60
45
60
45
60
57
45
57
60
57
57
57
57
FamousSparrow Exploits Public-Facing Exchange Servers to Deploy SparroWocky Backdoor
ESET attributes a new SparroWocky backdoor to espionage group FamousSparrow, deployed via exploited internet-facing Exchange servers across Latin American governments.
ESET's Welivesecurity team reports FamousSparrow gained initial access by exploiting publicly reachable Microsoft Exchange servers, with roughly 90 percent of targets since mid-2025 in Latin America, including governments in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. The group's new modular C-language backdoor SparroWocky replaces SparrowDoor and uses a three-part loader: a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL side-loaded in memory, and an encrypted payload. It persists via Windows services or Registry Run keys, supports screenshots, file operations, TCP proxying, Beacon Object Files, TLS/RC4-encrypted C2, and anti-forensics such as call-stack spoofing. IOCs including loader SHA-1 hashes and C2 IP addresses were published.
78
FamousSparrow Deploys New SparroWocky Backdoor Against Latin American Governments
China-aligned APT FamousSparrow deployed a new modular backdoor, SparroWocky, against government entities across eight Latin American countries since August 2025, ESET reports.
ESET reports that China-aligned threat actor FamousSparrow replaced its SparrowDoor implant with SparroWocky, a distinct modular C++ backdoor active against governments in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. Around 90% of the group's targets from mid-2025 into 2026 were in Latin America, which ESET links to regional competition over US influence. The backdoor arrives via a three-component DLL side-loading chain, persists through a Windows service (ProcAuditManager) or Run keys (SnapCart), captures screenshots, and exfiltrates RC4-encrypted data over TLS C2 on ports 443 and 8080. It supports in-memory Beacon Object File execution, API hashing, and SilentMoonwalk-style call-stack spoofing; IOCs for three C2 servers were released.
78
57
45
57
57
57
Chinese hackers use SparroWocky malware in govt espionage attacks
ESET reports China-linked FamousSparrow deployed a new modular backdoor, SparroWocky, in year-long espionage attacks on Latin American government organizations.
ESET researchers observed FamousSparrow using SparroWocky, a modular C++ backdoor replacing the earlier SparrowDoor tool, against government targets in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. Deployed via DLL side-loading with an RC4-encrypted payload mapped in memory, it captures screenshots, acts as a TCP proxy, and hooks CreateThread so malicious threads appear as AnimateWindow. Persistence uses a ProcAuditManager Windows service or SnapCart registry key; ESET tracked at least 18 C2 addresses and published IoCs.
70
DPRK APTs: Ted backdoor and curlRAT target South Korean media and automotive sectors
Rapid7 uncovered a DPRK-linked Linux toolkit using a HAProxy-embedded ted backdoor, SSH keylogger, and curlRAT against South Korean media and automotive firms.
Rapid7 Labs identified a previously undocumented framework attributed with medium confidence to DPRK actors, targeting South Korean automotive and media organizations likely since early 2025. The toolkit embeds a backdoor compiled into HAProxy 2.8.12 using its filter API, plus trojanized crond, agetty, atd, sshd, and polkitd, an SSH keylogger storing credentials under /var/lib/sshd/, and a curl-based RAT with a watchdog thread. It enables remote command execution, malicious script injection into served webpages (a watering-hole loop), credential harvesting, and long-term surveillance. Hardcoded C2s are associated with APT37 via ThreatFox, and exposed groupware portals and mail servers align with Kimsuky tradecraft; the initial access vector and any CVE remain unconfirmed.
68
Tick Group Weaponized Secure USB Drives to Target Air
Unit 42 says the Tick group weaponized South Korean certified secure USB drives with SymonLoader malware to reach air-gapped Windows XP systems.
Unit 42 discovered that the Tick cyberespionage group, which targets Japan and South Korea, compromised an ITSCC-certified secure USB drive made by a South Korean defense company and used a new loader named SymonLoader to extract a hidden executable from these drives. SymonLoader only infects Windows XP and Windows Server 2003, suggesting deliberate targeting of legacy air-gapped systems used by government and defense organizations. The group also delivered HomamDownloader and SymonLoader via Trojanized Korean and Japanese software sent as spearphishing attachments. Unit 42 believes the attacks occurred multiple years ago and that this malware is not part of an active campaign.
42
Threat Brief: Ongoing Russia and Ukraine Cyber Activity
Ukrainian government sites were defaced via OctoberCMS CVE-2021-32648 while Microsoft-attributed actor DEV-0586 deployed destructive WhisperGate malware.
Unit 42 tracks January 2022 attacks against Ukrainian government websites that were defaced or made inaccessible, which Ukraine attributed to Russia. Attackers exploited CVE-2021-32648, an account takeover flaw in OctoberCMS prior to 1.0.472, by submitting a boolean true as the password reset code to bypass validation. Separately, WhisperGate malware, attributed by Microsoft to DEV-0586, disabled Windows Defender and corrupted files across multiple Ukrainian organizations, using a ransomware-appearing first stage and an HTTPS-beaconing second stage with LOLBINs and anti-analysis techniques.
78
57
60
57
60
57
60
45
57
60
45
60
57
NightEagle Hackers Abuse Microsoft Dev Tunnels and GhostContainer to Breach Russian Companies
NightEagle (APT-Q-95) breached Russian firms using stolen VPN credentials, a GhostContainer Exchange backdoor, Dev Tunnels abuse, and DCSync.
Kaspersky's Securelink analysts, via Securelist, documented NightEagle (APT-Q-95) attacks on Russian companies that begin with VPN logins using stolen valid credentials from Cloudflare WARP and European infrastructure. On Exchange servers the group deployed GhostContainer, a .NET backdoor built from public components including Neo-reGeorg tunneling, CVE-2020-0688 logic, and the GhostWebShell class, controlled through Exchange web headers. The operators exposed RDP through Microsoft Dev Tunnels paired with rdp2tcp, staged tools in GitHub repositories, and exploited BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) to create admin accounts before running DCSync against Active Directory.
74
Discernment Deleted: Inside the Operation Server of BlackHatSect0r && DXQRTXX
SOCRadar analyzes the operation server of French-speaking crew BlackHatSect0r && DXQRTXX, revealing operators rewrote their AI agent's memory to read 'I am a weapon'.
SOCRadar examines the operation server of the French-speaking crew BlackHatSect0r && DXQRTXX. The operators deleted the line reading 'discernment retained' from their AI agent's memory and replaced it with 'I am a weapon'. The analysis offers rare visibility into how criminal crews operate and use AI agents.
48
North Korea-linked Hackers Hide a Backdoor Inside HAProxy
Rapid7 reports North Korea-linked hackers implanted a backdoor compiled into HAProxy at South Korean automotive and media firms, enabling covert C2 and credential theft.
Rapid7 documented a previously undocumented Linux toolkit hitting South Korean automotive and media organizations, centered on a backdoor compiled directly into victims' HAProxy 2.8.12. The 'ted backdoor' uses HAProxy's native filter API to intercept HTTP traffic, receive C2 commands hidden in requests to a fake image path, and erase all traces from logs and counters; the toolkit also trojanizes crond, agetty, atd, sshd, and polkitd, adds an SSH keylogger, and runs curlRAT with virtualization checks. It can inject scripts or replace page content for selected victims, turning the load balancer into a watering hole. Attribution sits at medium confidence toward North Korean state actors, with overlaps to APT37-linked infrastructure and a concurrent Lazarus campaign; the campaign's command domains have since gone dark.
60
Chinese Hackers Use AI Agents in Multi
China-linked campaign used the SecFlow AI-agent framework (Claude, Qwen, DeepSeek) to automate intrusions against government targets in Taiwan, Indonesia, China and Vietnam.
Hunt.io documented a second China-linked campaign wiring commercial AI models into live cyberespionage, reconstructing the SecFlow orchestration system from five accidentally exposed open directories. Targets included Taiwan's Kuomintang Party archives, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mainland Chinese government and education systems, and Vietnamese industrial hosts. The most extensive compromise hit a Fengtai District government Office Automation environment, yielding LSASS and registry hive theft, 822 user records and 1.28GB of attachments including patient health data. Tooling included a GLUTTON webshell hiding payloads in PNG pixels via steganography and a fake MySQL deserialization service for client-side code execution.
72