Cybercriminals are building phishing pages that exist only inside victims’ browsers
Barracuda details a DocuSign-themed phishing campaign that renders login pages locally via blob URLs, abusing genuine Microsoft OAuth and Teams infrastructure.
Barracuda researchers describe a phishing campaign that starts with DocuSign-themed emails carrying calendar invites pointing to genuine Microsoft OAuth endpoints, then routes victims through Microsoft Teams to a resource hosted on cdn.bloom[.]io. The login page is assembled entirely inside the victim's browser from a blob URL, registers a service worker, and runs inside a sandboxed iframe that receives live instructions from the attacker's backend. Hidden command-and-control configuration indicates the page is part of a centrally managed phishing platform that can be updated and steered across many victims. Barracuda recommends phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys or passkeys, monitoring of OAuth flows and redirect chains, and behavior-based identity controls rather than URL blocklisting.
- Phishing page is assembled client-side as a blob URL, registering a service worker and sandboxed iframe.
- DocuSign-themed calendar invites chain through genuine Microsoft OAuth endpoints and Teams to cdn.bloom[.]io.
- Hidden C2 configuration indicates a centrally managed phishing platform steerable across many victims.
- Barracuda recommends FIDO2 keys or passkeys, OAuth flow monitoring, and full redirect-chain inspection.
Indicators of compromiseauto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll →
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| domain | bloom.io | s. Teams loads a resource hosted on an external domain, cdn.bloom[.]io, which ultimately results in the phishing page being rend |
Full article386 words · extracted from helpnetsecurity.com · click to collapse
A phishing campaign routes victims through genuine Microsoft OAuth and Teams infrastructure before showing them a fake login page built entirely inside their own browser, according to researchers at Barracuda.
“Instead of delivering a phishing page from a web server, the malicious content is assembled inside the victim’s browser using a blob URL — a temporary browser-generated URL that points to content stored locally in memory rather than on a website,” researchers explained.
The attack starts with a DocuSign-themed email carrying a calendar invite as an attachment. The invite is not the payload. It exists to make the message look like an ordinary meeting request, and the approach works because it points to a genuine Microsoft OAuth endpoint rather than anything obviously suspicious.

Phishing email impersonating DocuSign (Source: Barracuda)
A crafted redirect parameter then sends the victim to Microsoft Teams. Teams loads a resource hosted on an external domain, cdn.bloom[.]io, which ultimately results in the phishing page being rendered from a blob URL entirely on the victim’s machine.
Once it loads, the page registers a service worker and runs part of its logic inside a sandboxed iframe. Those components let the attacker’s backend send live instructions to the page through browser messaging, allowing the operators to change what the victim sees without relying on a hardcoded redirect.
“Hidden command-and-control configuration shows this is not a standalone page but part of a managed phishing platform that can be centrally operated, updated and steered across many victims at once,” researchers noted.
Barracuda urges stronger identity controls
Barracuda advised users to watch OAuth authorization flows and redirect chains for unexpected destinations, inspect blob URL activity in login or authentication contexts, and flag service worker registrations tied to externally loaded content.
It also recommended phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys or passkeys, email security tools that follow a link’s entire path rather than just the first hop, and training staff to question document-signing requests even when they run through trusted Microsoft infrastructure.
“This campaign demonstrates how phishing is evolving beyond fake websites and suspicious domains, removing many of the indicators that security teams have traditionally relied on for detection,” said Ashitosh Deshnur, Associate Threat Analyst at Barracuda.
“Organizations should focus on identifying malicious behaviour and strengthening identity-based controls rather than simply blocking known phishing URLs,” Deshnur concluded.
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/09/10/browser-based-phishing-blob-urls-microsoft-oauth/