Search: “oss-security”

6 items in the last 3d

David Wheeler notes a rosbridge_library quadratic CPU cost flaw was publicly disclosed on oss-security without prior coordination.

In an oss-security reply, David A. Wheeler pointed out that a poster had just publicly disclosed details of a quadratic CPU cost issue in rosbridge_library's Protocol.incoming() JSON fallback path. Wheeler referenced the mailing list's stated norms encouraging public discussion of open-source security flaws. The reply itself contains no fix, CVE, or exploitation details.

oss-securitySep 14, 19:53 UTC · 2d agoVulnerability 3 sources

Re: rosbridge_library Protocol.incoming() quadratic CPU cost in JSON fallback

Alan Coopersmith's mailing list reply merely points to the public oss-security posting of the rosbridge_library disclosure.

A follow-up reply on oss-security by Alan Coopersmith notes that the rosbridge_library Protocol.incoming() quadratic CPU cost issue was disclosed publicly on the oss-security mailing list. The reply contains no additional technical detail beyond linking the original disclosure.

oss-securityupdated Sep 14, 19:53 UTC · 2d agofirst Sep 14, 18:29 UTC · 2d agoVulnerability 3 sources

Re: Retrospective by 'gpg.fail' authors

oss-security thread on the gpg.fail retrospective discusses legacy code removal and flaws surfaced by frontier AI models in open-source projects.

In a reply to Soatok Dreamseeker's gpg.fail retrospective thread on the oss-security mailing list, cryptographer Peter Gutmann argues it is often unclear which legacy code is obsolete or can be safely removed. He recounts a discussion with another well-known open-source project developer estimating, unscientifically, that around half of issues in such projects were found by frontier AI models. The exchange reflects on lessons from documenting weaknesses in GnuPG/OpenPGP implementations.

oss-security03:19 UTC · 6h agoResearch 9 sources

Re: Retrospective by 'gpg.fail' authors

oss-security follow-up to a gpg.fail authors' retrospective argues that GnuPG's unmaintained, forgotten code is a security liability and should be deleted.

On the oss-security mailing list, Soatok Dreamseeker responds to a retrospective published by the gpg.fail authors, asking why unmaintained code is retained and stating that forgotten, unmaintained code is a liability and effectively unmaintained by definition. The visible reply addresses Werner Koch and concerns GnuPG code maintenance. No specific CVE, flaw, or exploitation is described in this snippet.

oss-securityupdated 03:19 UTC · 6h agofirst Sep 16, 17:16 UTC · 16h agoVulnerability 9 sources1

Re: Retrospective by 'gpg.fail' authors

GnuPG maintainer Werner Koch responds on oss-security to a gpg.fail retrospective covering 2003-era GnuPG code.

On oss-security, GnuPG lead developer Werner Koch replied to a retrospective published by the gpg.fail authors, citing a December 2003 commit in GnuPG's gettime.c affecting asctimestamp and printf format attributes in util.h. The excerpt contains no new CVE identifiers or exploitation evidence, and appears to revisit long-standing historical GnuPG code paths discussed by the retrospective's authors.

oss-securityupdated 03:19 UTC · 6h agofirst Sep 16, 15:11 UTC · 19h agoResearch 9 sources

CVE-2026-91752: GNU libextractor < 1.15 Stack Overflow via OLE2

GNU libextractor before 1.15 has a stack-based buffer overflow (CVE-2026-91752) in its OLE2 parser, triggerable via crafted files.

A stack-based buffer overflow was identified in GNU libextractor's OLE2 plugin in versions prior to 1.15, assigned CVE-2026-91752. The flaw resides in the process_star_office function, which sizes a variable-length stack array using attacker-controlled OLE2 stream data. Attackers can craft malicious OLE2/StarOffice files to trigger the overflow. The issue was disclosed on the oss-security mailing list by researcher Haitam Lazaar on September 16, 2026.

oss-securitySep 16, 23:13 UTC · 10h agoVulnerability 2 sources CVE-2026-91752