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arXiv cs.CRpublished ()ingested Timo Treitz

Accountability in Certificate Transparency and Variants

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AI summary · glm-5.3-flash

Formal Dolev-Yao analysis shows plain Certificate Transparency requires an honest log, SCT Auditing removes that assumption, and Gossiping does not.

The paper analyzes accountability in Certificate Transparency and its SCT Auditing and Gossiping extensions in the Dolev-Yao model, starting from a vanilla PKI. It finds plain CT provides accountability only under the assumption of an honest log. The SCT Auditing extension can eliminate that assumption, while the Gossiping extension cannot. CT is supported by all major browsers and obliges Certificate Authorities to record issued certificates in public, monitored logs.

  • Plain CT provides accountability only if the log is honest
  • SCT Auditing extension removes the honest-log assumption; Gossiping does not
  • Analysis spans vanilla PKI through CT variants in the Dolev-Yao model
Full article195 words · extracted from arxiv.org · click to collapse

Certificate Transparency (CT) aims to reduce the trust required in Certificate Authorities (CAs) within the TLS certificate ecosystem. It is supported by all major browsers. The protocol obliges all CAs to record the certificates they issue in a public log, which itself is monitored for compliance and consistency by third parties. Given this complex set of checks between the four roles-CA, loggers, monitor but also the end user's client-it is very hard to provide a precise account of how CT eliminates trust assumptions in exchange for complex infrastructure. Analyses both in the Dolev-Yao paradigm and the computational paradigm only regard a very simplified model and feature definitions adapted specifically to CAs, essentially capturing design features rather than the target property. The present paper posits accountability as the main goal of CT and presents a thorough analysis in the Dolev-Yao model. We start with the vanilla PKI and, step by step, move to CT, finally analyzing proposed extensions for SCT Auditing and Gossiping. We show that plain CT relies on an honest log, but provides accountability under this assumption. Furthermore, we show that the SCT Auditing extension can eliminate this assumption, while the Gossiping extension cannot.

Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11552