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Differentially Private EEG Feature Anonymization: A Privacy-Utility Case Study in Clinical Neurophysiology

Case study applies Gaussian and Laplace differential privacy to clinical EEG features, quantifying privacy-utility trade-offs across three deployment scenarios.

Researchers evaluate subject-level differential privacy for EEG-derived feature representations using Gaussian and Laplace perturbations across client-side, centralized server-side, and decentralized local training scenarios. Utility is assessed with statistical measures and a downstream machine-learning check on clinical neurophysiology data. Results show DP can be integrated into EEG workflows, but mechanism choice, privacy parameters, and sensitivity calibration strongly influence data utility, particularly on small and imbalanced clinical datasets. The study highlights the privacy-utility trade-off in protecting biomedical signals against re-identification and inference risks.

arXiv cs.CR · 5d agoResearch

Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0 (1999)

Seminal 1999 USENIX study finds most novice users cannot correctly sign and encrypt email with PGP 5.0 in 90 minutes.

Whitten and Tygar's USENIX Security Symposium paper evaluates whether cryptography novices can use PGP 5.0 effectively, using cognitive walkthrough analysis and a laboratory user test. The majority of test participants failed to successfully sign and encrypt a message within 90 minutes, despite PGP 5.0 having a well-regarded graphical interface. The authors argue that security requires usability standards beyond those of general consumer software and propose domain-specific UI design principles for security. The paper is a foundational reference in usable security research.

Lobsters · security · 7d agoResearch

Don't Trust the Super-App: A Case Study of Russia's Max

Researchers show super-apps like Russia's Max can silently capture mini-app UI, storage, network traffic, and authentication, enabling untraceable user impersonation.

The paper challenges the assumption that super-apps are trusted intermediaries, citing WeChat's passive cross-mini-app tracking, Russia's Max's entanglement with state prosecution of online speech, and Iran's Bale operating during a prolonged internet shutdown. Using Max as a case study, the authors demonstrate that a super-app can capture mini-app UI, read and write mini-app local storage, inject arbitrary JavaScript into mini-app runtimes, mediate network traffic, and control authentication context, enabling silent user impersonation without trace. They argue these capabilities are inherent to the super-app architecture and call for mobile OS and app store interventions to close the blind spot.

arXiv cs.CR · 5d agoResearch1

Autoencoder Is All You Need: Profiling and Detecting Malicious DNS Traffic

Palo Alto Unit 42 details an autoencoder-based method that profiles DNS traffic to detect C2 and malicious domains, blocking ~374,000 malicious DNS requests daily.

Unit 42 built an RNN-based autoencoder that compresses DNS traffic time series into fixed-dimensional 'DNS profiles' for each domain and device. Downstream classification, clustering, and anomaly detection modules flag suspicious domains, capturing 170 emerging suspicious domains in May 2024. Signatures block roughly 374,000 malicious DNS requests daily and run in the Advanced DNS Security service, with detections shared to Advanced URL Filtering. Case studies link DNS traffic patterns to C2 beaconing, dynamic DNS abuse, and DNS tunneling for data exfiltration.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

TLD Tracker: Exploring Newly Released Top

Unit 42 tracked 19 newly released top-level domains and found large-scale phishing, unwanted program distribution, and cybersquatting tied to TLD launch dates.

Researchers analyzed 19 new generic TLDs, including .zip, .bot, .ing, and .meme, released or approaching general availability over roughly 18 months. Data from passive DNS, registry zone files, newly registered domain feeds, and the Tranco top-1M list showed phishing campaigns, potentially unwanted program distribution, and domain squatting on these TLDs. Abuse correlated with each TLD's rollout phases, indicating attackers monitor general availability dates to register and weaponize domains. The IANA root database now lists over 1,000 generic TLDs.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

Recent Trends in Internet Threats: Common Industries Impersonated in Phishing Attacks, Web Skimmer Analysis and More

Unit 42 analyzed 67 million malicious URLs and domains in H2 2022, a 52% increase, highlighting phishing impersonation and web skimmer trends.

Unit 42 observed more than 67 million unique malicious URLs, domains and IPs between July and December 2022, a 52% increase over the first half of the year. Malicious JavaScript detections grew 99.3%, with over 4 million malicious JS samples hosted on 4.8 million URLs. Over 85% of hosting infrastructure was concentrated in eight countries, led by the United States, Brazil and China. The report also analyzes industries spoofed in phishing pages and includes a web skimmer case study on a Tranco top 1 million website.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

Trends in Web Threats in CY Q2 2022: Malicious JavaScript Downloaders Are Evolving

Unit 42 detected 751,000 landing URL incidents in Q2 2022 and documented malicious JavaScript downloaders evolving to evade detection.

Unit 42 detected 751,331 landing URL incidents (253,644 unique) and 1,744,629 malicious host URL incidents (256,844 unique) from April through June 2022. Total landing URL incidents rose compared with Q1 2022, and unique host URL incidents grew 42%, indicating attackers deploying more variants. The report includes a case study of a JavaScript downloader campaign demonstrating new evasion techniques. Personal sites, blogs, and business sites were the top apparently benign entry points.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

The Year in Web Threats: Web Skimmers Take Advantage of Cloud Hosting and More

Unit 42 analyzed 2.24 million web threat incidents, finding web skimmers increasingly hosted on cloud infrastructure to steal payment card data.

Palo Alto Unit 42 analyzed 2,241,354 web threat incidents and 831,550 unique URLs detected via Advanced URL Filtering between October 2020 and September 2021. Threat activity peaked from October 2020 to January 2021, coinciding with the holiday shopping season, with most malicious domains geolocated to the United States, Russia, and Germany. Web skimmers ranked third among the top five threat classes and showed the most code diversity, making detection harder. Researchers observed more web skimmer families being hosted on cloud platforms to steal payment data and PII.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

Trends in Web Threats: Attackers Were More Active During Holiday Season

Unit 42 tracked 533,000 malicious landing URL incidents from October-December 2021, showing web threats peaked during the holiday shopping season.

Unit 42 detected 533,452 malicious landing URL incidents (120,753 unique) and 2,906,875 malicious host URL incidents (165,255 unique) from October through December 2021. Threat activity peaked in November, likely tied to Black Friday in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Most malicious domains appeared to originate in the United States, followed by Russia and Germany. Personal sites, blogs, business sites, and shopping sites were the most common apparently benign entry points for attacks.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

1Password's AI patching benchmark is misleading

Trail of Bits reanalysis says 1Password's 26% AI clean-fix rate is misleading; 86% of eligible patches blocked exploits.

Trail of Bits critiques 1Password's FLAWED AI patching benchmark, arguing its 26% clean-fix headline mixes trials where agents were instructed to apply wrong fixes (22% of data) with trials that prohibited compiling or testing (36%). Restricting to reasonable conditions, 2,634 of 3,067 patches (86%) blocked the supplied exploit. Trail of Bits also reports 12.5% of 2,265 developer first fixes failed in its own 2024-2026 assessments, and released post-patch-validation and review-walkthrough agent skills.

Lobsters · security · 18h agoResearch

MarkSec: Capability-Aware Evaluation of Adversarial Attacks Against LLM Watermarks

MarkSec unifies evaluation of stealing, scrubbing, and spoofing attacks against LLM watermarks with quality-constrained success metrics under shared reporting protocols.

MarkSec is a framework unifying analysis of stealing, scrubbing, and spoofing attacks against LLM watermarks under shared detector calibration, metric definitions, and reporting protocols. It introduces a quality-constrained attack success metric that jointly assesses attack effectiveness and text quality. Experiments across representative watermark families, attacks, LLMs, and datasets show that attacks strongest by watermark removal alone can fall behind general rewriting when success requires acceptable text quality, and stealing-based scrubbers often underperform the best general-scrubbing baselines.

arXiv cs.CR · 1d agoResearch

Beneath the Surface: Detecting and Blocking Hidden Malicious Traffic Distribution Systems

Unit 42 built an ML-based detector for malicious traffic distribution systems, finding malicious TDS chains average longer redirections and more URLs than legitimate ones.

Traffic distribution systems redirect victims through chains of intermediate domains to hide final destinations, serving phishing, malvertising, and online gambling operations. Unit 42's topological analysis of redirection graphs found malicious TDS traffic uses longer chains (about 25% exceed four hops vs 10% benign), more URLs (median 126 vs 80), and fewer isolated subgraphs with higher connectivity. These features power an ML detector integrated into Advanced DNS Security and Advanced URL Filtering to identify and block malicious TDS infrastructure in customer traffic.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

The MAL Simulator: Cyber Operations Simulation based on Attack & Defense Graphs

MAL Simulator grounds attack-defense graph simulations in a CRATE-emulated network, training RL attacker and defender agents where attackers outperform search methods.

The MAL Simulator is a cyber operations simulator built on the Meta Attack Language (MAL), enabling decision-driven attack and defense simulations adaptable to new domains without modifying source code. Case studies trained defensive and offensive agents, grounded in data collected from an emulated network implemented in the CRATE cyber range. The trained attacker policy reached designated targets more efficiently than compared search methods, and the trained defender induced lower costs than a naive heuristic under noisy alerts, though defender performance dropped significantly against an RL attacker.

arXiv cs.CR · 1d agoResearch

Automating Attack Graph Construction for Agentic Pentesting. Towards Neuro-Symbolic Vulnerability Hunting

Semi-automated pipeline converts Trivy, Semgrep, Nmap output into MulVAL attack graphs for agentic pentesting, 53.7% mean vulnerability coverage in CyBench.

The paper presents a semi-automated pipeline that parses Trivy, Semgrep, and Nmap findings into MulVAL predicates and uses an LLM-assisted process to build domain-specific Datalog rules linking scanner evidence to attack techniques. MulVAL/XSB then performs symbolic inference to generate structured, auditable attack paths for agentic pentesting. Evaluated on 54 web CTF tasks from CyBench, every task produced at least one goal-reaching graph with 53.7% mean ground-truth vulnerability coverage, 51.9% full coverage, and an 83.9% noise-path rate. Median end-to-end runtime was 24.9 seconds, making the pipeline runtime-practical for agentic workflows.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

MicroHasTEE: Bare-Metal Haskell for Type-Level Peripheral Ownership on Armv8-M

MicroHasTEE expresses TrustZone secure and non-secure firmware as one typed Haskell program, catching peripheral-ownership inconsistencies at compile time.

MicroHasTEE is a multiparty Haskell framework that models both TrustZone firmware images as participants in a single typed program, using type-level capability ledgers to track peripheral acquisition, configuration, transfer, and finalization. MicroHs compiles the shared program twice to produce separate bare-metal Secure and Non-secure firmware images. The framework rejects inconsistent resource use, post-configuration attribution changes, wrong-domain callbacks, and calls to unregistered Secure services. A door-lock case study on an STM32U5 Nucleo board produced images of 232.7 KiB and 228.4 KiB of flash with roughly 220 KiB of SRAM per domain.

arXiv cs.CR · 5d agoResearch1

CertiFlash: A Formal Verification Framework for Flash Translation Layers in Computational Solid State Drives

CertiFlash provides machine-checked formal verification of SSD flash translation layers, proving isolation, integrity, and ownership invariants to prevent tenant data leaks.

CertiFlash is an open-source formal verification framework for Flash Translation Layers (FTL) in computational SSDs, mechanized in the Rocq proof assistant. It shows that a faulty FTL can corrupt device state at five surfaces (e.g., leaking data between tenants or dropping integrity tags), demonstrated on a DaisyPlus OpenSSD. Designers prove once that every operation of a general FTL model preserves a global invariant covering mapping, isolation, integrity, ownership, and allocation; new designs need only discharge five hypotheses. Across four case studies, added effort was 27-3,231 lines against a 16,489-line framework.

arXiv cs.CR · 6d agoResearch1

Injected and Leaked: Actively Inducing Side-Channel Leakage Using Electromagnetic Injection and Hardware Nonlinearity

Researchers introduce InjectEave, using electromagnetic injection and hardware nonlinearity to induce side-channel leakage and eavesdrop on headphone audio from 30 meters.

An arXiv paper shows electromagnetic injection can actively amplify side-channel leakage: nonlinear hardware such as amplifiers, ADCs, and power converters modulates secret electrical signals onto an injected EM carrier, upconverting low-frequency secrets into measurable EM emissions. By tuning injection frequency and amplitude, an adversary can shape the effective spectrum and entropy of the resulting leakage. The InjectEave attack demonstrated eavesdropping on wired and wireless headphone audio from up to 30 meters and in through-wall scenarios using accessible RF equipment, plus leakage of smart home device power consumption and analog sensor inputs. Case studies show closed-loop eavesdropping and manipulation of landline phone conversations, and the paper discusses mitigations.

arXiv cs.CR · 12d agoResearch

Trends in Web Threats: Old Web Skimmer Still Active Today

Unit 42 detected 577,000 landing URL incidents in Q1 2022, with an old web skimmer family still actively stealing payment card data.

Palo Alto Unit 42 detected 577,275 landing URL incidents (116,643 unique) and 2,043,862 malicious host URL incidents (180,370 unique) between January and March 2022. Web threat volumes declined after the November 2021 holiday peak, but an old web skimmer family remained active. Business and economy sites overtook personal sites as the most common apparently benign entry points. Most malicious domains geolocated to the United States, Germany, and Russia, though proxy servers and VPNs obscure true locations.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Research

Learning Intrusion Response Strategies for OT Systems

Researchers model OT intrusion response as a POMDP and train PPO-based automated response strategies effective against MITRE attacks in an emulated OT system.

The paper formalizes automated intrusion response for OT systems as a partially observable Markov decision process, with partial observability modeled from traffic measurements. Learning-based solution methods built on PPO are developed and evaluated on an emulated OT system. The resulting response strategies proved effective against several types of MITRE attacks for the studied use case.

arXiv cs.CR · 6d agoResearch2