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DomainAll Cyber AIWindow24h 3d 7d 30d AllIn the wild Important only Show duplicates

CategoryAll Industry 49 Exploit / PoC 16 Malware 16 AI industry 15 Vulnerability 12 Tools 12 AI safety & security 11 Threat actor 8 Model release 7 Research 7 Policy & legal 5 AI tools & infra 5 Data breach 3 AI research 3

SeverityAll critical 8 high 26 medium 33 low 1 info 110

Zombie Card Attack Can Revive Expired Visa Cards for Contactless Payments

UMass Amherst researchers demonstrate Zombie Card, an NFC relay attack that revives expired Visa contactless cards for in-store purchases without breaking cryptography.

Researchers at the University of Massachusetts Amherst presented the Zombie Card attack at USENIX Security 2026, showing that Visa's Kernel 3 does not cryptographically bind the Application Expiration Date (tag 5F24) the terminal reads with the Track 2 expiry seen by the issuer. By positioning an NFC man-in-the-middle relay, an attacker can rewrite the terminal-facing expiration date of an expired card and complete contactless purchases, provided the account remains open under the same PAN and the bank does not independently re-check expiry. Testing across five major US banks found three distinct policies; Visa Kernel 3 accepted the modified date, while Mastercard, American Express, and Discover kernels declined modified transactions. Findings were disclosed to Visa and affected banks in May 2025, no CVE has been assigned, and no exploitation has been reported.

The Hacker NewsAug 20, 18:30 UTC · 27d agoResearch

Your Shredded Visa Card May Still Work at the Checkout

UMass Amherst researchers demonstrated expired Visa contactless cards can complete real purchases via relay attacks exploiting Visa Kernel 3's unsigned expiry date handling.

University of Massachusetts Amherst researchers presented at USENIX Security 2026 that expired Visa contactless cards can be revived for real purchases through an NFC man-in-the-middle attack on Visa's Kernel 3. The attack alters the expiry date the terminal sees (tag 5F24) while leaving the Track 2 Equivalent Data (tag 57) sent to the issuing bank unchanged, and the card's cryptographic signature does not cover the expiry date. Two Android phones emulating card and terminal relayed transactions within Visa's 500-millisecond limit. Mastercard, American Express, and Discover kernels blocked the attack, while Visa Kernel 3 did not; researchers also modified the Consumer Device Cardholder Verification Method flag at five US banks, and attackers can also exploit Terminal Verification Results zero-filling. Visa was notified in May 2025 and December 2025; no CVE has been assigned.

Security AffairsAug 21, 18:04 UTC · 26d agoResearch

Your Cloud Security Checklist Doesn't Work the Way You Think It Does

Intruder's 2026 Cloud Security Index found misconfiguration risk profiles differ sharply across AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud across 3,000 organizations.

Intruder analyzed misconfiguration data from 3,000 organizations across AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud for its 2026 Cloud Security Index. Weak IAM controls and missing logging affected 80-98% of accounts regardless of provider, while exposed services ranged from 76% on AWS to just 8% on Google Cloud. Top issues included S3 buckets without HTTPS enforcement (87% of AWS accounts), Entra ID users without MFA (55% of Azure accounts), and missing OS Login MFA (77% of Google Cloud accounts). Weak IAM prevalence rose with organization size, from 87% at SMEs to 98% at large enterprises, and midmarket organizations took the longest to remediate at 35 days on average.

The Hacker NewsSep 7, 11:45 UTC · 9d agoResearch

Can We Stop The Ads? Taxonomy and Characterization of Smartphone Splash Ads and Existing Countermeasures

Study of 108 ad-defense implementations finds only one tool blocked splash-ad navigation across ten popular apps, and it required Accessibility permission.

The paper taxonomizes smartphone splash ads — full-screen ads at app launch that trick users into trigger mechanisms such as moving the phone — and analyzes 108 documented advertising defenses for deployment barriers. Many defenses require device rooting, jailbreaking, runtime code injection, or application modification; others need extra permissions, rule maintenance, compilation, or payment. In evaluating 13 configurations of 11 tools across 10 popular apps, only one prevented ad-triggered navigation across all ten apps, requiring Accessibility permission and leaving ads visible roughly one second before dismissal. Documented harms include delayed emergency response, driver distraction, and degraded accessibility for vision-impaired users.

arXiv cs.CRSep 15, 15:24 UTC · 1d agoResearch

The Machine With Many Faces: Post-Exploitation Identity Misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE

Unit 42 demonstrates that root access on a Kubernetes node lets attackers spoof SPIFFE/SPIRE attestation and harvest co-located workloads' SVIDs.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 describes post-exploitation techniques in which an attacker with root on a compromised Kubernetes node spoofs Linux cgroup metadata used by the SPIRE agent during workload attestation, tricking it into issuing a co-located workload's SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document to an attacker-controlled process. The research shows the core trust assumption of machine-identity systems—that the node is trusted—collapses once root is obtained, exposing all cryptographic identities scoped to that node. Unit 42 released an open-source tool, Spooffe, for defenders to test identity exposure, and notes the technique has not been observed exploited in the wild.

Palo Alto Unit 42Sep 10, 10:00 UTC · 7d agoResearch1

When the Whole Company Adopts AI: What It Does to Your SOC

Analysis of 16.9 million SOC alerts finds AI-related alerts at 0.43%, growing 685% since February, with 94.1% noise and 0.02% real attacks.

A review of roughly 16.9 million SOC alerts found about 73,000 (0.43%) were AI-related, a share that grew 685% between February and June 2026. Of AI-related alerts, 94.1% were noise, 5.8% genuine risks, and 0.02% real attacks; 79.8% received benign verdicts, 81.7% were automatically suppressed, and only 5.4% reached a human analyst. The only confirmed attacks were phishing campaigns that weaponized AI brand names as lures, while developer coding agents spawning shells and reading credential stores routinely tripped detections written before AI agents existed.

The Hacker NewsSep 12, 10:24 UTC · 5d agoResearch2

Building a Linux GPU Driver for the M4 Mac Mini in One Month

Two developers built a fully OpenGL ES 3.0 compliant Linux GPU driver for the M4 Mac Mini in one month via clean-room reverse engineering.

Niklas and the author reverse engineered Apple's AGX GPU firmware ABI and user-space components in about a month, a process that normally takes years, producing an OpenGL ES 3.0 conformant driver fast enough to run Minecraft at 200fps on an M4 Mac Mini. The work was done transparently using hypervisor traces without examining Apple binaries, following clean-room practices, and included a custom shader compiler, command stream builder, and a full Linux kernel driver for the firmware ABI. The A18 Pro firmware ABI proved significantly more complex than the M1's, with 1.5x as many structs and twice as many pointers. All experiments and provenance evidence were published in public agx-re repositories.

Hacker News · AISep 15, 19:30 UTC · 1d agoResearch HN 40↑ · 5 comments