Accountability in Certificate Transparency and Variants
Formal Dolev-Yao analysis shows plain Certificate Transparency requires an honest log, SCT Auditing removes that assumption, and Gossiping does not.
The paper analyzes accountability in Certificate Transparency and its SCT Auditing and Gossiping extensions in the Dolev-Yao model, starting from a vanilla PKI. It finds plain CT provides accountability only under the assumption of an honest log. The SCT Auditing extension can eliminate that assumption, while the Gossiping extension cannot. CT is supported by all major browsers and obliges Certificate Authorities to record issued certificates in public, monitored logs.
- Plain CT provides accountability only if the log is honest
- SCT Auditing extension removes the honest-log assumption; Gossiping does not
- Analysis spans vanilla PKI through CT variants in the Dolev-Yao model
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgCertificate Transparency (CT) aims to reduce the trust required in Certificate Authorities (CAs) within the TLS certificate ecosystem. It is supported by all major browsers. The protocol obliges all CAs to record the certificates they issue in a public log, which itself is monitored for compliance and consistency by third parties.
By Timo Treitz · arxiv.org
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