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Trends in Web Threats in CY Q2 2022: Malicious JavaScript Downloaders Are Evolving
Unit 42 detected 751,000 landing URL incidents in Q2 2022 and documented malicious JavaScript downloaders evolving to evade detection.
Unit 42 detected 751,331 landing URL incidents (253,644 unique) and 1,744,629 malicious host URL incidents (256,844 unique) from April through June 2022. Total landing URL incidents rose compared with Q1 2022, and unique host URL incidents grew 42%, indicating attackers deploying more variants. The report includes a case study of a JavaScript downloader campaign demonstrating new evasion techniques. Personal sites, blogs, and business sites were the top apparently benign entry points.
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Trends in Web Threats: Old Web Skimmer Still Active Today
Unit 42 detected 577,000 landing URL incidents in Q1 2022, with an old web skimmer family still actively stealing payment card data.
Palo Alto Unit 42 detected 577,275 landing URL incidents (116,643 unique) and 2,043,862 malicious host URL incidents (180,370 unique) between January and March 2022. Web threat volumes declined after the November 2021 holiday peak, but an old web skimmer family remained active. Business and economy sites overtook personal sites as the most common apparently benign entry points. Most malicious domains geolocated to the United States, Germany, and Russia, though proxy servers and VPNs obscure true locations.
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Trends in Web Threats: Attackers Were More Active During Holiday Season
Unit 42 tracked 533,000 malicious landing URL incidents from October-December 2021, showing web threats peaked during the holiday shopping season.
Unit 42 detected 533,452 malicious landing URL incidents (120,753 unique) and 2,906,875 malicious host URL incidents (165,255 unique) from October through December 2021. Threat activity peaked in November, likely tied to Black Friday in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Most malicious domains appeared to originate in the United States, followed by Russia and Germany. Personal sites, blogs, business sites, and shopping sites were the most common apparently benign entry points for attacks.
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Beneath the Surface: Detecting and Blocking Hidden Malicious Traffic Distribution Systems
Unit 42 built an ML-based detector for malicious traffic distribution systems, finding malicious TDS chains average longer redirections and more URLs than legitimate ones.
Traffic distribution systems redirect victims through chains of intermediate domains to hide final destinations, serving phishing, malvertising, and online gambling operations. Unit 42's topological analysis of redirection graphs found malicious TDS traffic uses longer chains (about 25% exceed four hops vs 10% benign), more URLs (median 126 vs 80), and fewer isolated subgraphs with higher connectivity. These features power an ML detector integrated into Advanced DNS Security and Advanced URL Filtering to identify and block malicious TDS infrastructure in customer traffic.
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Phishing Research Challenges Conventional Security Awareness Testing
Pistachio's 2.47 million phishing simulations across 1,200 organizations show click rates alone mislead, with 30% of IT staff clicking and leak rates more predictive.
Between June 2025 and May 2026, Pistachio sent 2.47 million simulated phishing attempts to more than 123,000 employees at over 1,200 organizations, analyzing click, credential-leak and reporting behavior. Click rates ranged from 26% in Design to 41% in Construction; 30% of tech development and IT staff clicked at least once, while financial services were the most resilient sector. The report argues that click rate alone creates a false sense of security and that combined click, leak and report trends are better resilience indicators.
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TLD Tracker: Exploring Newly Released Top
Unit 42 tracked 19 newly released top-level domains and found large-scale phishing, unwanted program distribution, and cybersquatting tied to TLD launch dates.
Researchers analyzed 19 new generic TLDs, including .zip, .bot, .ing, and .meme, released or approaching general availability over roughly 18 months. Data from passive DNS, registry zone files, newly registered domain feeds, and the Tranco top-1M list showed phishing campaigns, potentially unwanted program distribution, and domain squatting on these TLDs. Abuse correlated with each TLD's rollout phases, indicating attackers monitor general availability dates to register and weaponize domains. The IANA root database now lists over 1,000 generic TLDs.
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Building a Linux GPU Driver for the M4 Mac Mini in One Month
Two developers built a fully OpenGL ES 3.0 compliant Linux GPU driver for the M4 Mac Mini in one month via clean-room reverse engineering.
Niklas and the author reverse engineered Apple's AGX GPU firmware ABI and user-space components in about a month, a process that normally takes years, producing an OpenGL ES 3.0 conformant driver fast enough to run Minecraft at 200fps on an M4 Mac Mini. The work was done transparently using hypervisor traces without examining Apple binaries, following clean-room practices, and included a custom shader compiler, command stream builder, and a full Linux kernel driver for the firmware ABI. The A18 Pro firmware ABI proved significantly more complex than the M1's, with 1.5x as many structs and twice as many pointers. All experiments and provenance evidence were published in public agx-re repositories.
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Automobile Camouflage to Hide from Flock Cameras
Schneier on Security highlights a printed vehicle-camouflage pattern tested to defeat Flock surveillance cameras and Axon body cameras.
The post discusses covering cars with printed patterns designed to fool Flock automated license-plate recognition software, with testing reportedly done against Flock and Axon body cameras. Reader comments question effectiveness against other ALPR vendors, Flock's RF MAC-address upgrade, and whether such camouflage might become regulated. The page also contains off-topic comment threads about anti-bot over-blocking and privacy.
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Linux Detection Engineering - Local Privilege Escalation
Elastic details a layered detection framework for Linux local privilege escalation, covering 2026's copy-on-write bug wave and LLM-assisted discovery.
Elastic Security Labs describes how most Linux local privilege escalations share a common host flow — an unprivileged process launched from a writable path becoming root — and proposes layered detections combining general outcome-based rules with per-technique rules in Elastic Defend and Auditd. It tracks 13 recent LPE disclosures, seven of which share a copy-on-write/zero-copy bug class, including Copy Fail, DirtyFrag, Fragnesia, DirtyDecrypt, DirtyClone, pedit COW, and RefluXFS. Qualys attributes RefluXFS to an LLM-assisted research effort with Anthropic using Claude Mythos Preview, and another bug is credited to an LLM-assisted workflow. Detection and endpoint rules are published in Elastic's detection-rules and protections-artifacts repositories.
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Hacking Public Wi-Fi DNS to Steal Credentials
Attackers can hijack public Wi-Fi DNS to redirect users to credential-stealing fake login pages; commenters debate HTTPS limits and mitigations like encrypted DNS.
The discussion examines how an attacker controlling DNS on shared or public Wi-Fi networks can redirect requests for legitimate services to attacker-controlled servers to steal credentials. Commenters analyze whether HTTPS and certificates mitigate the attack, noting attackers often rely on HTTP or browser trust quirks. Suggested defenses include encrypted DNS (DoH), DNSSEC, and travel routers running OpenWRT. No specific campaign, victims, or indicators are provided.
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