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Google Password Manager Attacks Could Let Malware Hijack Passkey
Unit 42 details three attack paths letting Windows malware silently sign into passkey-protected accounts via Chrome's Google Password Manager without user verification.
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 described three post-compromise attack paths—Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key and Golden Pass-ta-key—against Chrome's Google Password Manager cloud authenticator on TPM-equipped Windows systems. The attacks can silently obtain valid authentication assertions, install attacker-controlled user-verification keys, or extract the 32-byte Security Domain Secret used to decrypt synced passkey private keys, enabling reusable access from the attacker's own environment. No CVE was assigned and no exploitation in the wild was reported; demonstrations were validated against Chrome 142 and parts of the architecture are corroborated by Chromium source. GitHub enforced the User Verified flag check, while eBay accepted a test assertion lacking it before fixing its validation gap after disclosure.
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TPMSpy: Validation of Measured Boot Systems by Low-Level Tracing of TPM Usage
Researchers present TPMSpy, a platform-agnostic method validating TPM Measured Boot via low-level tracing, finding inconsistent Linux systemd measurements that break remote attestation and LUKS decryption.
An arXiv paper (2609.05011) introduces TPMSpy, a method that analyzes virtualized system–TPM interactions to independently reconstruct and validate TPM Event Logs without relying on the quoting mechanism, applicable to open and closed systems and demonstrated on Linux and Windows. A longitudinal analysis of Linux systems running systemd versions 245–258 (2020–2025) found wide divergence in Measured Boot usage, undocumented behavioral changes, and no common usage pattern. The authors report inconsistent measurement of user-space systemd services, which prevents reliable remote attestation and LUKS disk decryption on affected systems.
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DDRop Attack Forces Intel TDX Confidential VMs Into Debug Mode and Exposes Memory
KU Leuven and ETH Zurich researchers released DDRop PoC hardware that forces Intel TDX confidential VMs into debug mode and exposes plaintext memory.
Researchers from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Google, and Durham University published proof-of-concept code, hardware designs, and firmware for DDRop, a DDR5 interposer that injects parity errors to drop selected cache-line writebacks. Because Intel TDX, Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD SEV-SNP lack per-line cryptographic freshness, processors decrypt and accept stale DRAM contents as current state. The PoC flips a victim's ATTRIBUTES.DEBUG flag to enable TDX debug mode, then copies victim memory in plaintext and can forge attestation reports. Affected environments include Intel 5th- and 6th-generation Xeon Scalable with TDX; Intel says the attack falls outside its cloud-computing threat model.
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gr-PHYSEC: Real-time Channel-based Key Generation for Physical Layer Secure Wireless Communications
gr-PHYSEC GNU Radio module derives symmetric encryption keys from wireless channel randomness using a neural network, validated on robotic platforms with ADALM-Pluto SDRs.
The paper introduces gr-PHYSEC, a GNU Radio out-of-tree module for real-time physical-layer key generation that derives symmetric keys from the wireless channel's inherent randomness instead of pre-shared secrets. A trained neural network extracts channel features between trusted parties during probe exchanges; features are quantized into binary keys, reconciled via Reed-Solomon encoding, and secured with SHA-512 hashing before direct use for encryption. Real-world experiments at the FAU CAAI connected robotics testbed using ADALM Pluto software-defined radios and NVIDIA Jetson Orin demonstrated low key disagreement rates and NIST-verified randomness. Source code is publicly available on GitHub.
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New DDRop Attack Breaks Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP With $159 DDR5 Device
DDRop uses a $159 DDR5 RDIMM interposer to silently drop memory writes and break Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidential VMs.
Researchers published DDRop, a physical attack built from about $159 in parts that uses a custom DDR5 RDIMM interposer to inject parity errors and silently discard selected cache-line writebacks. Intel TDX, Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD SEV-SNP are affected because they lack per-line cryptographic freshness, so processors can accept stale encrypted data as valid state. The team demonstrated deterministic plaintext copying between pages, malicious Secure EPT entry injection, forcing trust domains into debug mode, and forging attestation measurements. The attack requires privileged host control plus brief physical access, and researchers say no simple software patch exists.
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Almost Half of Malware Samples Communicate Direct to IP
Unit 42 analysis of 4 million malware reports finds 45% of C2-active samples connect directly to hard-coded IPs, bypassing DNS defenses.
Palo Alto Unit 42 analyzed over 4 million Advanced WildFire dynamic analysis reports and found that 45.32% of malware samples with C2 activity made at least one direct-to-IP connection, accounting for 23.17% of all C2 connection attempts. The firm proposes zero trust IP (ZT-IP), an enforcement approach that verifies whether outbound destinations were ever sanctioned by a DNS response. ZT-IP analysis surfaced Phorpiex ransomware droppers fetching payloads directly from C2 IPs, a persistent data exfiltration campaign using an obfuscated \GET protocol, and Mozi P2P botnet payloads delivered to IoT devices without DNS. Only 1% of benign samples connected directly to untrusted IP addresses.
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New hardware device can RAM into encrypted memory, expose your data
Researchers built a $200 DDR5 interposer that silently drops memory writes to break TDX, SGX, and SEV-SNP confidential VM integrity, requiring physical access.
Researchers from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google demonstrated DDRop, a hardware interposer costing under $200 that corrupts DDR5 bus commands to silently drop writes to encrypted memory, enabling replay attacks on confidential VMs. Because scalable memory encryption lacks freshness checks, protected VMs keep computing on stale attacker-selected data; on an Intel TDX server the attack forces debug mode for plaintext memory reads or forges attestation reports, succeeding in under two minutes without crashing. Intel and AMD both called the attack out of scope for their cloud threat models, with no mitigation planned, and proposed cache line versioning appears still vulnerable. The full interposer design is being released as open-source hardware.
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New DDRop Attack Breaks Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP Confidential Computing
DDRop uses a sub-$200 DDR5 interposer to drop memory writes, breaking Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidentiality guarantees.
Researchers at KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google will present DDRop at ACM CCS 2026, a first active interposer attack on DDR5 that silently drops memory writes so processors keep reading stale encrypted data, exploiting the missing freshness guarantee in Intel TDX, Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD SEV-SNP. On Intel TDX's default logical integrity mode it enabled reading victim VM memory, toggling debug mode, and forging remote attestation; AMD SEV-SNP was limited to copying pages between VMs. TDX's stronger cryptographic integrity blocks cross-VM attacks but likely not attestation forgery. The team will release board designs, firmware, and attack code on GitHub; no evidence of real-world use exists and no simple patch is available.
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Has anybody seen my keys? A key-hierarchy strategy for rack-level security
Oxide's RFD 0301 proposes a rack-level key hierarchy using Shamir secret sharing and a trust quorum to protect data-at-rest keys.
Oxide's request for discussion (RFD 0301) lays out a key-hierarchy strategy for rack-level security, deriving keys from a rack secret protected by Shamir secret sharing across a trust quorum of sleds, with keys exchanged over authenticated sprockets sessions. The document maps which keys protect control-plane data, metrics, Crucible extents, and authentication tokens, and defines open questions on key lifecycle, locality, and compromise handling. Future work includes sealing shares with the root of trust so an attacker would need to steal K whole sleds to reconstruct the rack secret.
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