Mirai Variant V3G4 Targets IoT Devices
Unit 42 tracked the Mirai variant V3G4 exploiting 13 vulnerabilities across IoT devices and servers from July-December 2022 to build a DDoS botnet.
From July to December 2022, Unit 42 observed three campaigns spreading V3G4, a Mirai botnet variant, by exploiting 13 vulnerabilities, including CVE-2022-26134 in Atlassian Confluence and CVE-2019-15107 in Webmin. The campaigns shared the same C2 domains containing the string 8xl9, nearly identical shell script downloaders, and the same XOR keys, suggesting a single threat actor. The malware brute-forces telnet and SSH credentials, terminates rival botnet processes via a stop list, and receives DDoS commands from its C2. Compromised servers and networking devices are absorbed into the botnet for further attacks.
From Infostealer Log to Marketplace Listing: A Technical Walkthrough of the Credential Theft Pipeline
Cyble walkthrough maps how infostealer logs move from endpoint infection through aggregation and enrichment to dark web credential marketplace sales.
Cyble breaks the credential theft pipeline into stages: infostealer execution harvesting browser credential stores, cookies, session tokens, crypto wallets, and FTP configurations; aggregation of stealer logs via C2 panels into bundled archives; parsing and enrichment against previously leaked datasets; and final listing on dark web marketplaces. Enrichment adds employer and role context that raises prices and enables credential stuffing across reused passwords. The report advises SOC teams to monitor stealer logs and marketplace chatter early rather than waiting for breach alerts.
Android Car Malware Spreads Through Built
Kaspersky found MoYu Group malware infecting DoFun Android car head units via firmware updaters, enabling ad fraud and proxy botnet operations.
Kaspersky discovered in June 2026 the first documented malware specifically infecting Android-based car head units, spread through the built-in updater (TWCore) of DoFun head unit firmware via a dropper dubbed JarService. The multi-stage implant supports nine commands enabling unwanted ads, ad fraud, and additional module downloads, and installs the zhima reverse proxy module. The campaign is attributed with high confidence to the MoYu Group behind the BADBOX ad fraud and residential proxy scheme; the distribution issue was fixed after responsible disclosure.