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How to correlate Kubernetes audit logs with container runtime data

Elastic Security Labs shows how to join Kubernetes audit logs with Defend for Containers runtime data to investigate service account abuse and container escapes.

Elastic Security Labs demonstrates correlating Kubernetes audit logs with Defend for Containers (D4C) runtime telemetry in Elastic. In an Amazon EKS lab, a compromised workload service account performed discovery, read secrets, minted a token, created a privileged pod, and execed into it to attempt a container escape via nsenter and chroot. The escape wrappers appeared only in the decoded Kubernetes audit requestURI, not in runtime process events. The post covers join fields, prebuilt EQL sequence rules, and continues the control-plane correlation thread from the TeamPCP container attack scenario and the Hugging Face intrusion write-up.

Elastic Security Labs · 13d agoResearch1

Why The Vulnerability Backlog Is About To Get Worse

Recorded Future analysis says AI-driven vulnerability discovery and faster weaponization will grow the triage backlog while shrinking defenders' response windows.

Disclosed vulnerabilities rose from roughly 21,000 in 2021 to nearly 50,000 in 2025, while Recorded Future assessed only 446 as actively exploited in 2025. VulnCheck found nearly 29% of 2025 KEV entries were exploited on or before CVE publication. The authors argue AI-assisted discovery and automated exploit development will multiply credible reports, cut disclosure-to-exploit time toward minutes, and force re-evaluation of medium-severity flaws as exploit-chain components.

Recorded Future · 22d agoResearch

BTR Reforged: Weaponizing Defender’s Remediation Driver as a Kernel Operation Primitive

Check Point shows attackers can abuse Microsoft Defender's signed remediation driver for arbitrary Ring 0 file and registry operations without exploiting any vulnerability.

Check Point Research presents BTR Reforged, a technique that repurposes Microsoft Defender's trusted remediation driver into an attacker-controlled kernel operation primitive. The signed driver can be instructed to execute arbitrary file and registry operations from Ring 0 without exploits, vulnerabilities, or memory corruption. The work demonstrates how trusted security components can be turned into attacker primitives, which is relevant for defenders assessing driver abuse risks.

Check Point Research · 27d agoResearch

1Password's AI patching benchmark is misleading

Trail of Bits reanalysis says 1Password's 26% AI clean-fix rate is misleading; 86% of eligible patches blocked exploits.

Trail of Bits critiques 1Password's FLAWED AI patching benchmark, arguing its 26% clean-fix headline mixes trials where agents were instructed to apply wrong fixes (22% of data) with trials that prohibited compiling or testing (36%). Restricting to reasonable conditions, 2,634 of 3,067 patches (86%) blocked the supplied exploit. Trail of Bits also reports 12.5% of 2,265 developer first fixes failed in its own 2024-2026 assessments, and released post-patch-validation and review-walkthrough agent skills.

Lobsters · security · 1d agoResearch1

The MAL Simulator: Cyber Operations Simulation based on Attack & Defense Graphs

MAL Simulator grounds attack-defense graph simulations in a CRATE-emulated network, training RL attacker and defender agents where attackers outperform search methods.

The MAL Simulator is a cyber operations simulator built on the Meta Attack Language (MAL), enabling decision-driven attack and defense simulations adaptable to new domains without modifying source code. Case studies trained defensive and offensive agents, grounded in data collected from an emulated network implemented in the CRATE cyber range. The trained attacker policy reached designated targets more efficiently than compared search methods, and the trained defender induced lower costs than a naive heuristic under noisy alerts, though defender performance dropped significantly against an RL attacker.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

Linux Detection Engineering - Local Privilege Escalation

Elastic details a layered detection framework for Linux local privilege escalation, covering 2026's copy-on-write bug wave and LLM-assisted discovery.

Elastic Security Labs describes how most Linux local privilege escalations share a common host flow — an unprivileged process launched from a writable path becoming root — and proposes layered detections combining general outcome-based rules with per-technique rules in Elastic Defend and Auditd. It tracks 13 recent LPE disclosures, seven of which share a copy-on-write/zero-copy bug class, including Copy Fail, DirtyFrag, Fragnesia, DirtyDecrypt, DirtyClone, pedit COW, and RefluXFS. Qualys attributes RefluXFS to an LLM-assisted research effort with Anthropic using Claude Mythos Preview, and another bug is credited to an LLM-assisted workflow. Detection and endpoint rules are published in Elastic's detection-rules and protections-artifacts repositories.

Elastic Security Labs · 6d agoResearch1

The AI Malware Maturity Gap

Recorded Future introduces AIM3, a five-level maturity model for AI malware, showing current attacker AI use is mostly AI-assisted rather than autonomous.

Recorded Future proposes AIM3, a five-level model defining AI malware from LLM-translated to LLM-embedded, spanning experimentation to fully autonomous agentic campaigns. Public examples remain early-stage: PROMPTFLUX uses Google Gemini to rewrite its VBScript dropper (Level 1), while Lamehug/PROMPTSTEAL, attributed to APT28, invokes the HuggingFace API to generate reconnaissance commands (Level 3). The authors argue most current AI malware augments existing tradecraft rather than enabling one-click autonomous attacks.

Recorded Future · 22d agoResearch

The modern attack chain: Rethinking Google Workspace security in the age of AI

Analysis of Vercel and Composio breaches shows stolen OAuth tokens, not phishing email, now open Google Workspace attacks — a path authorized AI agents follow.

The author analyzes the Vercel and Composio breaches as the same OAuth-first attack chain run twice: a stolen OAuth token, obtained via a compromised supplier, becomes the entry point rather than email. These tokens survive password resets, are hard to observe, and let attackers read Gmail and Drive data, take over accounts, and pivot laterally using stored credentials and password-reset magic links. The piece warns that authorized AI agents with overbroad OAuth grants can unintentionally traverse the same path — accessing inboxes, reading sensitive content, and exfiltrating data downstream — without any malicious actor or compromised credential.

Help Net Security · 1d agoResearch in the wild

A Cyber Range Evaluation of Autonomous Network Incident Response Agents

Cyber range evaluation shows reinforcement learning incident response agents defend emulated networks more efficiently than heuristic policies, depending heavily on adversary behavior.

The paper evaluates agents for automated network intrusion response in a cyber range designed for human operator training, featuring variable topology, red-team emulation, and simulated users. Alerts are generated by a SIEM platform and mapped to a data modeling language used by the agents, with reinforcement learning policies optimized to minimize combined defense and availability costs using a cyber attack simulator. Reinforcement learning agents defended the system more efficiently than heuristic policies, with performance highly dependent on the adversary policy and simulated user behavior.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

Linux Detection Engineering - Fileless Execution

Elastic Security Labs reproduces five Linux fileless execution patterns, including memfd_create staging and in-memory kernel module loads, and maps each to Elastic Defend rules.

Elastic Security Labs reproduced five Linux fileless execution patterns using its FENIX tooling: memfd_create staging, interpreter one-liners, deleted binaries, and in-memory kernel module loads. Each pattern is mapped to the Elastic Defend detection rules that catch it. The post is part of the team's ongoing Linux detection engineering series.

Elastic Security Labs · 15d agoResearch

Securing the unpatchable in an age of AI-driven vulnerabilities

Cisco Talos argues AI-driven vulnerability discovery leaves unpatchable OT systems exposed, recommending virtual patching via NGFW/IPS and micro-segmentation.

AI-assisted code analysis is uncovering vulnerabilities faster than organizations can patch, leaving certified or end-of-life OT systems with unmitigated known flaws. Talos recommends virtual patching with next-generation firewalls and IPS, micro-segmentation using VLANs and ACLs, and building visibility-based inventories of legacy systems. The article cites WannaCry's impact on the NHS and 2023 exploitation of end-of-life software in government systems, and warns that air gaps and data diodes are routinely circumvented by operational shortcuts.

Cisco Talos · 20h agoResearch

MacOS 27 - First Boot, (Tue, Sep 15th)

SANS ISC documents the expected network traffic macOS 27 'Golden Gate' generates on first boot to help defenders baseline their networks.

Johannes Ullrich of SANS Internet Storm Center captured roughly 300 packets from a macOS 27 'Golden Gate' system before user login, covering DHCP, IPv6 duplicate address discovery, DNS, and TCP behavior. macOS 27 resolves hostnames like albert.apple.com (device activation, certificate-pinned), push messaging hosts, and ipv4only.arpa for NAT64 networks. The OS still uses a TCP window scale of 6, ECN, and random timestamps, with only four TCP connections observed during boot. The analysis provides a reference baseline for security teams monitoring Apple endpoints.

SANS Internet Storm Center · 1d agoResearch

What Zero-Day Response Should Be in the Post-Mythos Era

Picus Security outlines a zero-day response playbook where defenders simulate exploit technique chains before public PoCs exist.

The article uses PaperCut NG/MF's August incident — exploitation in the wild before any patch, with the first emergency fix bypassed the same day and a third landing September 1 — as the template for AI-accelerated vulnerability response. It walks through a hypothetical CVE-2026-1001 (explicitly made up) to argue defenders should map CVEs to ATT&CK technique chains and simulate them against NGFW, WAF, EDR, endpoint hardening, and SIEM controls within minutes of disclosure. It notes disclosure-to-exploitation time has fallen from 21.5 days to hours.

BleepingComputer · 1d agoResearch in the wildCVE-2026-1001

Agentic Ransomware: From Human-Operated to AI-Operated Attacks

SOCRadar analyzes the shift from human-operated ransomware to agentic AI-driven attacks and what this transition means for defenders.

The article traces ransomware's evolution from operations requiring human involvement, such as affiliates navigating networks by hand, toward AI-agent-operated attacks. It argues agentic ransomware could automate stages historically dependent on human operators. The piece discusses implications for detection and defensive planning.

SOCRadar · 1d agoResearch

Hackers Turn Windows Shadow Copies Into a Tool for Credential Theft and Ransomware

Attackers abuse Windows VSS shadow copies to delete recovery points before ransomware and to extract NTDS.dit/SAM credentials, demanding context-aware detection.

Threat actors are weaponizing the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) for two purposes: destroying local recovery points via vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, diskshadow.exe, wbadmin.exe, and bcdedit.exe before encryption, and accessing static copies of locked files such as NTDS.dit and SAM for credential theft. Ransomware families tied to shadow-copy removal include Akira, Black Basta, BlackCat, Conti, LockBit, Qilin, RansomHub, REvil, Ryuk, and WannaCry. Huntress's analysis of the Nightmare-Eclipse tool showed the BlueHammer technique chaining a Windows Defender timing issue with a VSS snapshot to dump the SAM database and decrypt NT hashes. Defenders should correlate VSS operations with parent process, hive access, and subsequent encryption activity, and maintain immutable off-host backups.

GBHackers · 2d agoResearch in the wild1

Turn it off and on again, but for critical infrastructure

KTH researchers trained a reinforcement-learning intrusion response agent on an emulated segmented OT network that autonomously resets hosts and processes to disrupt intruders.

Researchers at KTH Royal Institute of Technology built a containerized replica of a segmented industrial network, attacked it across 14 days, and captured 40,000 30-second traffic intervals to train a defense agent under partial observability. The agent observes six packet-count numbers per interval, maintains 500 running state hypotheses, and can reset supervisory hosts, water tank processes, or entire subnets, with resets rebooting the target, renewing credentials, and changing its IP. The best agent approached a full-visibility baseline but depends on an assumed attacker behavior model; the testbed comprised three supervisory hosts, two PLCs, two tanks, weak credentials, and CVE-2017-7494 exposure. The team released its implementation and plans validation on a real industrial testbed with a partner.

Help Net Security · 3d agoResearchCVE-2017-74942· 1 read

Evidence-Grounded Retrieval for Investigation Hunt Lead Generation from CTI Reports

AHLERT generates environment-aware threat hunting leads from CTI reports using ATT&CK-seeded knowledge graph retrieval, roughly doubling F1 over flat-RAG baselines.

The paper introduces AHLERT, a system that converts Cyber Threat Intelligence reports into structured, investigable hunt leads via hybrid dense retrieval with multi-hop traversal over an MITRE ATT&CK-seeded knowledge graph and ontology-grounded RAG constrained to the defender's assets. It is LLM-agnostic and evaluated on public CTI reports for well-known APTs across proprietary and open-weight models. Hybrid evidence retrieval with ontology grounding raises mean F1 from 0.44 to 0.85, and AHLERT attains the highest effectiveness score (~86.95%) versus off-the-shelf LLMs.

arXiv cs.CR · 8d agoResearch

Rootless Docker and Its Hidden Security Trade-Offs

A blog post examines the security trade-offs of running Docker in rootless mode, covering isolation benefits and hidden limitations for defenders.

Ken Muse published a write-up titled 'Rootless Docker and Its Hidden Security Trade-Offs', analyzing the security implications of rootless Docker deployments. The feed provides only the title, so detailed findings are not available in this item, but the piece targets the intersection of containerization and privilege isolation practices.

Lobsters · security · 17d agoResearch1

Time Exploit Plummets Nday Flaws

Analysis shows time-to-exploit for n-day vulnerabilities has plummeted, shrinking defender patch windows as known flaws are exploited faster.

Infosecurity Magazine reports on analysis finding that the time between a vulnerability's disclosure and its exploitation in the wild has dropped sharply for n-day flaws. Faster exploitation compresses defenders' patching windows and raises the urgency of rapid patch deployment. The specific flaw families and metrics were not detailed in the available information.

Infosecurity Magazine · 29d agoResearch in the wild

Staying Ahead of Adversarial AI Through Agentic Source Code Review

Google Threat Intelligence details an agentic AI pipeline with human expert oversight to review source code and outpace AI-enabled attackers.

Google Threat Intelligence researchers argue that adversaries' misuse of AI raises the risk of data theft and extortion when proprietary source code is exposed. They describe a structured agentic source code review pipeline that combines AI models with skeptical validation steps and injected human domain expertise. The team reports a leap in efficacy in finding vulnerabilities before adversaries can exploit them.

Google Threat Intelligence · 29d agoResearch1

When Agents Look Like Beacons: NIDS Evasion by Model Context Protocol Traffic

Research shows Model Context Protocol agent traffic structurally resembles C2 beaconing and evades Suricata signatures and RITA behavioral scoring in testbeds.

An arXiv study demonstrates that Model Context Protocol (MCP) JSON-RPC traffic over Streamable HTTP mimics the polling patterns of C2 frameworks like Cobalt Strike and is not flagged as anomalous by standard enterprise defenses. In a Docker testbed with eleven traffic profiles across three TLS conditions, Suricata with the Emerging Threats Open ruleset produced near-zero alerts and RITA assigned a consistent 0.0 beacon score, regardless of jitter or TLS inspection. The authors propose an agent-native network indication standard using Agent-Native ALPN and out-of-band headers.

arXiv cs.CR · 12h agoResearch

Tractable Defense against Advanced Persistent Threats in Networked Settings

Mean-field heuristic makes Boolean Dynamical Systems defense against APTs tractable, exactly computing the value function under max-entropy assumptions.

The paper models APT network defense via Boolean Dynamical Systems, capturing attack stealth, noisy IDS observations, lateral movement, and defender hardening trade-offs. Because the emergent value function is computationally intractable with respect to network size, the authors propose a mean-field-inspired heuristic value function. They prove the heuristic is an exact computation under a maximum-entropy state-estimate assumption and numerically evaluate its quality as entropy assumptions are violated.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

A First-Principles Evaluation of Graph-Based Network Intrusion Detection Systems

GIDS-Eval framework reveals evaluation gaps in graph-based network intrusion detection; two crafted edges fully evade three detector-dataset pairs.

Researchers introduce GIDS-Eval, a framework decomposing graph-based network intrusion detection systems into six interchangeable stages to enable controlled comparisons. Surveying nine GIDS and reimplementing five, they find two crafted edges achieve full evasion against three of eight detector-dataset pairs, snapshot windows alone cause a mean 38.3% relative swing in average precision, and none of 18 replayed detector-dataset pairs can alert as events arrive. Their encoder-free GIDS-Lite control ranks first by AP on two of four datasets at up to 575x lower runtime.

arXiv cs.CR · 6d agoResearch1

BlueSTAR: Tiered Agentic Architecture for Autonomous Cyber Defense

BlueSTAR is a tiered agentic LLM architecture for autonomous cyber defense, validated on live enterprise IT/OT cyber ranges against seven attack chains.

Researchers present BlueSTAR, a tiered agentic architecture for autonomous cyber defense in enterprise IT/OT networks that transforms high-volume security telemetry into compact indicators of compromise. It pairs deterministic containment for known threats with LLM reasoning for attacks requiring contextual and cross-cycle analysis, and introduces a resilience metric jointly weighing attacker reach, mission-critical impact, and defensive disruption. Evaluation on two live cyber ranges with seven attack chains based on real-world intrusion techniques covered credential theft, repeated compromise, concurrent attackers, and attacks on physical processes.

arXiv cs.CR · 6d agoResearch

The Machine With Many Faces: Post-Exploitation Identity Misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE

Unit 42 demonstrates that root access on a Kubernetes node lets attackers spoof SPIFFE/SPIRE attestation and harvest co-located workloads' SVIDs.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 describes post-exploitation techniques in which an attacker with root on a compromised Kubernetes node spoofs Linux cgroup metadata used by the SPIRE agent during workload attestation, tricking it into issuing a co-located workload's SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document to an attacker-controlled process. The research shows the core trust assumption of machine-identity systems—that the node is trusted—collapses once root is obtained, exposing all cryptographic identities scoped to that node. Unit 42 released an open-source tool, Spooffe, for defenders to test identity exposure, and notes the technique has not been observed exploited in the wild.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · 6d agoResearch1

AD Rights Management Service (Part 1): Architecture, Deprecation, and Reconnaissance

Huntress maps AD RMS architecture and recon paths, setting up an offline key-extraction attack against its unrotatable 255-year root key.

Huntress's multi-part research examines Active Directory Rights Management Services, Microsoft's enterprise DRM role that still ships in Windows Server 2025 despite migration guidance favoring Azure Information Protection. Part 1 covers the trust model and how an ordinary domain account can locate RMS clusters and read rights-policy templates. Part 2 will detail four independent paths for extracting the Server Licensor Certificate (SLC) private key via service-group membership and the configuration database, enabling fully offline decryption of protected documents. The SLC certificate is valid from 2002 to 2258 and has no key-rotation mechanism, so a stolen key decrypts protected content indefinitely.

Huntress · 9d agoResearch1

LLM-Based Penetration Testing in the Presence of Honeypots

Studies honeypot-aware budget allocation for LLM attack agents, showing detector-guided policies let agents skip deception and compromise real hosts efficiently.

The paper formalizes LLM attacker behavior against honeypots as a budgeted decision process, where agents choose to continue or skip targets when honeypot suspicion arises. A detector-guided policy lets LLM agents allocate execution budget effectively across a mixed host pool in a controlled testbed. Findings show LLM-driven attackers can reason about heterogeneous artifacts and use honeypot suspicion to guide target selection, challenging traditional deception defenses that rely on realism and obscurity against human or script-driven attackers.

arXiv cs.CR · 9d agoResearch

Your threat feed is someone else's database: What ingesting malware intel at scale takes

GitHub's Dependabot lead shares five production lessons for ingesting community malware intelligence feeds across eight package ecosystems at scale.

GitHub's Dependabot team monitors over 30 million repositories and extended malicious-package advisories from npm to eight package ecosystems by ingesting OpenSSF's malicious-packages intelligence. The team catalogued roughly 18 new malicious npm packages per day in the year ending May 2026. The write-up argues that provenance with batch reverts, fingerprinting to catch echo-chamber duplicates, and heavyweight normalization are the make-or-break engineering for feed ingestion. It also recommends automated publishing with import caps and anomaly flagging, and quarantining malformed records rather than silently repairing them.

Help Net Security · 14d agoResearch1

$536 and 8 Hours: AI Learns to Attack a Different PLC

Forescout used Claude to port a WAGO PLC exploit for $536 in 8 hours, and an AI-generated payload later permanently bricked the test device.

Forescout researchers used Claude Code with Ghidra, terminal access, and physical hardware to port CVE-2021-31886, a pre-authentication buffer overflow in the Nucleus FTP server, from a WAGO 750-852 PLC to the WAGO 750-831 without source code or debugger access. The final RCE development stage cost $535.74 in API fees over an 8-hour, 32-minute session (2.6k input and 1.3M output tokens) and required heavy researcher guidance. Claude produced working ICMP and UDP beacon exploits in 12 minutes after identifying that normal FTP command completion was overwriting its shellcode, fixed by omitting the CRLF terminator. A follow-up session extending the payloads toward a C2 implant wrote to flash-mapped memory and permanently bricked the PLC, underscoring the risks of autonomous agents operating against physical infrastructure.

Security Affairs · 14d agoResearchCVE-2021-318861

AI AppSec tools agree on just 5% of security findings

Contrast Security report finds 42 confirmed exploit attempts per application monthly and three AI scanners agreeing on only 5% of findings.

Contrast Security's AppSec Overflow 2026 report, drawing on telemetry from hundreds of thousands of production applications and APIs, found adversaries touch the average application every four minutes with 42 confirmed viable exploit attempts per application monthly, led by untrusted deserialization, path traversal, and method tampering. Legacy flaws Log4Shell and Spring4Shell remain widespread, mean time to exploit fell from over two years in 2018 to under three weeks for most 2025 exploited vulnerabilities, and average critical fix time is 92 days. Three AI scanners set on the same codebase agreed on only 5% of findings, and triaging a 2-million-line codebase scan cost roughly $128,000 versus $315 in API charges. Among exploited CVEs in the dataset, 82% of KEV-listed entries carried EPSS scores of 90% or higher, while CVE-2006-1547 and CVE-2023-38180 were confirmed exploited despite EPSS scores under 25%.

Help Net Security · 17d agoResearch in the wildCVE-2006-1547CVE-2023-381801

Chrome DevTools Technique Enables Authenticated Session Hijacking in Live Windows Browsers

SpecterOps released CDP-Enable-BOF, a Beacon Object File that enables Chrome DevTools Protocol in live Chrome or Edge processes on Windows for session hijacking.

SpecterOps released CDP-Enable-BOF, an x64 Beacon Object File that activates Chrome DevTools Protocol inside running chrome.exe or msedge.exe processes on Windows, exposing cookies, history, saved passwords, and authenticated sessions without administrator rights. It calls Chromium's StartRemoteDebuggingServer on the browser UI thread to stay reliable under CFG, TLS, and CET, and was tested on Chrome 147 and Edge 147. The technique builds on work by DeathFlamingo and Cedric Van Bockhaven; Google had hardened remote debugging in Chrome 136 after attackers used it to steal cookies post-App-Bound Encryption. Defenders can watch Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10 for injection into browser processes.

The Hacker News · 22d agoResearch2

Risks in IoT Supply Chain

Unit 42 analyzes multilayer IoT supply chain risks across hardware, firmware, and software, citing counterfeit Cisco switches and OpenWrt attacks.

Unit 42 examines weaknesses in the IoT supply chain ecosystem across hardware, firmware, operation, and vulnerability layers, noting that 89% of IT decision-makers reported IoT device growth and IDC forecast 41.6 billion connected IoT devices by 2025. Examples include counterfeit Cisco Catalyst 2960-X switches with possible backdoor access (F-Secure, July 2020), a March 2020 OpenWrt flaw enabling malicious update impersonation, and threat actor interest in TeamViewer remote support software. The report stresses that untracked third-party components and missing device inventories make it hard to assess vulnerability impact across vendors.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · 28d agoResearch