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Counterfeit installers to system compromise: Tracking a deceptive software download campaign

Microsoft Security Blogby Microsoft Security Research, Microsoft Defender Experts and Parth Jomadkar ()10 min read12 · 6 reads
AI summary · glm-5.3-flashSummaries by Vani AI

Microsoft tracks a counterfeit software-installer campaign compromising multinationals' China operations, moderately linked to the Silver Fox (Yinhu) actor.

Microsoft Defender Experts is tracking an active campaign using spoofed software download sites for brands such as Razer, Kaspersky, Microsoft Edge, Calibre, and Baidu Netdisk on .com.cn and .hl.cn domains, delivering installer archives whose hashes change per download, indicating server-side payload generation. The implants establish persistence, weaken security protections, and communicate with attacker-controlled infrastructure, with confirmed compromises across healthcare, manufacturing, gaming, technology, logistics, government, and education. Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that the activity matches the publicly reported Silver Fox (Yinhu) fake software campaign; it has not attributed it to a nation-state actor.

Key facts
  • Look-alike vendor download pages funnel to shared delivery hosts such as gehie246[.]com and rotating domains.
  • Installer archives keep the same filename while hashes change, indicating per-request server-side generation.
  • Victims are predominantly China-based operations of multinationals and Chinese-speaking users.
  • Microsoft recommends SmartScreen, network protection, tamper protection, and Defender XDR.
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Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainapp-microsoft-edge.com.cnc-razerzone[.]com[.]cn Peripherals / drivers Microsoft Edge app-microsoft-edge[.]com[.]cn Browser Kaspersky kaspersky-lab[.]hl[.]cn Security soft
domainbaidu-pan.com.cns zh-diskgenius[.]com[.]cn Disk utility Baidu Netdisk (Pan) baidu-pan[.]com[.]cn Cloud storage oCam Screen Recorder ocam-pc[.]com[.]cn S
domaincalibre-ebook.com.cnpc-razerzone[.]com[.]cn → hxxp://www.gehie246[.]com/712down calibre-ebook[.]com[.]cn → hxxp://www.gehie246[.]com/712down Brand-impersonation
domaincc8ttkv35b.comand to rotating delivery hosts ( yimxg25tiy[.]com/73inst , cc8ttkv35b[.]com/7qinst , n7b8t85zsg[.]com/ins711 ) and a suspected attack
domaincn-drawio.com.cnm Screen Recorder ocam-pc[.]com[.]cn Screen capture draw.io cn-drawio[.]com[.]cn Diagramming SteelSeries steelseries-cn[.]com[.]cn Perip
domaingehie246.comnd downloading app_setup.6653004.zip from the delivery host gehie246[.]com/712down ; two content-distinct copies of the same-named a
domaingw-sogou.com.cning SteelSeries steelseries-cn[.]com[.]cn Peripherals Sogou gw-sogou[.]com[.]cn Input method Calibre calibre-ebook[.]com[.]cn E-book Mi
domainhl.cnl, web-tbtool, zh-doubaosrf, ieway-cn (all [.]com[.]cn / [.]hl[.]cn) Various utilities Although these domains impersonate unr
domainkaspersky-lab.hl.cnalidated hash set is in the indicators of compromise below. kaspersky-lab[.]hl[.]cn → hxxp://www.gehie246[.]com/712down pc-razerzone[.]com[
domainmindmoster.com.cnibre calibre-ebook[.]com[.]cn E-book MindMaster (typosquat) mindmoster[.]com[.]cn Mind-mapping Others pc-codex, jinshan-cibapc, zh-tbtool
domainn7b8t85zsg.comhosts ( yimxg25tiy[.]com/73inst , cc8ttkv35b[.]com/7qinst , n7b8t85zsg[.]com/ins711 ) and a suspected attacker-controlled Alibaba Clou
domainocam-pc.com.cnan) baidu-pan[.]com[.]cn Cloud storage oCam Screen Recorder ocam-pc[.]com[.]cn Screen capture draw.io cn-drawio[.]com[.]cn Diagramming
domainoijfwe.netled Multiple C:\ProgramData\ payloads 103.183.3[.]162:5090 (oijfwe[.]net) Connection failed Stage-one / persistent payloads Alibab
domainpc-razerzone.com.cnlemetry captured a device navigating to the fake Razer page pc-razerzone[.]com[.]cn and downloading app_setup.6653004.zip from the delivery
domainsejda.hl.cnspersky kaspersky-lab[.]hl[.]cn Security software Sejda PDF sejda[.]hl[.]cn Productivity NetEase Youdao Dictionary translate-youdao
domainsteelseries-cn.com.cnapture draw.io cn-drawio[.]com[.]cn Diagramming SteelSeries steelseries-cn[.]com[.]cn Peripherals Sogou gw-sogou[.]com[.]cn Input method Cali
domaintranslate-youdao.hl.cnPDF sejda[.]hl[.]cn Productivity NetEase Youdao Dictionary translate-youdao[.]hl[.]cn Translation DiskGenius zh-diskgenius[.]com[.]cn Disk ut
domainwww.gehie246.comns. pc-razerzone[.]com[.]cn (spoofed Razer download site) → www[.]gehie246[.]com/712down → app_setup.6653004.zip → stage-one loader A de
domainyimxg25tiy.comnation page that served it and to rotating delivery hosts ( yimxg25tiy[.]com/73inst , cc8ttkv35b[.]com/7qinst , n7b8t85zsg[.]com/ins71
domainzh-diskgenius.com.cnictionary translate-youdao[.]hl[.]cn Translation DiskGenius zh-diskgenius[.]com[.]cn Disk utility Baidu Netdisk (Pan) baidu-pan[.]com[.]cn C
ipv4103.156.25.35fanged) Result 40gK5T.exe, RhT9aQ.exe (Program Files (x86)) 103.156.25[.]35:7031 Connection failed Multiple C:\ProgramData\ payloads
ipv4103.183.3.16235:7031 Connection failed Multiple C:\ProgramData\ payloads 103.183.3[.]162:5090 (oijfwe[.]net) Connection failed Stage-one / persist
ipv4202.95.14.237q) and IP-and-port endpoints; a primary hub was observed on 202.95.14[.]237 (AS152194, CTG Server Limited). Payloads were observed be
ipv447.239.232.245chost.exe (Task Scheduler) 02:44:21.971 NETWORK outbound to 47.239.232[.]245:8050 → FirewallOutboundConnectionBlocked 02:44:24.860 NET
sha2561bd3662d784840e410d2d3c0a1040277f7f549089447359f01e05c2559cb1f17ocessFolderPath C:\ProgramData\.exe InitiatingProcessSHA256 1bd3662d784840e410d2d3c0a1040277f7f549089447359f01e05c2559cb1f17 InitiatingProcessCommandLine ".exe" InitiatingProcessCreati
sha2566d6ba2bc9ad414837826f7278bc3e0116f1aeda02d0c2284ed65819f5d9180a8ogram Files (x86)\72q1o6\40gK5T.exe InitiatingProcessSHA256 6d6ba2bc9ad414837826f7278bc3e0116f1aeda02d0c2284ed65819f5d9180a8 InitiatingProcessCommandLine "40gK5T.exe" InitiatingProcess
urlhttp://www.gehie246.com/712downe indicators of compromise below. kaspersky-lab[.]hl[.]cn → hxxp://www.gehie246[.]com/712down pc-razerzone[.]com[.]cn → hxxp://www.gehie246[.]com/712do

From the original article

10 min read at microsoft.com

An active campaign is impersonating legitimate software vendors to deliver malware through look-alike download pages and regenerated installer archives. Microsoft Defender Experts shares observed attack techniques, Defender XDR detections, indicators of compromise, and practical mitigations to help organizations identify, block, and respond to this threat.

Microsoft Security Blog

By Microsoft Security Research, Microsoft Defender Experts and Parth Jomadkar · microsoft.com

Read the full article at Microsoft Security Blog

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.