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ANSSI warns of Russia

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2020-12641
Command Injection RCE in Roundcube Webmail (CVE-2020-12641)

Roundcube Webmail versions before 1.4.4 contain an OS command injection flaw (CWE-78) in rcube_image.php: shell metacharacters in the im_convert_path or im_identify_path configuration settings are not escaped before the configured ImageMagick binaries are executed. When image processing is triggered, an attacker who can control those configuration values can append arbitrary shell commands that run with the privileges of the web server user, yielding full remote code execution on the mail server. Successful exploitation can expose stored email, mail credentials, and the underlying host; the flaw is scored 9.8 (critical), with no privileges or user interaction required per the CVSS vector. Any self-hosted Roundcube deployment older than 1.4.4 is affected, including Roundcube packages shipped by openSUSE Leap and openSUSE Backports for SUSE Linux Enterprise. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2023-06-22, EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at ~84%, and headlines note APT28-linked activity targeting government Roundcube servers, including Ukrainian entities.

Do: Upgrade Roundcube to 1.4.4 or later, or apply the vendor-patched openSUSE Leap / SLE backport packages, as required by the CISA KEV listing (added 2023-06-22). After patching, verify that im_convert_path and im_identify_path settings contain no unescaped metacharacters and review web server logs for injected command activity; given APT28's targeting of government Roundcube servers, prioritize public-sector mail infrastructure for patching and threat hunting.

9.884% KEV PoC
  • roundcube webmail all versions before 1.4.4
  • opensuse leap packages shipping Roundcube before 1.4.4 (fixed via openSUSE updates)
  • opensuse backports sle packages shipping Roundcube before 1.4.4 (fixed via openSUSE updates)
masstens of thousands of internet-exposed Roundcube instances; millions of end users via bundled/self-hosted deployments (estimate)
CVE-2020-35730
Cross-Site Scripting in Roundcube Webmail Plain-Text Email Link Handling

Roundcube Webmail contains a cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw (CWE-79) in the link-reference handling of rcube_string_replacer.php, where the linkref_addindex function mishandles JavaScript embedded in a link element of a plain-text email. An attacker triggers the flaw simply by sending a crafted plain-text message to a victim; when the message is processed/displayed in the Roundcube interface, the embedded script executes in the context of the victim's webmail session. Successful exploitation can lead to session hijacking, theft of webmail cookies or credentials, and arbitrary actions in the victim's mailbox. Any deployment of Roundcube Webmail is affected, which includes self-hosted instances and webmail offered by hosting providers, ISPs, and universities. Although no public proof-of-concept is known, CISA added this vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-06-22, confirming exploitation in the wild; ransomware association is unknown, and no CVSS score is yet available, though EPSS puts 30-day exploitation probability at 32.7% (98th percentile).

Do: Apply the vendor's updated Roundcube release per CISA's required action (updates per vendor instructions); since no specific fixed versions appear in this data, install the latest patched release of your deployed 1.x branch and verify with the vendor advisory. Check webmail servers for processing of plain-text messages with link-reference elements and review logs for anomalous webmail sessions; treat KEV-listed status as evidence of active exploitation and prioritize internet-exposed Roundcube instances.

6.133% KEV
  • Roundcube Webmail
masslikely >1M users across tens of thousands of exposed instances (Roundcube is bundled as webmail in cPanel/Plesk and by many ISPs)
CVE-2021-44026
SQL Injection in Roundcube Webmail via Search Parameters

Roundcube Webmail contains a SQL injection flaw (CWE-89) in which attacker-controlled 'search' or 'search_params' input is incorporated into database queries without sufficient sanitization. An attacker with access to the webmail search functionality (typically an authenticated mailbox user) can submit crafted parameters to execute arbitrary SQL against the Roundcube backend database, potentially reading or modifying stored mail account data. Any organization running Roundcube is affected, including self-hosted mail servers and customers of hosting providers that ship Roundcube as their bundled webmail client. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-06-22, indicating exploitation in the wild, and EPSS assigns a 41.9% probability of exploitation within 30 days (99th percentile). No public proof-of-concept is known, and CISA lists ransomware use as unknown.

Do: Apply vendor updates per Roundcube's instructions by upgrading to the latest patched, supported release, prioritizing internet-facing webmail servers; federal agencies must remediate per the CISA KEV requirement. If Roundcube is managed by a hosting provider (e.g., via cPanel), coordinate patching with them. In the interim, restrict webmail exposure and review database and web logs for anomalous search-related queries that may indicate exploitation.

9.842% KEV
  • Roundcube Webmail
massmillions of users across tens of thousands of exposed Roundcube deployments (estimated)
CVE-2022-30190
MSDT URL Protocol Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Windows (Follina)

CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) is a remote code execution flaw in the Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) when MSDT is invoked through its ms-msdt URL protocol by a calling application such as Microsoft Word. Attackers trigger it by luring a user into opening a malicious document — typically a Word/RTF file whose link or remotely linked template launches the ms-msdt: URI with attacker-supplied commands — and CVSS 3.1 rates it 7.8 with a local attack vector and required user interaction. A successful exploit runs arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling application, allowing the attacker to install programs, view, change or delete data, or create new accounts in the user's context. Per the CISA data, affected platforms are Windows 7, 8.1 and RT 8.1, Windows 10 versions 1507 through 21H2, Windows 11 21H2, and Windows Server 2008 and 2012 — essentially any Windows installation that ships MSDT, with Office/Word as the common delivery vector. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: Microsoft acknowledged it as an exploited zero-day, CISA added it to the KEV on 2022-06-14 with known ransomware use, EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 99.2% (99th percentile), and contemporaneous reporting also tied its use to espionage actors including APT28.

Do: Apply Microsoft's security updates per vendor instructions (the fix shipped in the June 2022 Patch Tuesday releases for the affected Windows versions), as required by CISA's KEV. If patching must be delayed, follow Microsoft's documented mitigation to disable the MSDT URL protocol (remove or restrict the HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ms-msdt registry key) and enforce Office Protected View / block Word from fetching remote templates over the network. Hunt for exploitation by checking whether Office processes (WINWORD.exe) launch msdt.exe or sdiagnhost.exe, or whether ms-msdt: URIs are invoked unexpectedly.

7.899% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Microsoft Windows 10 1507, 1607, 1809, 20H2, 21H1, 21H2
  • Microsoft Windows 11 21H2
  • Microsoft Windows 7
  • +4 more
mass≈1 billion+ Windows devices (effectively the entire supported Windows installed base)
CVE-2023-23397
Zero-Click Elevation of Privilege in Microsoft Outlook (Forced NTLM Credential Leak)

CVE-2023-23397 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook caused by improper input validation (CWE-20) combined with authentication bypass via spoofed authentication data on the channel (CWE-294), allowing an attacker to force Outlook to authenticate to an attacker-controlled SMB/WebDAV server. It is triggered when Outlook processes a crafted email or calendar object — for example a meeting or task reminder whose sound property points to an attacker-supplied UNC path — and requires no user interaction. That authentication exchange leaks the victim's NTLM credential hash, which the attacker can crack offline or relay to authenticate as the victim and access resources such as Exchange mailboxes, effectively escalating privileges. Affected software spans Microsoft 365 Apps, Microsoft Office (including the Long Term Servicing Channel), and Microsoft Outlook, which are deployed across enterprises, governments, and militaries worldwide. It is actively exploited in the wild — added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-03-14 with a 97.4% EPSS — and Microsoft has warned of exploitation by Russia-aligned threat actors in campaigns against government and military mail servers, with patches shipped in Microsoft's March 2023 security updates.

Do: Apply Microsoft's March 2023 security updates to Microsoft 365 Apps, Office/LTSC, and Outlook immediately, per CISA's required action. As interim mitigation, enable Extended Protection for Authentication or add accounts to the Protected Users group to block the NTLM credential leak, and audit calendar and task reminder sound properties for UNC paths (Microsoft published an audit/cleanup script for this) while watching for unexpected outbound SMB/WebDAV connections from hosts running Outlook.

9.897% KEV
  • Microsoft 365 Apps Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • Microsoft Office Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • Microsoft Office Long Term Servicing Channel (LTSC) Affected builds as covered by Microsoft's March 2023 security updates; see Microsoft advisory for exact build ranges
  • +1 more
masson the order of hundreds of millions of users (Outlook ships with Microsoft Office/Microsoft 365, the dominant enterprise and government email suite)

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
domainmockbin.org“mocky[.]io,” while the output of the commands was sent to “mockbin[.]org”. Both MOCKY and MOCKBIN are public services used to gene
domainmocky.iot of installed security patches.” The script was hosted on “mocky[.]io,” while the output of the commands was sent to “mockbin[.
Full article656 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

France National Agency for the Security of Information Systems warns that the Russia-linked APT28 group has breached several critical networks.

The French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information) warns that the Russia-linked APT28 group has been targeting multiple French organizations, including government entities, businesses, universities, and research institutes and think tanks.

The French agency noticed that the threat actors used different techniques to avoid detection, including the compromise of low-risk equipment monitored and located at the edge of the target networks. The Government experts pointed out that in some cases the group did not deployed any backdoor in the compromised systems.

The report published by ANSSI is based on technical reports published in open source and elements collected during incident response operations carried out by the agency.

The document provides details about the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) associated with threar actors since the second half of 2021. The document also includes a series of recommendations to protect against this type of attack.

The APT28 group (aka Fancy BearPawn StormSofacy GroupSednit, BlueDelta, and STRONTIUM) has been active since at least 2007 and it has targeted governments, militaries, and security organizations worldwide. The group was involved also in the string of attacks that targeted 2016 Presidential election.

The group operates out of military unity 26165 of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS).

Most of the APT28s’ campaigns leveraged spear-phishing and malware-based attacks.

ANSSI observed at least three attack techniques employed by APT28 in the attacks against French organizations:

  • searching for zero-day vulnerabilities [T1212, T1587.004];
  • compromise of routers and personal email accounts [T1584.005, T1586.002];
  • the use of open source tools and online services [T1588.002, T1583.006]. ANSSI investigations confirm that APT28 exploited the Outlook 0-day vulnerability CVE-2023-23397. According to other partners, over this period, the MOA also exploited other vulnerabilities, such as that affecting Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT, CVE-2022-30190, also called Follina) as well as
    than those targeting the Roundcube application (CVE-2020-12641, CVE-2020-35730, CVE-2021-44026).

The attackers build and maintain part of their attack infrastructure by compromising routers and personal email accounts of individuals and businesses. APT28 used the compromised email accounts to send malicious emails and compromised routers to recover exfiltrated data.

Incident response investigations conducted by ANSSI confirmed the use of the Mimikatz and reGeorg tools by APT28, the former is a popular collector of sensitive information and the latter is a tunnel creation tool.

“In a campaign documented at the end of April 2023, APT28 operators distributed phishing emails
instructing users to update their system by executing instructions in PowerShell language.” reads the report. “These instructions downloaded and ran a script containing two commands:

  • tasklist, which allows you to list all the processes currently running;
  • systeminfo, which allows you to display detailed configuration information about a computer and its system operating. This information contains, for example, the list of installed security patches.”

The script was hosted on “mocky[.]io,” while the output of the commands was sent to “mockbin[.]org”. Both MOCKY and MOCKBIN are public services used to generate web endpoints to test, track, and simulate an HTTP request or response. The experts believe that the attackers were using the command as part of a reconnaissance phase in an attempt to retrieve information about the target IT environment.

The command and control (C2) infrastructure used by the Russia-linked APT group relies on legitimate services to avoid detection.
The researchers noticed that APT28 hosted the Graphite and DriveOcean implants respectively on
OneDrive and Google Drive services.

ANSSI recommends admins increase the level of cyber security of their networks by implementing additional defense measures.

Additional technical details about the attacks and the agency’s recommendations are included in the report.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Russia)



Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/153131/apt/france-anssi-apt28.html