is confirmed, check hosts for signs of compromise; CISA has published an ESXiArgs recovery script for affected deployments.

9.883% KEV ransomware
  • vmware ESXi 7.0 before ESXi_7.0.1-0.0.16850804
  • vmware ESXi 6.7 before ESXi670-202010401-SG
  • vmware ESXi 6.5 before ESXi650-202010401-SG
  • +1 more
large≈90,000-100,000 internet-exposed ESXi hosts on port 427 (many more reachable only on internal management networks)
Full article434 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

Pierluigi Paganini December 13, 2022

A new Python backdoor is targeting VMware ESXi servers, allowing attackers to take over compromised systems.

Juniper Networks researchers spotted a previously undocumented Python backdoor targeting VMware ESXi servers. The researchers discovered the backdoor in October 2022, experts pointed out the implant is notable for its simplicity, persistence and capabilities.

The experts were not able to determine the initial compromise due to limited log retention on the compromised server, they speculate attackers may have exploited known issues (i.e. CVE-2019-5544 and CVE-2020-3992) in ESXi’s OpenSLP service.

The backdoor maintain persistence by modifying some systems files such as /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh , which is executed at startup.

VMware ESXi

The following line of code launches a Python script that starts a web server. The webserver accepts password-protected POST requests from the attackers, each request can include a base-64 encoded command payload or launch a reverse shell on the host.

“While the Python script used in this attack is cross-platform and can be used with little or no modification on Linux or other UNIX-like systems, there are several indications that this attack was designed specifically to target ESXi.” reads the analysis published by Juniper. “The name of the file and its location, /store/packages/vmtools.py, was chosen to raise little suspicion on a virtualization host.”

Below is the list of files installed or modified in this attack:

  • /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh: stored in RAM, but changes are backed up and restored on reboot
  • /bin/hostd-probe.sh: changes are stored in RAM and reapplied after a reboot
  • /store/packages/vmtools.py: saved to the persistent disk stores used for VM disk images, logs, etc.
  • /etc/vmware/rhttpproxy/endpoints.conf: changes are stored in RAM and reapplied after a reboot

In order to allow access by remote attackers, they changed the configuration of the ESXi reverse HTTP proxy. The mappings from pathnames to network ports are stored in the configuration file, /etc/vmware/rhttpproxy/endpoints.conf.

The changes to the above file are persistent because it is one of the system files that are backed up and restored automatically at the reboot.

In order to determine if your installation was compromised the researchers recommend review the vmtools.py and local.sh files.

“The hashed password in vmtools.py has been redacted because it might uniquely identify the compromised server, so that file’s hash should not be used as an IOC. The modifications to hostd-probe.sh and endpoints.conf are shown in their entirety above.” concludes the report.

Experts also recommend applying all vendor patches as soon as possible, restricting incoming network connections to trusted hosts.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

[adrotate banner=”9″][adrotate banner=”12″]

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, vmware)

[adrotate banner=”5″]

[adrotate banner=”13″]



Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/139586/hacking/vmware-esxi-backdoor.html