SuperBlack Ransomware operators exploit Fortinet Firewall flaws in recent attacks
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-55591 | Unauthenticated Super-Admin Bypass in Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy CVE-2024-55591 is an authentication bypass (CWE-288) in the Node.js websocket module of Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy that lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker gain super-admin privileges via crafted websocket requests. It affects FortiOS 7.0.0 through 7.0.16 and FortiProxy 7.0.0 through 7.0.19 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.12, and is trivially triggerable from the network with no user interaction given network access to the management/websocket interface. Successful exploitation gives full super-admin control of the appliance, which attackers can use to pivot, create persistent access, and deploy ransomware. Any organization running the affected FortiOS or FortiProxy versions, especially with admin interfaces reachable from the internet, is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-01-14, and multiple ransomware crews (reported as Gunra, SuperBlack, and Mora_001) are actively exploiting it. Do: Upgrade all affected systems beyond the vulnerable ranges — FortiOS later than 7.0.16 and FortiProxy later than 7.0.19 / 7.2.12 — following Fortinet's advisory, or apply the vendor's mitigations where upgrades are not possible (per CISA KEV instructions). Restrict access to the admin/websocket interface from the internet, and hunt for unauthorized super-admin accounts and suspicious websocket connections, since ransomware operators are actively exploiting this flaw. Verify device versions and audit logs for signs of compromise before and after patching. | 9.8 | 98% | KEV ransomware |
| large≈48,000+ internet-exposed Fortinet devices per public scans, out of an installed base in the hundreds of thousands | |
| CVE-2025-24472 | Authentication Bypass in Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy Grants Super-Admin Access CVE-2025-24472 is an authentication bypass (CWE-288) in the Fortinet Security Fabric of FortiOS and FortiProxy. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who already knows the serial numbers of both the upstream and downstream devices can send crafted CSF proxy requests to gain super-admin privileges on the downstream device; the attack only works where the Security Fabric is enabled, and the need for serial-number knowledge raises attack complexity. An attacker gains full super-admin control of the downstream Fortinet device, which can serve as a foothold for network-wide compromise. Organizations running affected FortiOS 7.0.x or FortiProxy 7.0.x/7.2.x builds with Security Fabric enabled are in scope. The flaw was added to CISA's KEV catalog on 2025-03-18 with known ransomware use, and multiple ransomware groups (including Gunra, SuperBlack, Mora_001 and Qilin operators) have been reported exploiting Fortinet firewall flaws in recent campaigns. Do: Upgrade FortiOS 7.0.x and FortiProxy 7.0.x/7.2.x deployments to the fixed releases listed in the Fortinet PSIRT advisory for CVE-2025-24472, and identify any devices where the Security Fabric is enabled and serial numbers of peer devices may be discoverable. As interim mitigation, restrict or disable Security Fabric (CSF) connectivity toward untrusted peers and limit access to the CSF proxy handling path. Because the flaw is KEV-listed with known ransomware use, federal agencies must apply vendor mitigations per BOD 22-01 or discontinue use, and all defenders should review device logs for unexpected super-admin sessions and anomalous CSF proxy traffic. | 8.1 | 7% | KEV ransomware |
| masshundreds of thousands of deployed Fortinet appliances plausibly affected; the practical subset is those with Security Fabric enabled |
Indicators of compromiseauto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll →
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| ipv4 | 1.1.1.1 | P address often spoofed as 127.0.0.1, 13.73.13.73, 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, or other recognizable addresses HTTPS : Attackers use dire |
| ipv4 | 13.73.13.73 | onsole(IP), with the IP address often spoofed as 127.0.0.1, 13.73.13.73, 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, or other recognizable addresses HTTPS : |
| ipv4 | 8.8.8.8 | ith the IP address often spoofed as 127.0.0.1, 13.73.13.73, 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, or other recognizable addresses HTTPS : Attackers |
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Operators behind the SuperBlack ransomware exploited two vulnerabilities in Fortinet firewalls for recent attacks.
Between January and March, researchers at Forescout Research – Vedere Labs observed a threat actors exploiting two Fortinet vulnerabilities to deploy the SuperBlack ransomware. The experts attribute the attacks to a threat actor named “Mora_001” which using Russian-language artifacts and exhibiting a unique operational signature. The experts speculate Mora_001 could be linked to the LockBit ecosystem, reflecting the growing complexity of ransomware operations.
Mora_001 used the leaked LockBit builder to create encryptor, tracked by Forescout as SuperBlack ransomware, and removed any LockBit’s branding.
However Mora_001 is tracked as an independent threat actor, it exhibits consistent post-exploitation tactics, including identical usernames across victims, overlapping IPs, and rapid ransomware deployment within 48 hours. It is interesting to note that the ransom note shares a TOX ID with LockBit, suggesting a potential affiliation. However, its structured playbook and unique operational patterns distinguish it as a separate entity capable of independent intrusions.
The threat actor exploited CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472 in FortiOS and FortiProxy to gain super-admin access on vulnerable Fortinet appliances.
“CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472 allow unauthenticated attackers to gain super_admin privileges on vulnerable FortiOS devices (<7.0.16) with exposed management interfaces.” reads the report published by Forescout. “A proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit was publicly released on January 27, and within 96 hours”
Fortinet patched CVE-2024-55591 in January, later adding CVE-2025-24472 as another attack vector. Just four days after a proof-of-concept exploit for FortiOS was published on January 27, Forescout observed Mora_001 using it to create at least one local system admin account, demonstrating rapid weaponization of these vulnerabilities.
The attackers used two distinct methods:
- jsconsole: Attackers exploit the WebSocket vulnerability via the jsconsole interface. The activity could be spotted by analyzing logs where it appears as jsconsole(IP), with the IP address often spoofed as 127.0.0.1, 13.73.13.73, 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, or other recognizable addresses
- HTTPS: Attackers use direct HTTPS requests, however, this technique appears differently in logs, but it targets the same underlying vulnerability.
The threat actor utilized both the default PoC exploit and slightly modified versions with minor changes, such as altered usernames and IP addresses.
“When the firewall had VPN capabilities, the threat actor created local VPN user accounts with names resembling legitimate accounts but with an added digit at the end. These newly created users were then added to the VPN user group, enabling future logins.” reads the report. “This tactic was likely intended to evade detection during casual administrative reviews, and to maintain persistent access even if the initial entry points were discovered. The actor then manually assigned a password to the newly created users.”
Mora_001 targeted high-value assets like servers and domain controllers, using WMIC for discovery and SSH for access, deploying ransomware only after data exfiltration.
SuperBlack modifies LockBit 3.0’s ransom note and exfiltration tool but retains a wiper component, WipeBlack, which erases ransomware traces post-encryption.
“We have designated this wiper component as “WipeBlack” which has been observed in previous ransomware incidents tied to LockBit and BrainCipher. BrainCipher, in turn, has been linked to SenSayQ, EstateRansomware, and RebornRansomware. Additionally, the wiper’s builder is associated with the leaked LockBit builder, reinforcing its connection to LockBit-linked ransomware operations.” concludes the report. “The wiper file is designed to remove evidence of the ransom executable after encryption.”
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