TWINLOOT Abuses SharePoint and Teams to Steal Credentials and Move Across Networks
Ontinue disclosed TWINLOOT, a Python implant hiding C2 in SharePoint dead drops and Teams TURN relays, harvesting credentials and pivoting via reverse SOCKS5.
Ontinue's Cyber Defense Center identified TWINLOOT during a July 2026 campaign investigation: a modular, PyArmor-hardened Python implant (a 39 MB bootstrap-fat.pyc loader) whose entire C2 infrastructure lives inside trusted Microsoft services. Tasking flows through SharePoint Online file dead drops polled every 15 seconds via the Microsoft Graph API, while interactive operator access uses WebRTC DataChannels relayed by Microsoft Teams TURN servers; Graph traffic is driven by the victim's own headless Edge browser. The implant harvests Windows credentials with fake lock screens, offers a reverse SOCKS5 pivot for lateral movement to SMB, RDP, WinRM, and MSSQL, executes commands, and persists on hosts. Initial access is assessed to be Teams social engineering masquerading as IT support, prompting a PowerShell command to download the payload.
Shai-Hulud's Reach Just Grew to 469 Credential Locations. Here's What That Means
GitGuardian found the Shai-Hulud infostealer worm now scans 469 credential locations, including CI/CD and AI tool configs, expanding supply-chain risk.
GitGuardian researchers found that a recent Shai-Hulud worm variant scans for credentials across 469 locations in developer environments, CI/CD tooling, cloud configurations, and AI tool configs, up from 189 paths in earlier variants. The worm reuses stolen credentials to pivot from developer workstations to source code, cloud infrastructure, and package publishing channels, turning credential theft into forward-propagating supply chain attacks. The analysis urges defenders to prioritize removing long-lived package publishing tokens in favor of short-lived OIDC-based trusted publishing, citing recent Docker and GitHub Actions improvements.