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Researchers outline the Lazarus APT offensive toolset

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2021-21551
Local Privilege Escalation in Dell dbutil_2_3.sys Driver

CVE-2021-21551 is an insufficient access control flaw (CWE-782) in Dell's dbutil_2_3.sys driver, present on Dell systems for roughly 12 years before being patched. A local, authenticated user can trigger the flaw by sending crafted requests (IOCTLs) to the driver, gaining the ability to read and write arbitrary memory. An attacker who exploits it can escalate privileges (typically to kernel/SYSTEM level), cause a denial of service, or disclose information, making it a useful stepping stone for post-compromise attacks. Any Dell machine that shipped or ran the dbutil driver — used in Dell support and BIOS/BIOS-update tooling — is affected, and public reporting indicates hundreds of millions of Dell PCs are exposed. The flaw is actively exploited: it is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (added 2022-03-31), public PoCs exist, and the Lazarus APT reportedly used it in attacks to deploy a rootkit; EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 79.2%.

Do: Apply Dell's updated driver/firmware per vendor instructions, as required by CISA's KEV catalog. Inventory your fleet for the dbutil_2_3.sys driver file (commonly found with Dell support tools and BIOS update utilities) and prioritize patching endpoints, since the bug requires only local user access. Hunt for signs of local privilege-escalation activity consistent with public PoCs, given documented Lazarus APT use to deploy a rootkit.

7.879% KEV PoC ×2
  • Dell dbutil driver (dbutil_2_3.sys) dbutil_2_3.sys as identified in the advisory; source data provides no detailed fixed-version range, so check for the presence of dbutil_2_3.sys on Dell systems
masshundreds of millions of Dell PCs (the driver was broadly distributed with Dell support/update tooling for over a decade)
Full article574 words · extracted from helpnetsecurity.com · click to collapse

ESET researchers uncovered and analyzed a set of malicious tools that were used by the Lazarus APT group in attacks during the end of 2021. The campaign started with spear phishing emails containing malicious Amazon-themed documents, and it targeted an employee of an aerospace company in the Netherlands and a political journalist in Belgium. The primary goal of the attackers was data exfiltration.

tools lazarus apt

Amazon-themed document sent to the target in the Netherlands. Source: ESET

Both victims were presented with job offers: The employee in the Netherlands received an attachment via LinkedIn Messaging, and the journalist in Belgium received a document via email. The attacks started after these documents were opened. The attackers deployed several malicious tools on the system, including droppers, loaders, fully featured HTTP(S) backdoors, and HTTP(S) uploaders.

The most notable tool delivered by the attackers was a user-mode module that gained the ability to read and write kernel memory due to the CVE-2021-21551 vulnerability in a legitimate Dell driver. This vulnerability affects Dell DBUtil drivers; Dell provided a security update in May 2021. This is the first ever recorded abuse of this vulnerability in the wild.

“The attackers then used their kernel memory write access to disable seven mechanisms the Windows operating system offers to monitor its actions, like registry, file system, process creation, event tracing, etc., basically blinding security solutions in a very generic and robust way,” explains Peter Kálnai, Senior Malware Researcher at ESET, who discovered the campaign. “It was not just done in kernel space, but also in a robust way, using a series of little- or undocumented Windows internals. Undoubtedly this required deep research, development, and testing skills,” he adds.

Lazarus also used a fully featured HTTP(S) backdoor known as BLINDINGCAN. ESET believes this remote access trojan (RAT) has a complex server-side controller with a user-friendly interface through which the operator can control and explore compromised systems.

In the Netherlands, the attack affected a Windows 10 computer connected to the corporate network, where an employee was contacted via LinkedIn Messaging about a potential new job, resulting in an email with a document attachment being sent. The Word file Amzon_Netherlands.docx sent to the victim is merely an outline document with an Amazon logo. Researchers were unable to acquire the remote template, but they assume that it may have contained a job offer for the Amazon space program Project Kuiper. This is a method that Lazarus practiced in the Operation In(ter)ception and Operation DreamJob campaigns targeting aerospace and defense industries.

Based on the number of command codes that are available to the operator, it is likely that a server-side controller is available where the operator can control and explore compromised systems. The more than two dozen commands available include downloading, uploading, rewriting, and deleting files, and taking screenshots.

“In this attack, as well as in many others attributed to Lazarus, we saw that many tools were distributed even on a single targeted endpoint in a network of interest. Without a doubt, the team behind the attack is quite large, systematically organized, and excellently prepared,” says Kálnai.

ESET Research attributes these attacks to Lazarus with high confidence. The diversity, number, and eccentricity in implementation of Lazarus campaigns define this group, as well as that it performs all three pillars of cybercriminal activities: cyberespionage, cybersabotage, and pursuit of financial gain. Lazarus (also known as HIDDEN COBRA) has been active since at least 2009. It is responsible for several high-profile incidents.

Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2022/10/03/lazarus-apt-offensive-toolset/