NIST and CISA finalize playbook to stop token theft and forgery
NIST and CISA finalized NIST IR 8587, a playbook helping federal agencies and cloud providers defend identity tokens against theft and forgery.
The finalized NIST IR 8587 guidance covers protecting token signing keys, verifying tokens, lifetimes, revocation, session management, and dividing security responsibilities between cloud providers and customers. It cites an incident in which foreign actors forged tokens with a stolen commercial signing key to steal more than 60,000 emails from one government agency. It also recommends extending token protections to AI agents and preparing identity systems for a future post-quantum cryptography transition.
AI agent authorization risks remain a gap in new NIST-CISA token security guidance
NIST and CISA release IR 8587 guidance on securing signed tokens, but AI agent authorization and delegation risks remain out of scope.
NIST, with CISA support, published 'Protecting Tokens and Assertions from Forgery, Theft, and Misuse' (NIST IR 8587), recommending continuous monitoring and tighter token lifecycle controls for SSO and API access. The guidance does not yet fully address AI agent identity, delegation chains, or prompt injection steering agents with valid tokens, and NIST says new or expanded standards are needed. Experts recommend treating AI agents as low-trust non-human identities, maintaining agent inventories, expiring credentials after task completion, and requiring human approval for high-risk actions. The report references shared-signal mechanisms like CAEP and RISC, and follows a May incident where a CISA contractor GitHub repository exposed AWS and GitHub tokens.
CISA and NIST Issue Guidance to Protect Cloud Identity Tokens
CISA and NIST published Interagency Report 8587 with voluntary guidance to harden cloud identity tokens against theft, forgery, and lateral movement.
CISA and NIST released NIST Interagency Report 8587 on September 15 with final voluntary guidance for federal agencies, cloud providers, and their customers on protecting SSO, federation, and API tokens. Requirements include one-hour maximum token lifetimes, 90-day signing key rotation for high-impact systems, hardware-backed key storage, explicit audience fields, and keeping tokens out of logs. The guidance was motivated by the 2020 ADFS compromise where forged SAML assertions bypassed MFA, and an incident where a leaked consumer signing key enabled token forgery and theft of 60,000+ emails from one agency. Nearly 250 public comments shaped the text, with input from Google, Microsoft, Okta, AWS, Oracle, IBM, HashiCorp, Wiz, and the OpenID Foundation via the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative.
CISA and NIST Release Technical Checklist for Safeguarding Identity Tokens From Theft and Misuse
CISA and NIST published NIST IR 8587, final guidance for protecting identity tokens from forgery, theft, replay, and signing-key compromise.
NIST Interagency Report 8587 (September 15, 2026) expands the IA-13 'Identity Providers and Authorization Servers' control from NIST SP 800-53 R5.1.1, guiding federal agencies and cloud providers on SSO, identity federation, and machine-to-machine authentication. It requires hardware-backed signing-key storage for moderate-impact systems, 90-day key rotation for high-impact systems, token lifetimes under one hour, and sender-constrained mechanisms such as mutual TLS and DPoP. The report cites incidents including forged SAML assertions that exposed over 60,000 emails from a federal agency. It also extends guidance to agentic AI systems using signed tokens and urges post-quantum cryptography migration planning.
CISA tells operators to harden Siemens S7 PLCs. Here’s how to do it without disrupting production
CISA, NSA, FBI and other agencies warn of active targeting of internet-exposed Siemens S7 PLCs and urge patching, exposure removal and hardening.
Joint advisory AA26-231A from the NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA warns that actors are actively targeting Siemens S7 PLCs using internet scanning, AI-assisted scripts and libraries such as Snap7 and python-snap7 over S7comm on TCP port 102. The advisory covers S7-200 through S7-1500 series controllers and recommends patching, removing internet exposure, access controls, monitoring and disabling unneeded services. Siemens states no new S7 vulnerabilities are involved, only misconfigurations addressed in existing ProductCERT guidance SSB-104599. The article details how to apply each measure without breaking production dependencies such as remote I/O, HMI links and diagnostics.
Microsoft shares workaround for Windows domain login issues
Microsoft confirms September 2026 Windows updates trigger domain trust failures via Machine Identity Isolation and shares a workaround for Windows 11 enterprises.
Microsoft confirmed the September 2026 security updates (KB5124008 for Windows 11 24H2/25H2, KB5124012 for 26H1) cause Windows to honor Machine Identity Isolation enforcement settings, breaking domain trust on systems not connected to Windows Server 2025 domain controllers. Admins report valid credentials failing with domain trust and credential errors. The workaround requires disabling Machine Identity Isolation via the same management method that enabled it (Intune, group policy, or registry) and resetting the secure channel with Test-ComputerSecureChannel. Microsoft previously shipped out-of-band fixes for Remote Desktop, Hyper-V, and USB audio issues from the same updates.
NIST Issues New Guidance to Protect SSO and API Tokens From Theft and Forgery
NIST released IR 8587 giving agencies and cloud providers recommendations to prevent identity token forgery, theft, and misuse in SSO and API environments.
NIST Internal Report 8587, released September 15, 2026, provides implementation recommendations covering token creation, signing, validation, storage, revocation, and lifecycle management for SAML, OpenID Connect, and OAuth 2.0 environments. It builds on SP 800-53 Rev. 5.1.1 and incorporates lessons from breaches involving stolen signing keys, abused OAuth applications, and replayed federated assertions. Recommendations include strong signing algorithms, strict claim validation, short token lifetimes, token binding, leakage prevention, and monitoring for abnormal token use.
Cisco Identity Services Engine Hardening Release: September 2026
Cisco ISE hardening release fixes multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities, including an authentication bypass known to be actively exploited.
Cisco released September 2026 hardening updates for Identity Services Engine (ISE) and ISE Passive Identity Connector (ISE-PIC) following a comprehensive internal security review that uncovered multiple vulnerabilities. One of the flaws, an ISE authentication bypass, is known to be actively exploited. Cisco grouped the issues by underlying vulnerability to help customers prioritize patching and streamline disclosure.
Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of September 16, 2026, Security Advisories
Cisco will publish security advisories with fixed software on September 16, 2026, covering BroadWorks, ISE, Nexus Dashboard, ASA, FMC, FTD and ThousandEyes.
Cisco PSIRT announced advance notification for security advisories to be published on September 16, 2026, along with fixed software releases. Affected products include BroadWorks CommPilot Application Software, Identity Services Engine (ISE), Nexus Dashboard, Secure Firewall ASA, Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC), Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD), and ThousandEyes Virtual Appliance. ISE, Nexus Dashboard and the Secure Firewall products receive security hardening releases, and the ASA, FMC and FTD advisories will be included in the same combined release.
AL26-019 - Vulnerabilities impacting Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway - CVE-2026-19490 and CVE-2026-19489
Canadian Cyber Centre alerts on Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway flaws CVE-2026-19490 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2026-19489 (buffer overflow), urging emergency patching.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security issued alert AL26-019 covering two Citrix NetScaler vulnerabilities disclosed in a vendor advisory on August 19, 2026. CVE-2026-19490 (CWE-288) allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication on appliances configured as a Gateway for SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy, or as an AAA virtual server. CVE-2026-19489 (CWE-120) is a classic buffer overflow that may cause memory overflow, unpredictable behavior, or denial-of-service conditions. Affected appliances are vulnerable when configured as a SAML IdP; fixed versions include 14.1-73.32, 13.1-63.21, and 13.1-37.277 for FIPS.
Water sector passes, government sector fails attempts to spot and halt simulated CISA attack
CISA red teamers compromised both a government and a water organization; water defenders detected and contained the simulated attack, government defenders did not.
CISA's red team gained initial access, elevated domain privileges, and lateral movement into sensitive business systems and cloud resources at an unnamed government organization, whose SOC ignored low- and medium-severity EDR alerts buried under thousands of false positives. A water organization's SOC quarantined phishing-compromised workstations within 2, 10, and 20 minutes, and later detected and isolated intrusions reaching the OT DMZ bastion host. Both organizations underestimated cloud risk, lacked Microsoft Conditional Access for workload identities, and had no process to revoke compromised access and refresh tokens. This is one of CISA's rare public red-team reports since 2023.
CISA Warns Hackers Exploit 17 Active Directory Techniques to Gain Control of Enterprise Networks
CISA and Five Eyes agencies issued joint guidance detailing 17 Active Directory attack techniques like Kerberoasting and DCSync, with hardening and detection advice.
CISA, the NSA, and cyber agencies from Australia, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand released joint guidance on September 15 covering 17 techniques attackers use to compromise Active Directory, including AD CS, Certificate Services, and Federation Services attacks. Named techniques include Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, password spraying, DCSync, NTDS.dit dumping, Golden and Silver Tickets, Golden SAML, and Skeleton Key. Recommendations include minimizing SPN accounts, enforcing AES encryption, disabling NTLM, account lockout thresholds of five attempts, phishing-resistant MFA, and Tier 0 prioritization. The guide also lists Windows event IDs 4769, 4768, 4625, 4771, and 2889 for detecting Kerberoasting and password spraying on domain controllers.