Competition, Collusion, and Corruption: The Spectrum of MEV Attacks on DAG-Based BFT Consensus Protocols
Researchers map the MEV attack space for DAG-based BFT consensus protocols, showing all six evaluated production protocols are vulnerable to at least some attacks.
The paper organizes maximal extractable value (MEV) attacks on DAG-based Byzantine Fault-Tolerant consensus protocols into an attack space with four families: adversary, protocol, target, and deployment. Experiments isolating individual dimensions empirically measure each dimension's effect on attack success rates across six production DAG-based BFT protocols. Every evaluated protocol is vulnerable to at least a subset of the MEV attacks, and which attacks succeed is mostly dictated by the protocol's own design rather than attacker effort.
- Attack space organized into four families: adversary, protocol, target, and deployment.
- Experiments isolate single dimensions across six production DAG-based BFT protocols.
- Every evaluated protocol is vulnerable to at least a subset of MEV attacks.
- Attack success depends mostly on protocol design rather than attacker effort.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgByzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) protocols guarantee safety and liveness despite the malicious failure of nodes. However, they do not prevent adversarial manipulation of transaction order, where the order a proposer assigns diverges from the order in which clients submitted their transactions.
By Iliya Mirzaei · arxiv.org
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