Sality, one of the longest
US and European authorities, with CrowdStrike and Shadowserver, disrupted the 20-year-old Sality peer-to-peer botnet, severing 15,000+ infected machines from operators.
US and European authorities disrupted the Sality botnet, active since at least 2003, in an operation involving the DOJ, CrowdStrike, the Shadowserver Foundation and agencies in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Researchers reverse-engineered the botnet's peer-to-peer architecture and injected false data into infected machines' 'super peer' lists, cutting more than 15,000 systems off from their operators. For the past eight years Sality primarily distributed EggJagger, malware that replaces clipboard cryptocurrency addresses and is estimated to have netted the operator at least $150,000. No arrests were announced, and CrowdStrike assesses the operator works from Russia's Bashkortostan region.
Rust Supply Chain Attack Puts Build-Time Malware in Crates with 245 Million Downloads
Compromised maintainer account published malicious versions of popular Rust crates with 245M downloads, delivering a build-time payload via typosquatted proc-macro1 dependency.
The Rust Project deleted malicious releases of arrayref 0.3.10, internment 0.8.7, and append-only-vec 0.1.9 from crates.io after a compromised maintainer account added a typosquatted dependency, proc-macro1, whose build script downloaded and executed a remote payload during compilation. Each malicious version was online for 86 to 107 minutes on August 20, 2026, before deletion. The build script disabled TLS validation and deployed OS-specific implants on Unix, macOS, and Windows, with builds alone sufficient to trigger execution. Wiz Research confirmed active exploitation, noting the impacted packages appear in 35% of cloud and code environments and over 75% of Rust-using environments; arrayref alone has 245 million all-time downloads and 403 dependent crates.