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Testing race conditions with memory access tracing and stack-based delay injection

Google Project Zero released MAccConc, Linux kernel tooling that traces memory accesses to explore and test race condition interleavings.

A Google Project Zero researcher published MAccConc (Memory Access Concurrency), tooling for exploring possible interleavings of multithreaded test cases in the Linux kernel, available on GitHub. The tools use KCOV with ASAN outline-mode instrumentation to record per-access memory traces, enabling automatic testing of all A-B-A interleavings plus terminal and GUI explorers for manual analysis. The work targets confirming race condition candidates, building reliable regression tests, and enabling concurrency fuzzing, drawing on ideas from SKI and Ned Williamson's sockfuzzer.

Google Project Zero · 8d agoResearch1

Harnessing LLMs for Automating BOLA Detection

Unit 42's BOLABuster methodology uses LLMs to automate detection of broken object-level authorization vulnerabilities, uncovering flaws in Grafana, Harbor, and Easy!Appointments.

Palo Alto Unit 42 details BOLABuster, a methodology combining large language models with heuristics to automate detection of broken object-level authorization (BOLA) flaws, which traditional fuzzing and static analysis struggle to find. The approach uses LLM reasoning to understand application logic, map endpoint dependency relationships, and generate and interpret test cases. It found CVE-2024-1313 in Grafana, CVE-2024-22278 in Harbor, and 15 CVEs in Easy!Appointments. The team is continuing to hunt for BOLAs in open-source and internal projects.

1Password's AI patching benchmark is misleading

Trail of Bits reanalysis says 1Password's 26% AI clean-fix rate is misleading; 86% of eligible patches blocked exploits.

Trail of Bits critiques 1Password's FLAWED AI patching benchmark, arguing its 26% clean-fix headline mixes trials where agents were instructed to apply wrong fixes (22% of data) with trials that prohibited compiling or testing (36%). Restricting to reasonable conditions, 2,634 of 3,067 patches (86%) blocked the supplied exploit. Trail of Bits also reports 12.5% of 2,265 developer first fixes failed in its own 2024-2026 assessments, and released post-patch-validation and review-walkthrough agent skills.

Lobsters · security · 14h agoResearch

Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0 (1999)

Seminal 1999 USENIX study finds most novice users cannot correctly sign and encrypt email with PGP 5.0 in 90 minutes.

Whitten and Tygar's USENIX Security Symposium paper evaluates whether cryptography novices can use PGP 5.0 effectively, using cognitive walkthrough analysis and a laboratory user test. The majority of test participants failed to successfully sign and encrypt a message within 90 minutes, despite PGP 5.0 having a well-regarded graphical interface. The authors argue that security requires usability standards beyond those of general consumer software and propose domain-specific UI design principles for security. The paper is a foundational reference in usable security research.

Lobsters · security · 7d agoResearch

Phishing Research Challenges Conventional Security Awareness Testing

Pistachio's 2.47 million phishing simulations across 1,200 organizations show click rates alone mislead, with 30% of IT staff clicking and leak rates more predictive.

Between June 2025 and May 2026, Pistachio sent 2.47 million simulated phishing attempts to more than 123,000 employees at over 1,200 organizations, analyzing click, credential-leak and reporting behavior. Click rates ranged from 26% in Design to 41% in Construction; 30% of tech development and IT staff clicked at least once, while financial services were the most resilient sector. The report argues that click rate alone creates a false sense of security and that combined click, leak and report trends are better resilience indicators.

SecurityWeek · 4d agoResearch

AVP-Inspect: Coordinated Cyber-Physical Testing for Privacy Analysis of COTS Apple Vision Pro Applications

AVP-Inspect automated testing finds 58% of 324 Apple Vision Pro apps show privacy violations, with over 60% of network traffic flows undisclosed.

Researchers built AVP-Inspect, a dynamic analysis framework combining custom hardware device control, 3D UI exploration, and a unified privacy taxonomy for Apple Vision Pro. Testing 324 App Store apps for 20 minutes each found 188 (58.0%) with at least one privacy violation. More than 60% of observed network traffic flows were not properly disclosed, extending prior XR privacy work beyond Android-based devices such as Meta Quest.

arXiv cs.CR · 8d agoResearch1

338 Million Attack Simulations Reveal The State Of Enterprise Defense

Picus Labs' Blue Report 2026, from 338 million attack simulations, finds defenses strong at the perimeter but blocking only 37% of post-compromise actions.

Picus Labs' fourth annual Blue Report analyzed over 338 million attack simulations from production environments in H1 2026. Average prevention effectiveness rose from 62% to 69%, but only 37% of attacker actions were blocked after compromise, with reconnaissance and credential theft largely missed. IOC-based malware download prevention fell to 50% from 71% in 2024, and Mimikatz credential dumping from LSASS memory was blocked 94% of the time versus 17% from other memory locations and 3% from registry.

Help Net Security · Aug 12, 2026Research

Enterprise Defenses Recovered at the Edge and Collapsed Inside

Picus Labs' Blue Report 2026 finds perimeter prevention at 69% but post-compromise prevention just 37%, with reconnaissance blocked only 10% of the time.

Picus Labs' Blue Report 2026, based on 434,000+ simulated attacks across client production environments in H1 2026, found perimeter prevention effectiveness rose from 62% to 69% while the Post-Compromise Prevention Rate was only 37%. Quiet techniques fared worst: reconnaissance was blocked 10% of the time, registry-based credential access less than 1%, and the alert score stayed at 14% despite logging at a four-year high of 58%. IOC-based prevention fell to 50% from 71% in 2024, and Mimikatz's LSASS path was blocked about 94% while alternative credential-read paths went nearly undetected.

The Hacker News · Aug 12, 2026Research

Building a Linux GPU Driver for the M4 Mac Mini in One Month

Two developers built a fully OpenGL ES 3.0 compliant Linux GPU driver for the M4 Mac Mini in one month via clean-room reverse engineering.

Niklas and the author reverse engineered Apple's AGX GPU firmware ABI and user-space components in about a month, a process that normally takes years, producing an OpenGL ES 3.0 conformant driver fast enough to run Minecraft at 200fps on an M4 Mac Mini. The work was done transparently using hypervisor traces without examining Apple binaries, following clean-room practices, and included a custom shader compiler, command stream builder, and a full Linux kernel driver for the firmware ABI. The A18 Pro firmware ABI proved significantly more complex than the M1's, with 1.5x as many structs and twice as many pointers. All experiments and provenance evidence were published in public agx-re repositories.

What Zero-Day Response Should Be in the Post-Mythos Era

Picus Security outlines a zero-day response playbook where defenders simulate exploit technique chains before public PoCs exist.

The article uses PaperCut NG/MF's August incident — exploitation in the wild before any patch, with the first emergency fix bypassed the same day and a third landing September 1 — as the template for AI-accelerated vulnerability response. It walks through a hypothetical CVE-2026-1001 (explicitly made up) to argue defenders should map CVEs to ATT&CK technique chains and simulate them against NGFW, WAF, EDR, endpoint hardening, and SIEM controls within minutes of disclosure. It notes disclosure-to-exploitation time has fallen from 21.5 days to hours.

BleepingComputer · 20h agoResearch in the wildCVE-2026-1001

Efficient Branch-and-Bound Testing and Verification of zkVMs

ZEBRA verifies zkVM constraint systems via branch-and-bound cardinality counting, finding 11 zero-day bugs across five real-world zkVMs and running 51.5x faster than SMT verification.

ZEBRA reduces zkVM correctness to a solution-set cardinality problem requiring that each constraint system admit exactly one valid execution trace, eliminating redundancies like null-row padding and non-deterministic permutations before counting. It lifts analysis from finite-field witnesses to an integer interval lattice, exploiting that constraints across 5 real-world zkVMs use only 14.0% of theoretical connectivity capacity on average, enabling tight interval propagation. A parallel branch-and-bound search produces concrete counterexamples or certifies absence of violations within a bounded region. ZEBRA discovers 11 zero-day bugs (6 independently confirmed, 3 fixed), is 51.5x faster than SMT-based verification, and verifies 16.5 percentage points more instances.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

LLM-Based Penetration Testing in the Presence of Honeypots

Studies honeypot-aware budget allocation for LLM attack agents, showing detector-guided policies let agents skip deception and compromise real hosts efficiently.

The paper formalizes LLM attacker behavior against honeypots as a budgeted decision process, where agents choose to continue or skip targets when honeypot suspicion arises. A detector-guided policy lets LLM agents allocate execution budget effectively across a mixed host pool in a controlled testbed. Findings show LLM-driven attackers can reason about heterogeneous artifacts and use honeypot suspicion to guide target selection, challenging traditional deception defenses that rely on realism and obscurity against human or script-driven attackers.

arXiv cs.CR · 8d agoResearch

$536 and 8 Hours: AI Learns to Attack a Different PLC

Forescout used Claude to port a WAGO PLC exploit for $536 in 8 hours, and an AI-generated payload later permanently bricked the test device.

Forescout researchers used Claude Code with Ghidra, terminal access, and physical hardware to port CVE-2021-31886, a pre-authentication buffer overflow in the Nucleus FTP server, from a WAGO 750-852 PLC to the WAGO 750-831 without source code or debugger access. The final RCE development stage cost $535.74 in API fees over an 8-hour, 32-minute session (2.6k input and 1.3M output tokens) and required heavy researcher guidance. Claude produced working ICMP and UDP beacon exploits in 12 minutes after identifying that normal FTP command completion was overwriting its shellcode, fixed by omitting the CRLF terminator. A follow-up session extending the payloads toward a C2 implant wrote to flash-mapped memory and permanently bricked the PLC, underscoring the risks of autonomous agents operating against physical infrastructure.

Security Affairs · 13d agoResearchCVE-2021-318861

Zombie Card Attack Can Revive Expired Visa Cards for Contactless Payments

UMass Amherst researchers demonstrate Zombie Card, an NFC relay attack that revives expired Visa contactless cards for in-store purchases without breaking cryptography.

Researchers at the University of Massachusetts Amherst presented the Zombie Card attack at USENIX Security 2026, showing that Visa's Kernel 3 does not cryptographically bind the Application Expiration Date (tag 5F24) the terminal reads with the Track 2 expiry seen by the issuer. By positioning an NFC man-in-the-middle relay, an attacker can rewrite the terminal-facing expiration date of an expired card and complete contactless purchases, provided the account remains open under the same PAN and the bank does not independently re-check expiry. Testing across five major US banks found three distinct policies; Visa Kernel 3 accepted the modified date, while Mastercard, American Express, and Discover kernels declined modified transactions. Findings were disclosed to Visa and affected banks in May 2025, no CVE has been assigned, and no exploitation has been reported.

The Hacker News · 26d agoResearch

Researchers find a loophole that lets expired credit cards make unauthorized payments

UMass Amherst researchers showed at USENIX Security 2026 that NFC relay attacks can rewrite unprotected expiration dates, letting expired Visa contactless cards keep making payments.

UMass Amherst researchers presented the Zombie Card attack at USENIX Security 2026, using two smartphones to relay and modify NFC payment data from expired Visa cards. The expiration date lies outside the card's digital signature coverage in Visa Kernel 3, and one major US bank accepted $1-$500 test purchases plus live $2.79 and $3.19 purchases with rewritten dates. Mastercard, American Express, and Discover rejected tampered dates; researchers notified Visa in May 2025 and no CVE or confirmed fix existed at publication.

Help Net Security · 27d agoResearch

LG smart TVs caught logging audio with screen off and snooping on local devices

Gamers Nexus found LG smart TVs record microphone audio in standby, scan home networks, and feed LG Ad Solutions ad targeting.

A 135-minute Gamers Nexus investigation with Level1Techs and independent researchers found retail LG OLED TVs running webOS sweep local networks, gather device names and Wi-Fi metadata, and run Automated Content Recognition. Tests showed the TVs capture clean microphone audio while appearing powered down and store it offline, uploading once reconnected. The team also found RCE vulnerabilities in webOS now moving through responsible disclosure; LG claims 216 million smart TV sales, and its ad unit claims access to 363 million addressable devices in the US.