More on Apple's iPhone Backdoor
Full article181 words · extracted from schneier.com · click to collapse
In this post, I’ll collect links on Apple’s iPhone backdoor for scanning CSAM images. Previous links are here and here.
Apple says that hash collisions in its CSAM detection system were expected, and not a concern. I’m not convinced that this secondary system was originally part of the design, since it wasn’t discussed in the original specification.
Good op-ed from a group of Princeton researchers who developed a similar system:
Our system could be easily repurposed for surveillance and censorship. The design wasn’t restricted to a specific category of content; a service could simply swap in any content-matching database, and the person using that service would be none the wiser.
EDITED TO ADD (8/30): Good essays by Matthew Green and Alex Stamos, Ross Anderson, Edward Snowden, and Susan Landau. And also Kurt Opsahl.
EDITED TO ADD (9/6): Apple is delaying implementation of the scheme.
Tags: Apple, backdoors, hashes, photos, privacy, surveillance
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/08/more-on-apples-iphone-backdoor.html