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Trends in Web Threats: Old Web Skimmer Still Active Today

Unit 42 detected 577,000 landing URL incidents in Q1 2022, with an old web skimmer family still actively stealing payment card data.

Palo Alto Unit 42 detected 577,275 landing URL incidents (116,643 unique) and 2,043,862 malicious host URL incidents (180,370 unique) between January and March 2022. Web threat volumes declined after the November 2021 holiday peak, but an old web skimmer family remained active. Business and economy sites overtook personal sites as the most common apparently benign entry points. Most malicious domains geolocated to the United States, Germany, and Russia, though proxy servers and VPNs obscure true locations.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

Getting a stranger’s phone kicked off the cellular network costs a few dollars

Researchers show attackers can remotely block strangers' phones and alarm gateways on US cellular networks by abusing lost/stolen IMEI reporting for $2.50-$4 per device.

Researchers from Michigan State University and three partner schools found six weaknesses in the lost/stolen device reporting ecosystem spanning devices, carrier systems, and cross-carrier block-list sharing. They demonstrated blocking unopened Samsung Galaxy Z Fold 7 phones and home alarm gateways on three major US carriers, with each block costing $2.50-$4 and taking roughly 20-80 seconds. The attacks exploit thin identity and ownership checks in prepaid accounts, IMEI leakage from vulnerable cellular chipsets used by two vendors with over 40% global market share, and pre-release IMEI databases purchasable for $600. Victims receive no notification, and restoring service requires proving device ownership to the carrier.

Help Net Security · 6d agoResearch

Enterprise Defenses Recovered at the Edge and Collapsed Inside

Picus Labs' Blue Report 2026 finds perimeter prevention at 69% but post-compromise prevention just 37%, with reconnaissance blocked only 10% of the time.

Picus Labs' Blue Report 2026, based on 434,000+ simulated attacks across client production environments in H1 2026, found perimeter prevention effectiveness rose from 62% to 69% while the Post-Compromise Prevention Rate was only 37%. Quiet techniques fared worst: reconnaissance was blocked 10% of the time, registry-based credential access less than 1%, and the alert score stayed at 14% despite logging at a four-year high of 58%. IOC-based prevention fell to 50% from 71% in 2024, and Mimikatz's LSASS path was blocked about 94% while alternative credential-read paths went nearly undetected.

The Hacker News · Aug 12, 2026Research

Package Manager Trends

Sixteen-week roundup finds package managers converging on release-age cooldowns, install-script blocking, malware scans, and recurring path-traversal and credential-leak fixes.

The author aggregates supply-chain security trends from sixteen weeks of This Week in Package Management, built from about 80 RSS feeds. Release-age cooldown gates shipped in Deno 2.8, Bundler, npm, Yarn, mise, Hex, Mamba, and Cargo, with Dependabot making a three-day cooldown default in August. npm 12 and Bun 1.4 now block lifecycle install scripts by default, and Composer 2.10 and uv added install/publish-time malware checks, while npm's registry began scanning at publish time. Path traversal on archive extraction was fixed in 14 of 16 weeks across tools including uv, pnpm, Docker, and Composer, and credential-misdirection bugs affected Cargo, ORAS, Composer, and Renovate.

Lobsters · security · 6d agoResearch1

Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0 (1999)

Seminal 1999 USENIX study finds most novice users cannot correctly sign and encrypt email with PGP 5.0 in 90 minutes.

Whitten and Tygar's USENIX Security Symposium paper evaluates whether cryptography novices can use PGP 5.0 effectively, using cognitive walkthrough analysis and a laboratory user test. The majority of test participants failed to successfully sign and encrypt a message within 90 minutes, despite PGP 5.0 having a well-regarded graphical interface. The authors argue that security requires usability standards beyond those of general consumer software and propose domain-specific UI design principles for security. The paper is a foundational reference in usable security research.

Lobsters · security · 7d agoResearch

The Gopher in the Room: Analysis of GoLang Malware in the Wild

Unit 42 analysis of 10,700 Go-compiled malware samples shows steady growth in the wild, with 92% targeting Windows and top families including Veil, GoBot2, and HERCULES.

Unit 42 collected roughly 10,700 unique Go-compiled malware samples and found that Go usage by malware developers has steadily risen in recent months. About 92% of samples targeted Windows and 75% were attributed to known families, led by Veil, GoBot2, and HERCULES. The most prevalent groupings were penetration testing tools, remote access Trojans, and backdoors. Statically linked Go binaries average 4.65MB, which can complicate phishing delivery but sometimes causes antivirus products to skip or fail scanning.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research1

What Zero-Day Response Should Be in the Post-Mythos Era

Picus Security outlines a zero-day response playbook where defenders simulate exploit technique chains before public PoCs exist.

The article uses PaperCut NG/MF's August incident — exploitation in the wild before any patch, with the first emergency fix bypassed the same day and a third landing September 1 — as the template for AI-accelerated vulnerability response. It walks through a hypothetical CVE-2026-1001 (explicitly made up) to argue defenders should map CVEs to ATT&CK technique chains and simulate them against NGFW, WAF, EDR, endpoint hardening, and SIEM controls within minutes of disclosure. It notes disclosure-to-exploitation time has fallen from 21.5 days to hours.

BleepingComputer · 1d agoResearch in the wildCVE-2026-1001

Post-quantum migration gets harder when every user holds a key

Quantus CEO Christopher Smith discusses post-quantum migration pitfalls, including oversized keys breaking IPsec, SSH and TLS, and hard-to-migrate blockchain user keys.

Quantus CEO Christopher Smith describes post-quantum migration findings from banks and hospitals, including forgotten default passwords, orphaned admin keys held by former employees and hidden password hashes on user devices. Larger post-quantum keys and signatures break size assumptions in IPsec, SSH, TLS and libp2p, while migrating blockchain user keys remains hard because every user must act. He argues boards should fund quantum migration like insurance by quantifying cryptographic failure risk, and warns a silent quantum break would be difficult to detect from outside.

Help Net Security · Aug 12, 2026Research