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ZDI-26-559: (Pwn2Own) Amazon Smart Plug OTA Update Process Out-Of-Bounds Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

ZDI disclosed a Pwn2Own out-of-bounds write RCE (CVSS 7.5) in Amazon Smart Plug's OTA process, exploitable by unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers.

The Zero Day Initiative published ZDI-26-559 for an out-of-bounds write remote code execution flaw in the Amazon Smart Plug OTA update process, demonstrated at Pwn2Own. Unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers can execute arbitrary code on affected installations. ZDI rated the issue CVSS 7.5.

ZDI Published Advisories · Aug 12, 2026Advisory

ZDI-26-558: (Pwn2Own) Amazon Smart Plug OTA Update Process Improper Certificate Validation Vulnerability

ZDI disclosed a Pwn2Own certificate validation flaw (CVSS 6.8) in Amazon Smart Plug's OTA process, allowing network-adjacent attackers to bypass update verification.

The Zero Day Initiative published ZDI-26-558 for an improper certificate validation flaw in the Amazon Smart Plug OTA update process, demonstrated at Pwn2Own. Network-adjacent attackers need no authentication to bypass certificate validation for over-the-air updates. ZDI rated the issue CVSS 6.8.

ZDI Published Advisories · Aug 12, 2026Advisory

ZDI-26-557: (Pwn2Own) Amazon Smart Plug Insecure Fallback Information Disclosure Vulnerability

ZDI disclosed a Pwn2Own information disclosure flaw (CVSS 4.3) in Amazon Smart Plug, letting unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers access sensitive information.

The Zero Day Initiative published ZDI-26-557 for an insecure fallback information disclosure flaw in Amazon Smart Plug, demonstrated at Pwn2Own. Unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers can disclose sensitive information on affected installations. ZDI rated the issue CVSS 4.3.

ZDI Published Advisories · Aug 12, 2026Advisory

AWS Certificate Manager sets 2027 end date for email-validated certificate renewals

AWS Certificate Manager will phase out email validation for public certificates during 2027, requiring migration to DNS validation before September 30, 2027.

AWS Certificate Manager will stop offering email validation in new Regions on January 1, 2027, discontinue it for new certificate requests on March 31, 2027, and stop renewing email-validated certificates on September 30, 2027. This precedes the CA/Browser Forum's March 15, 2028 deadline ending email-based domain validation for publicly trusted certificates. AWS is updating the UpdateCertificateOptions API so customers can switch to DNS validation in place while retaining the certificate ARN, with Route 53 support for creating required CNAME records.

Help Net Security · Aug 14, 2026Advisory

CISA and NIST Issue Guidance to Protect Cloud Identity Tokens

CISA and NIST published Interagency Report 8587 with voluntary guidance to harden cloud identity tokens against theft, forgery, and lateral movement.

CISA and NIST released NIST Interagency Report 8587 on September 15 with final voluntary guidance for federal agencies, cloud providers, and their customers on protecting SSO, federation, and API tokens. Requirements include one-hour maximum token lifetimes, 90-day signing key rotation for high-impact systems, hardware-backed key storage, explicit audience fields, and keeping tokens out of logs. The guidance was motivated by the 2020 ADFS compromise where forged SAML assertions bypassed MFA, and an incident where a leaked consumer signing key enabled token forgery and theft of 60,000+ emails from one agency. Nearly 250 public comments shaped the text, with input from Google, Microsoft, Okta, AWS, Oracle, IBM, HashiCorp, Wiz, and the OpenID Foundation via the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative.

Infosecurity Magazine · 9h agoAdvisory

CISA Red Team Compromised Two Critical Infrastructure Orgs, One Detected Nothing

CISA red teams fully compromised two critical infrastructure orgs with similar tradecraft; one detected nothing, the other contained phishing within minutes.

CISA advisory AA26-237A, 'A Tale of Two SOCs,' describes two simultaneous red team assessments of a Government Services organization and a Water and Wastewater Systems organization, both compromised to the domain level. Organization A never detected the intrusion, enabled by default credentials, a misconfigured AD CS template (ESC1), cleartext credentials, non-expiring static AWS keys, and over-permissioned Entra ID applications. Organization B detected and isolated phishing within 2-20 minutes, though the red team still reached krbtgt via DCSync from cleartext SCCM credentials. CISA attributes the outcome gap to people and processes rather than the security tools themselves.

The Hacker News · 21d agoAdvisory