ZeroHour
Kaspersky Securelistpublished ()ingested @Securelist

Not-so

highMalwareimportance 42

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
domainokyesmobi.come background about the device and sends it to the server ps.okyesmobi[.]com. Example of a request received after decrypting app traff
ipv494.25.169.249112672190_250110201713837_862921000707889_201905211050_0.31_94.25.169.249" , "id" : 0 , "oid" : 112672190 } ] , "cr" : [ { "tl" : "ht
md5308f03d2e9173d9a1a43dfa15fdaf47d211050" , // app ID "y" : 1184 , // screen height "sign" : "308F03D2E9173D9A1A43DFA15FDAF47D" "z" : "PUSH" , "e" : "201905211050" , "pl" : "25011" , //
sha25659d64fbff1e5a9ac1f8e29660ed9a76e5546ca07c2ff99fe56242fa43b5abec3DEE2C0E3E38A851CEA6FD5C4283E98497A894CA14A58B27D33A89B5ED5F 59D64FBFF1E5A9AC1F8E29660ED9A76E5546CA07C2FF99FE56242FA43B5ABEC3 C5B6146D7C126774E5BB299E732F10655139056B72C28AA7AD478BD876D
sha256796a72004fae62c43b1f02aa1ed48139da7975b0bb416708ba8271573c462e79B74BAD44D2AF4DAA0C07E4D4FD8FFC2FC165B50ED34C7A25565E310C33B 796A72004FAE62C43B1F02AA1ED48139DA7975B0BB416708BA8271573C462E79 C5CA6AA73FDCB523B5E63B52197F134F229792046CBAC525D46985AD728
sha2567f5c5a5f57650a44c10948926e107ba9e69b98d1cd1ad47af0696b6cccc08d13me carriers for managing subscription payments. IOCs SHA256 7F5C5A5F57650A44C10948926E107BA9E69B98D1CD1AD47AF0696B6CCCC08D13 E706EB74BAD44D2AF4DAA0C07E4D4FD8FFC2FC165B50ED34C7A25565E31
sha256b9038dc32de0ea3619631b54585c247ecfd304b72532e193ded722084c4a7d1cAA73FDCB523B5E63B52197F134F229792046CBAC525D46985AD72880395 B9038DC32DE0EA3619631B54585C247ECFD304B72532E193DED722084C4A7D1C D4406DEE2C0E3E38A851CEA6FD5C4283E98497A894CA14A58B27D33A89B
sha256c5b6146d7c126774e5bb299e732f10655139056b72c28aa7ad478bd876d0537eFBFF1E5A9AC1F8E29660ED9A76E5546CA07C2FF99FE56242FA43B5ABEC3 C5B6146D7C126774E5BB299E732F10655139056B72C28AA7AD478BD876D0537E C&C ps.okyesmobi[.]com:8802 Latest Webinars Reports Kaspers
sha256c5ca6aa73fdcb523b5e63b52197f134f229792046cbac525d46985ad728803952004FAE62C43B1F02AA1ED48139DA7975B0BB416708BA8271573C462E79 C5CA6AA73FDCB523B5E63B52197F134F229792046CBAC525D46985AD72880395 B9038DC32DE0EA3619631B54585C247ECFD304B72532E193DED722084C4
sha256d4406dee2c0e3e38a851cea6fd5c4283e98497a894ca14a58b27d33a89b5ed5fDC32DE0EA3619631B54585C247ECFD304B72532E193DED722084C4A7D1C D4406DEE2C0E3E38A851CEA6FD5C4283E98497A894CA14A58B27D33A89B5ED5F 59D64FBFF1E5A9AC1F8E29660ED9A76E5546CA07C2FF99FE56242FA43B5
sha256e706eb74bad44d2af4daa0c07e4d4fd8ffc2fc165b50ed34c7a25565e310c33bA5F57650A44C10948926E107BA9E69B98D1CD1AD47AF0696B6CCCC08D13 E706EB74BAD44D2AF4DAA0C07E4D4FD8FFC2FC165B50ED34C7A25565E310C33B 796A72004FAE62C43B1F02AA1ED48139DA7975B0BB416708BA8271573C4
Full article795 words · extracted from securelist.com · click to collapse

Research

Research

20 Jun 2019

minute read

Many people have had a run-in with subscriptions to mobile content providers. They appear out of the blue, and get discovered only when account funds run dry. It might seem that the obvious solution is not to visit dubious sites and not to install apps from third-party sources. But, alas, these days such advice is clearly not enough. We recently discovered several apps in Play Market directly related to such intrusive services.

Pink Camera (com.paint.oil) and Pink Camera 2 (com.psbo.forand) are identical save for the numeral in the name; each has been installed more than 10,000 times

On the face of it, they are ordinary photo editors, but suspicions start to creep in on perusing the list of permissions. For example, the apps request access to Wi-Fi controls, which is rather unusual for this type of software. What’s more, when run, the editors request access to notifications — and keep doing it till the user says “yes.” Next, while the user is trying to embellish a photo (using the meager functionality), the app collects information in the background about the device and sends it to the server ps.okyesmobi[.]com.

Example of a request received after decrypting app traffic:

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{

"q1":"201905211050",// app ID

"y":1184,// screen height

"sign":"308F03D2E9173D9A1A43DFA15FDAF47D"

"z":"PUSH",

"e":"201905211050",

"pl":"25011",// network operator code

"cf":"111,108",

"s1":"104870",

"a":"862921000707889",// imei

"i":720,// screen width

"b":"250110201713837",// imsi

"c":"unknown",

"j":"ru",

"d":"S10",// phone model

"e1":1// Wi-Fi status

}

As can be seen, information is transmitted about the device and network operator. In response, the software receives a set of links (depending on the country and network operator) to the pages:

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{

"sts":200,

"ph":"",

"js":[],

"list":

[

{

"sta":0,

"cf":"111",

"dy":0,

"tl":"http://of.okyesmobi[.]com/redirect?uid=F867D2329F195671825571419DB5B7FA67880B4E99583D6B&sourceid=2300&clickid=104870_112672190_250110201713837_862921000707889_201905211050_0.31_94.25.169.249",

"id":0,

"oid":112672190

}

],

"cr":

[

{

"tl":"http://of.okyesmobi[.]com/redirect?uid=35092271DFB564AE09748A8CF282E15D089A4800D04DE5FE&sourceid=2300&clickid=104870_155608136_250110201713837_862921000707889_201905211050_0.36_94.25.169.249&p=1",

"oid":155608136

},

{

"tl":"http://of.okyesmobi[.]com/redirect?uid=71CBD61E0439CE5B6B6EF0BC46C140A842767CC39AC9A56E&sourceid=2300&clickid=104870_130581973_250110201713837_862921000707889_201905211050_0.24_94.25.169.249&p=1",

"oid":130581973

}

],

"wf":true

}

After several redirects, the addresses take the user to a subscription page. Our technologies detect these pages as not-a-virus:HEUR:AdWare.Script.Linkury.gen.

Examples of “subscription” pages

On receiving the addresses of the malicious pages, the program loads them in a window unseen by the user. Before doing so, the app turns off Wi-Fi in the user’s phone, thereby activating mobile data to simplify the subscription process.

The app then decrypts a Java helper script stored in the app resources, and performs the actions required to activate the subscription:

  • It substitutes the user’s phone number (obtained while harvesting information) into the relevant field.
  • If the subscription page is CAPTCHA-protected, the app uses the image recognition service chaojiying[.] and automatically inserts the result into the relevant field on the page.
  • If an SMS code is required, the app gets it through access to notifications.
  • It clicks the “subscribe” button.

How to protect yourself

Analysis of pages loaded by the malware revealed the targets to be users from different countries, while its distribution through an official app store helped the authors to spread it far and wide. To avoid the hook and save money on your mobile phone account, we recommend carefully studying the list of requested permissions during app installation and installing a security solution on your smartphone capable of detecting this type of threat. Additionally, you can enable content-blocking options, or open a “content account” — a free service offered by some carriers for managing subscription payments.

IOCs

SHA256

  • 7F5C5A5F57650A44C10948926E107BA9E69B98D1CD1AD47AF0696B6CCCC08D13
  • E706EB74BAD44D2AF4DAA0C07E4D4FD8FFC2FC165B50ED34C7A25565E310C33B
  • 796A72004FAE62C43B1F02AA1ED48139DA7975B0BB416708BA8271573C462E79
  • C5CA6AA73FDCB523B5E63B52197F134F229792046CBAC525D46985AD72880395
  • B9038DC32DE0EA3619631B54585C247ECFD304B72532E193DED722084C4A7D1C
  • D4406DEE2C0E3E38A851CEA6FD5C4283E98497A894CA14A58B27D33A89B5ED5F
  • 59D64FBFF1E5A9AC1F8E29660ED9A76E5546CA07C2FF99FE56242FA43B5ABEC3
  • C5B6146D7C126774E5BB299E732F10655139056B72C28AA7AD478BD876D0537E

C&C

  • ps.okyesmobi[.]com:8802
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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securelist.com/mobile-subscriptions/91211/